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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Previous research on the determinants of economic inequality in the wealthy democracies 
has found that differences in the size and constitution of labor unions accounts for much of 
the cross-national and over time variation in economic inequality.  Despite numerous 
theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose the contrary, most of this research assumes 
that the union effect on economic inequality is independent of the particular socio-
economic and political environment unions are situated within and the types of workers 
actually unionized.  The broad purpose of this dissertation is to push back against these 
assumptions and examine whether the union effect on economic inequality is conditioned 
by certain factors external and internal to unions. This is done through consideration of the 
four processes by which unions impact economic inequality; which I label the employer, 
intra-union, insider, and political mechanisms.  In particular, I argue that the level of 
unionization conditions the political mechanism by providing (dis)incentives for parties of 
the left and right to respond to union member preferences for government action to reduce 
economic inequalities (chapter 2); that increasing exposure to the world economy 
conditions the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms by reducing the ability and 
willingness of lower-paid union workers to extract wage gains from their employers 
(chapter 3); and that market institution and welfare state regimes indirectly condition the 
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms for female and male union workers by 
generating particular forms and levels of vertical gender occupational segregation within 
unions (chapter 4).  The empirical analyses focus on between 8 and 16 wealthy democracies 
(depending on data availability) over the final decades of the twentieth century and the first 
 vi 
 
decade of the twenty-first century.  The evidence presented suggests that we cannot 
understand the totality of the union effect on economic inequality - or on any other socio-
economic outcome - without considering each of the four mechanisms by which unions 
impact economic inequality, the many and varied ways these mechanisms are expressed, 
and how these mechanisms interact within particular contexts.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
 
General Introduction  
 
Although some degree of economic inequality1 is probably inevitable – and perhaps 
even desirable (e.g., to incentivize or reward individual effort), high levels and/or specific 
forms of economic inequality are likely to conflict with basic norms of fairness and produce 
outcomes that, according to modern liberal values at least, are suboptimal and even 
pernicious (Foster and Sen 1997).  Empirical work on the consequences of higher levels of 
economic inequality have found it to be harmful to economic growth (Stiglitz 2013); the 
survival of democratic institutions (Reenock et al. 2007; Houle 2009); the protection of 
civil liberties and private property (Landman and Larizza 2009; Fails 2012); tolerance 
toward minorities (Andersen and Fetner 2008); political engagement (Solt 2008; Pontusson 
and Rueda 2010; Anderson and Baramendi 2012); the responsiveness of politicians to 
citizen preferences (Ellis 2013; Rigby and Wright 2013); trust in individuals and the 
government (Rothstein and Uslaner 2005; Anderson and Singer 2008); and even overall 
public health (Ghobarah et al. 2004; Wilkinson and Pickett 2009).  Perhaps less worrisome, 
but highly significant nonetheless, are findings that higher levels of economic inequality 
increase ideological, political party, and class polarization (McCarty et al. 2006; Garanda 
2010; Newman et al. 2015); the positive evaluation of the role of religion in politics 
                                            
1 Economic inequality is defined here as differences across a particular population in access to, or control 
over, monetary resources or certain factors of production.  This definition is a slightly modified version of 
that provided by Jenkins (1991). 
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(Karakoç and Başkan 2012); nationalist sentiment (Shayo 2009; Solt 2011); and support 
among the poor for radical right-wing political parties (Han forthcoming). In short, in 
addition to its inherent moral implications, economic inequality matters for a host of 
important socio-economic and political outcomes. 
Labor unions (also referred to as trade unions; hereafter unions) are organizations 
consisting primarily of wage earners and dedicated to improving the economic well-being 
of their members – and, at times, certain non-union members - through the exertion of 
pressure on employers and policymakers.2  This exertion of pressure takes many forms, 
from economic strikes (targeted at particular firms or industries) to general strikes (targeted 
at government) to information and political campaigns (targeted at union members and the 
wider public) to lobbying efforts (targeted at particular political parties, politicians, or 
bureaucrats) to simple hard-nosed bargaining tactics (targeted primarily at employers) 
(e.g., see Leighley and Nagler 2007; Anzia 2011; Avdagic et al. 2011; Iversen and Soskice 
2011; Hamann et al. 2013).  By substituting collective action for separate individual action 
(McLean 1996), unions are often able to gain concessions from employers and/or 
policymakers (or install their preferred employers and policymakers) through these 
methods, and thus have a substantial impact on numerous national level outcomes.  These 
include, but are certainly not limited to, tax structures (Swank 2006; Beramendi and Rueda 
2007; Plümper et al. 2009), social insurance policies (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2006; 
Nijhuis 2009), economic growth (Durham 2004; Hall and Gingerich 2009), unemployment 
                                            
2 This is a slightly modified version of the definitions provided by Webb and Webb (1920) and Bennett and 
Kaufman (2007). 
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(Mares 2004; Baccaro and Diego Rei 2007; Bradley and Stephens 2007), and, of course, 
economic inequality.  
The Union Effect on Economic Inequality 
    
One of the few areas of broad consensus in the comparative political economy 
literature has been that differences in union strength account for much of the cross-national 
and over-time variation in economic inequality in the wealthy democracies, with stronger 
unions resulting in less economic inequality (Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; 
Freeman and Oostendorp 2000; Kahn 2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Alderson and 
Nielsen 2002; Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004; Golden and 
Londregan 2006; Oliver 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009; Martin and Swank 2012).  
However, there has been less consensus on how, exactly, unions achieve this effect.  Each 
of the major academic branches and theoretical traditions in comparative political economy 
has argued that unions impact economic inequality through one or more of four (non-
mutually exclusive) processes; or what I label here the employer, intra-union, insider, and 
political mechanisms.  The employer mechanism is emphasized in the power resource 
theory (PRT) literature and refers to unions’ ability to extract wage and other 
compensation-related concessions from employers (Stephens 1980; Korpi 1985); the intra-
union mechanism is emphasized in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) and economics 
literature and refers to the tendency of unions to compress wages among their own 
members (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; 
Card et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007; Hall and Thelen 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2010); the 
insider mechanism is emphasized primarily in the economics literature and refers to the 
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(positive or negative) externalities that result from the costs associated with collective 
bargaining (e.g., higher wages for non-union members or elevated levels of 
unemployment) (Friedman 1962; Freeman 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Rueda and 
Pontusson 2000; Wallerstein and Western 2000; Card et al. 2003; Rosenfeld and Western 
2012); and the political mechanism is emphasized in PRT and the insider-outsider model 
and refers to the ability of unions to (successfully) pressure governments to implement 
policies that have consequences for economic inequality (e.g., employment protections and 
particularly designed social insurance policies) (Esping-Andersen 1990; Rueda 2007; 
Bacarro 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009; Ellis 2013).   
Despite a long-standing (and unstated) agreement across the major academic 
branches and theoretical traditions that the net effect of the employer, intra-union, insider, 
and political mechanisms is to reduce economic inequality, a number of recent studies have 
found the size and significance of the union effect on economic inequality to vary across 
countries and over time (Baccaro 2008; Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Beecher and 
Pontusson 2011; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013). More specifically, these 
studies have generally found the union effect on economic inequality to have diminished, 
on average, across the wealthy democracies since at least the 1990s.3  The explanation 
provided for this finding varies.  One claim is that it is the result of a less effective employer 
mechanism, or unions losing the ability to extract substantial wage gains from their 
employers.  The argument here is that greater economic globalization, particularly trade 
                                            
3 The one exception to this is Scheve and Stasavage (2009). In their analysis of the determinants of the 
proportion of total income shares held by top earners over the course of most of the twentieth century, these 
authors find that the effect of union density has diminished in recent decades but that the effect of the level 
of wage bargaining has grown.  
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with less developed countries (LDCs), has produced wage pressures that increasingly weak 
unions have been unable to resist (Golden and Wallerstein 2011).  Another claim is that 
the diminished union effect is the result of a less effective intra-union mechanism, or lesser-
paid union members extracting fewer wage gains relative to higher-paid union members as 
they did in the past.  There have been two different but related reasons given for this 
phenomenon.   First, in response to membership losses, unions in the manufacturing sector 
increasingly support employer efforts to decouple wage developments in the 
manufacturing and service sectors (Pontusson 2013).  Second, economic globalization and 
technological change have changed how wage bargaining institutions function, as the 
former reduces demand for less skilled (and lower-paid) union members and the latter 
increases demand for more skilled (and better-paid) union members (Baccaro 2008).  Still 
others claim that the diminished union effect is the result of a more potent insider 
mechanism, or a growing wage gap between union and non-union members. The argument 
here is that unions increasingly consist of workers that are better-paid than most non-union 
members.  This condition also has implications for the political mechanism, as better-paid 
union members support inequality-reducing social insurance transfers less than lesser-paid 
union members (Becher and Pontusson 2011).  Some recent scholarship on labor markets 
and the welfare state also alludes to a weakened or altered political mechanism.  For 
example, Mares (2004) argues that union members become less likely to practice wage 
restraint as taxes on labor rise and social insurance policies become increasingly targeted 
at non-union members; and Kwon and Pontusson (2010) find that left governments 
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increase social insurance spending less relative to center and right governments when union 
strength is declining; a condition that currently exists in nearly all wealthy democracies.4    
If unions no longer reduce economic inequality to the same extent as in the past, 
then this necessarily implies that unions’ indirect effect on the socio-economic and political 
outcomes associated with greater economic inequality has also diminished.  Furthermore, 
it suggests that the direct union effect on other macro-level outcomes – such as 
unemployment and inflation – is changing as well.  Why has the union effect on economic 
inequality diminished?  Or, more precisely, why does the union effect on economic 
inequality vary across countries and over time?  The broad purpose of this dissertation is 
to provide some preliminary answers to these questions by considering how the union 
effect on economic inequality is conditioned by certain features of the environment that 
unions operate within as well as particular union characteristics.   
How the Dissertation is Organized 
  
Each of the three core chapters in this dissertation is dedicated to examining a 
conditional union effect on income or wage inequality through consideration of how a 
particular factor or factors external or internal to unions influence the employer, intra-
union, insider, and/or political mechanisms.   
In chapter 2, I examine how the level of unionization determines the responsiveness 
of particular partisan governments to union member preferences for less economic 
inequality.  Scholars have long argued that partisanship matters for income inequality 
                                            
4 A political mechanism-based explanation for the diminished union effect on income inequality is also 
provided by Jacobs and Myers (2014), but their analysis focuses exclusively on the United States. 
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because left governments favor government action to reduce economic inequalities more 
than center or right governments (e.g., see Esping-Andersen 1990 and Korpi and Palme 
2003).  However, many other scholars have claimed that partisanship does not matter for 
income inequality (or most other socio-economic outcomes) because environmental 
factors, including voter sentiments and political institutions, frequently prohibit politicians 
from pursuing their first-order policy preferences (e.g., see Kitschelt 1994; Pierson 2001; 
Beckfield 2006).  Both the “partisanship matters” and the “partisanship does not matter” 
viewpoints have found empirical support in studies examining the determinants of income 
inequality across the wealthy democracies (Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004; Scheve and 
Stasavage 2009; Mahler et al. 2013).  I argue that these inconsistent findings are at least 
partly the result of scholars not properly modeling the relationship between unionization 
and the partisan composition of government. If we accept that union members favor greater 
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members 
(Iversen 2001; Checchi et al. 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2011), politicians desire to hold 
elected office and be popular but also to implement particular public policies (Muller and 
Strom 1999), and left party politicians share union members’ policy preferences to a greater 
extent than center and right party politicians (Esping-Andersen 1990; Kwon and Pontusson 
2010), then partisan differences should be greatest at moderate levels of unionization, a 
condition that allows all politicians to pursue their policy preferences while maintaining 
electoral viability.  The empirical analysis in this chapter examines 16 wealthy democracies 
between 1970 and 2010. The results of error-correction models confirm the theoretical 
expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or proportional 
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representation electoral system.  These findings suggest that the impact of declining 
unionization on political and socio-economic outcomes will depend on the level of 
unionization from which a country is falling from and that electoral outcomes only have 
consequences for economic inequality under certain (relatively limited) conditions. 
In chapter 3, I examine how economic globalization influences the ability and 
willingness of particular types of union members to extract wage gains from their 
employers. Although scholars have speculated as to the possible causes of the decline in 
the union effect on wage inequality since the 1990s, a comprehensive theory explaining it 
has not been crafted or tested.   I argue that economic globalization – or increasing exposure 
of states to the world economy – reduces the ability and willingness of traditionally lower-
paid union workers (in sectors and occupations substantially exposed to international 
competition) to extract wage gains from their employers while having no such effect on 
the ability and willingness of traditionally higher-paid union workers (in sectors and 
occupations relatively sheltered from international competition).  This results in greater 
earnings dispersion between traditionally lower-paid union workers and employers, 
traditionally lower-paid union workers and traditionally higher-paid union workers, and 
low-paid non-union workers and employers.  The empirical analysis in this chapter 
primarily focuses on 8 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010, although three 
additional countries are examined as well.  The results of error-correction models 
demonstrate that as a state becomes more exposed to the world economy, the union effect 
on the level of wage inequality declines (and perhaps even reverses for the lower half of 
the wage distribution); but that the union effect on the “structure” of wage inequality (or 
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the extent to which the upper half of the wage distribution is more compressed than the 
lower half) grows.  This finding suggests that the meaning of the “the union effect on wage 
inequality” depends on which aspects of wage inequality are being considered; and 
increasingly changes as economic globalization proceeds.  A more general implication is 
that the union effect on economic inequality is likely influenced by a range of other factors 
– such as those relating to the partisan or ideological orientation of government and public 
opinion – that alter the bargaining power of (some) employers relative to (some) union 
members.  
In chapter 4, I examine how gender occupational segregation among union 
members influences the female union effect on female wage inequality and the male union 
effect on male wage inequality.  Although numerous scholars have acknowledged the 
decline in union strength in recent decades and its likely consequences for wage inequality, 
few have explored whether certain types of union workers have experienced a more 
substantial decline than others; and whether any such divergence has had consequences for 
wage inequality.  Of particular interest is evidence that male union strength has weakened 
substantially more than female union strength; and that a large and growing share of union 
members are women as a result.5  All else being equal, this suggests that aggregate union 
decline has contributed more to a rise in male wage inequality than female wage inequality.  
Yet different degrees and types of gender occupational segregation across liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) as well as liberal, 
conservative, and social democratic welfare states, suggests that all else might not be equal 
                                            
5 Data on female and male union membership are presented in Chapter 4. 
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(Sainsbury 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; Chang 2000; Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005; 
Estevez-Abe 2006).  I argue that a particularly large number of professionals among female 
union members in LMEs (with liberal welfare states) means that the female union effect is 
likely to be smaller than the male union effect within that regime; and that a particularly 
large number of workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations among female union 
members in CMEs with conservative welfare states means that the female union effect is 
likely to be larger than the male union effect within that regime.  In other words, the size 
of the female union effect relative to the male union effect is indirectly conditional on 
market institution and welfare state type.  The empirical analysis in this chapter focuses on 
15 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010.  The results of error-correction models 
confirm the theoretical expectations, although differences between the female and male 
union effects across the regimes are generally larger than those between the female and 
male union effects within each regime.  These findings suggest that the occupational 
composition of union members is critical to explaining the union effect on economic 
inequality; and that the consequences that aggregate union decline has on economic 
inequality in general and gender economic inequality in particular depends (indirectly) on 
the market institution and welfare state regime that such union decline is happening within. 
In the fifth and final chapter, I summarize the main empirical and theoretical 
contributions of each of the core chapters and the dissertation as a whole; discuss three 
important factors that were omitted from the preceding chapters – employer organizations, 
wealth inequality, and conceptions of economic inequality that incorporate consumption 
and/or non-paid non-market work; provide suggestions on how to incorporate these omitted 
 11 
 
factors into future research on labor unions and economic inequality; outline a potentially 
promising research agenda that focuses on unions as an effect rather than unions as a cause; 
and offer some reflections on how union weakening may ironically be leading to the 
growing popularity of redistributive public policies and, eventually, stronger workers’ 
movements as well.  
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CHAPTER II 
UNIONIZATION AND THE PARTISAN EFFECT ON INCOME 
INEQUALITY 
  
Introduction 
 
Do left governments reduce income inequality6 relative to center and right 
governments?  The expectation that partisanship should matter for income inequality arises 
somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political party typology, whereby left parties 
are defined as those favoring government intervention to reduce economic inequalities; and 
center and right parties are defined as those favoring either less government intervention 
in the economy generally, or government intervention that maintains or exacerbates 
economic inequalities (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lijphart 1997; 
Korpi 2002; Korpi and Palme 2003).7  The expectation that partisanship should not matter 
for income inequality arises out of the recognition that environmental factors, including 
voter sentiments and political institutions, frequently prohibit politicians from pursuing 
their first-order policy preferences (Kitschelt 1994; Pierson 2001; Beckfield 2006).8   Both 
the “partisanship matters” and the “partisanship does not matter” viewpoints have found 
empirical support in studies that have examined the determinants of income inequality 
                                            
6 In this article, the term “income” encompasses wages, other market (pre-tax and pre-transfer) income such 
as rents and capital gains, and government transfers such as means-tested benefits and pensions.   
7 Two assumptions in this article are that politicians consciously pursue a policy based on its likely outcome 
and, once implemented, a policy typically results in that expected outcome.   
8 A “first-order preference” is defined here as an actor’s (not necessarily revealed) “ideal point”, or the 
particular option an actor would choose under minimal external constraints. This can be contrasted with 
“revealed preferences”, or the choices that are made by actors within a particular environmental context, 
frequently as a result of practical or pragmatic concerns.  In the theoretical argument outlined here, left party 
politicians are assumed to possess a greater first-order preference for government intervention to reduce 
economic inequalities than center and right party politicians (Korpi 2002, 2006).  The question, therefore, is 
under what political conditions such politicians are able to pursue these preferences to a greater or lesser 
degree. 
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across wealthy democracies (Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 2004; 
Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Mahler et al. 2013).   
What explains the inconsistent findings of partisan effects on income inequality?  I 
argue that one part of the explanation is the difference in unionization levels across 
countries and over time.  Although many scholars acknowledge the strongly symbiotic 
relationship between unions and particular political parties, surprisingly few model such a 
relationship when they empirically examine the determinants of income inequality.  
Instead, partisan effects are assumed to be constant across space and time, despite the 
scholarly consensus that parties strategically adapt to their environment in general and to 
union movements in particular (Kitschelt 1994; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Simoni 2013).  
When partisanship has been argued to be conditional on union presence,9 scholars have 
tended to assume that this union impact is exclusively through left parties (Pontusson et al. 
2002; Kwon and Pontusson 2010; Golden and Wallerstein 2011).  This is understandable 
given the historical connection between unions and left parties and their similar first-order 
preferences on matters relating to economic inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-
Andersen 1999). However, if union members have a stronger preference for government 
intervention to reduce economic inequalities than non-union members (Iversen 2001; 
Checchi et al. 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2011), politicians have policy preferences but also 
desire to hold elected office and be popular (Muller and Strom 1999), and left party 
                                            
9 A country’s degree of union presence can be measured in numerous ways, including by union density (the 
proportion of workers that belong to a union), union coverage (the proportion of workers that are covered by 
a collective bargaining agreement, whether or not the workers are union members), or the level of wage 
bargaining (the primary level at which unions and employers negotiate over compensation) (Visser and 
Checchi 2009).    
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politicians share union-member policy preferences to a greater extent than center and right 
party politicians, then left party politicians should see higher unionization levels as an 
opportunity to pursue their first-order policy preferences and lower unionization levels as 
necessitating consenting to non-union member preferences.  Likewise, center and right 
party politicians should see lower unionization levels as an opportunity to pursue their first-
order policy preferences and higher unionization levels as necessitating consenting to union 
member preferences.  In other words, an environmental condition that acts to constrain 
politicians from one political party simultaneously acts to enable politicians from another.  
These expectations imply that the anticipated negative effect of left government on income 
inequality is likely to diminish as we reach relatively low and relatively high levels of 
unionization, conditions in which left party politicians and center and right party 
politicians, respectively, have to veil their first-order preferences in order to remain 
electorally viable. Stated another way, the partisan effect on income inequality is likely to 
grow as we reach relatively moderate levels of unionization. 
To assess whether unionization rates condition the partisan effect on income 
inequality in a non-linear manner, I employ data on net income inequality from 16 wealthy 
democracies over the years 1970 to 2010.  The evidence I present suggests that countries 
with lower and higher levels of unionization experience less of a partisan effect on income 
inequality than countries with moderate levels of unionization.  This result holds regardless 
of whether a country has a majoritarian or proportional representation (PR) electoral 
system, although a country’s electoral system does influence at what level of unionization 
partisanship matters more or less for income inequality.  This article is divided into six 
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sections.  The first section discusses how public policy may act to decrease or increase 
income inequality.  The second and third sections place the theoretical expectations 
outlined above within the context of the existing literature.  The fourth section details the 
methods and variables used in the analysis.  The fifth section report the results of the 
empirical analysis and the sixth section provides a discussion of the findings.  
Public Policy and Income Inequality 
 
Income inequality can be described as arising from a two-stage distributional 
process (Kelly 2009; Morgan and Kelly 2013).  The first stage consists of those factors that 
lead to the “pre-tax and pre-transfer” distribution of income, while the second stage 
consists of those tax and spend policies that alter this distribution and replace it with the 
“post-tax and post-transfer” distribution of income.  The change in income inequality from 
the first stage to the second stage of the distributional process is typically termed 
“redistribution” (Bradley et al. 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2006).  Redistributive policies 
may entail taxing the rich and providing cash benefits to the poor or taxing the employed 
and providing cash benefits to those without employment, but it also may include 
publically financed and managed social insurance, such as pensions, in which individuals 
at least partially finance their own benefits (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Moene and 
Wallerstein 2003; Pennings 2013).  Redistributive policies may also include any 
government transfer that is financed through more diffuse and regressive means, such as 
with a general sales tax (Prasad and Deng 2009). 
Given that governments are able to choose more or less progressive methods of 
financing redistributive policies, as well as the specific individuals or households that will 
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benefit from government transfers, it is by no means certain, a priori, that “redistribution” 
reduces income inequality from before taxes and transfers to after taxes and transfers.  The 
issue becomes further complicated by the fact that the “pre-tax and pre-transfer” 
distribution of income is itself dependent on redistributive policies.  For example, long-
term unemployment benefits may encourage individuals to remain outside of the labor 
market (and thus earn zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income) or generous public pensions 
may crowd out private pensions or encourage early retirement (and thus, again, produce 
greater numbers of individuals with zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income) (Esping-
Andersen 2009; Bradley and Stephens 2012).  On the other hand, redistributive policies 
may also increase pre-tax and pre-transfer incomes by raising the “reservation wage” and 
thus inducing employers to offer higher wages (Golden and Wallerstein 2011).  These 
higher wages, however, are also likely to increase the cost of business and thus may result 
in elevated levels of unemployment, once again producing a greater stock of individuals 
earning zero pre-tax and pre-transfer income (Boix 1998).  
In order to examine whether the net effect of redistributive policies is to increase or 
decrease income inequality, Figure 1 plots redistribution10 by pre-tax and pre-transfer 
(“market”) income inequality and post-tax and post-transfer (“net”) income inequality in 
16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and 2010 for all available country-years.  A clear 
positive relationship emerges in the plot containing redistribution and market income 
inequality (r=.5412), suggesting that redistributive policies do tend to increase “pre-tax and 
pre-transfer” income inequality.  However, a clear negative relationship emerges in the plot  
                                            
10 Redistribution is arrived at by way of the equation provided by Iversen et al. (2006):  [(market income 
inequality – net income inequality)/market income inequality)]*100.  Data provided by Solt (2009).   
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Figure 1. Bivariate Correlations of Redistribution and Market (Net) Income 
Inequality in 16 rich democracies for all available country-years between 1970 and 
2010 
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containing redistribution and net income inequality (r=-.6615), with higher (lower) levels 
of redistribution clearly associated with lower (higher) levels of net income inequality.  
Given that post-tax and post-transfer income inequality is the result of both the first and 
second stages of the distributional process, this suggests that the net effect of redistributive 
policies is to reduce income inequality. 
Such explicitly redistributive policies are not the only method at the disposal of 
governments if they wish to impact income inequality.  Governments may engage more 
directly in the first stage of the distributional process and implement policies that determine 
the distribution of “pre-tax and pre-transfer” income.  Most obviously, governments can 
enact a minimum wage, expand public sector employment, or increase public sector wages 
(Pontusson et al. 2002; Rueda 2008).  In addition, governments can actively encourage and 
facilitate (private or public sector) employment (so called “active labor market policies”) 
or invest in education or worker training, which act to improve the skills of the labor force 
and thus increase workers’ market earning potential (Huo et al. 2008; Bradley and Stephens 
2012).  There are countless other government policies that may impact the distribution of 
“market” incomes, from trade agreements, to (lack of) restrictions on capital flows, to 
taxation and employment regulations (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Burgoon 2001; 
Reuveny and Li 2003; Beckfield 2006; Koske et al. 2014). 
 
Partisanship and Income Inequality 
 
Given that governments have a plethora of policies at their disposal to impact the 
distribution of income, one would expect the partisan orientation of government to matter 
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for income inequality. After all, parties of the left are typically defined as those favoring 
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities, while parties of the center and 
right are defined as those favoring either less government intervention in the economy 
generally, or government intervention that maintains or exacerbates economic inequalities 
(Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Lijphart 1997; Korpi 2002; Korpi and 
Palme 2003).  Thus, we would anticipate left party electoral success to be associated with 
lower levels of market and net income inequality and higher levels of redistribution than 
center or right party electoral success.  However, the empirical evidence is notably mixed.  
In their examination of market income inequality across wealthy democracies over the 
twentieth century, Scheve and Stasavage (2009) found a modest negative effect of left 
government on the share of national income held by the top 1 percent of income earners, 
but no such partisan effect on the share of national income held by the top 10 percent of 
income earners.  In one of the few cross-national studies of wealthy democracies that 
focuses on the determinants of both pre-tax and pre-transfer income inequality and 
redistribution, Bradley et al. (2003) found no partisan effect on the former but the 
anticipated positive effect of left government on the latter.  Given the clear negative 
association between redistribution and net income inequality that we observed in Figure 1, 
this finding would lead us to expect a negative association between left government and 
post-tax and post-transfer income inequality.  Yet in one of the few cross-national studies 
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examining the determinants of such inequality across wealthy democracies,11 Mahler 
(2004) found no such partisan effect.12 
One explanation for absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality or 
redistribution is the difficulty any partisan government has in making major changes to the 
public sector and existing welfare state policies due to political pressure from voters and 
interest groups (Pierson 2001; Mahler et al. 2013).  However, this explanation is 
unsatisfying given the plethora of public sector and welfare state reforms across rich 
democracies in recent decades (Clayton and Pontusson 1998; Allan and Scruggs 2004) and 
the growing body of evidence that partisan governments are not systematically punished 
for engaging in welfare state retrenchment (Wenzelburger 2014).  A likelier explanation 
for absent or inconsistent partisan effects is that, over time, common underlying forces or 
processes push most political parties in the same ideological direction; or, similarly, result 
in “waves” of party convergence and divergence (Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Kwon and 
Pontusson 2010).  In other words, partisan behavior is not driven solely (or primarily) by 
the inherent programmatic differences between party families or relatively constant 
constituent preferences, but by parties’ changing environmental contexts (Mahler 2004).  
If this is correct, then absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality would be 
                                            
11 Bradley et al. (2003) and Mahler (2004) use a Gini coefficient as their measure for income inequality.  
Unlike the income share data utilized by Stasavage and Scheve (2009), Gini coefficients consider the entire 
income distribution.  This may or may not have practical empirical implications.  A change in the share of 
national income going to the top 1 percent of households will be apparent with both measures.  However, a 
change in the share of national income going to households representing a particular subgroup within the top 
1 percent (e.g., the top .1 percent) may only be reflected in the Gini coefficient. 
12 Empirical results are similarly mixed in examinations of wage or earnings inequality (e.g., see Wallerstein 
1999; Pontusson, Rueda, and Way 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Martin and Swank 2012).  This is 
not surprising given that individual labor income inequality accounts for most of the variation in household 
market income inequality (Hoeller et al. 2014). 
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the result of politicians’ shifting (revealed) preferences, which at times produce a partisan 
consensus for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities or (at other 
times) produce a partisan consensus for less government intervention to reduce economic 
inequalities.   
Politicians’ Preferences and Partisan Behavior 
 
If the absent or inconsistent partisan effects on income inequality are the result of 
trending environmental factors that pressure most or all political parties to drift in the same 
ideological direction and if these environmental factors consistently impact partisan 
behavior in the same manner over time, then there are at least two reasons for us to expect 
these factors to result in an increase in partisanship in some circumstances and a decrease 
in partisanship in other circumstances.  First, while it is reasonable to suppose that most 
politicians want to hold elected office and be popular, politicians from different party 
families are likely to have divergent preferences regarding the size, scope, and role of 
government, and consequently the type of public policies they would prefer to implement.  
In other words, most politicians are simultaneously “office-seeking”, “vote-seeking”, and 
“policy-seeking” (Laver and Schofield 1990; Muller and Strom 1999).  Second, each party 
family has a different base of electoral support.  While politicians’ policy agenda may not 
perfectly reflect that favored by their constituents, it is likely to be more representative of 
their constituents’ preferences than that of parties representing other voters with different 
preferences (Dalton 1985; Bartels 2008; Adams and Ezrow 2009).  In short, even if all 
politicians and party families experience a common external stimuli that pushes them 
towards implementing particular public policies, their divergent preferences and 
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constituencies are likely to lead them to resist (or exploit) this pressure more or less 
(Plümper et al. 2009). 
Although early work that explored candidate preferences assumed that politicians 
were exclusively office- or vote-seeking and were able to change their policy positions to 
appeal to the pivotal voter with relative ease (Downs 1957), more recent work has 
acknowledged that politicians, like most political activists, have their own policy 
preferences (Wittman 1983; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989); and that politicians’ ability to 
shift their positions for electoral purposes is constrained by party activists (Kitschelt 1994; 
Moon 2004). This more sophisticated characterization of politicians’ preferences and 
behavior suggests that political leaders are likely to desire to seek to mobilize and exploit 
their activist base (which presumably shares their policy preferences) when it is large 
enough and strong enough to be a benefit electorally (as this will assist the politicians in 
both winning elected office and implementing their preferred policies), but attempt to 
dislodge themselves from this activist base when it is a hindrance to their electoral 
prospects (as this will at least provide the politicians with the opportunity to be successful 
electorally). 
Labor Unions and Parties of the Left 
 
Parties of the center and right have traditionally found their largest base of activist 
support and a reservoir of potential political leaders among employers and the (upper) 
middle class.  By contrast, parties of the left have traditionally found their largest base of 
activist support and a reservoir of potential political leaders among working class wage 
laborers and the poor (Duverger 1990; Ware 1996).  Micro studies have consistently found 
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members of the latter group to have a stronger preference for economic inequality reduction 
than the former group (Corneo and Gruner 2002; Alesina and Giuliano 2009; Pontusson 
2013).  While there are numerous types of political resource theories, each emphasizing 
different actors, actions, or institutions, nearly all postulate that political influence 
increases as the result of larger (informal or formal) membership numbers and sustained 
collective action.13  Since the traditional left party constituency is numerically larger than 
that of the center or right, there would appear to be a natural advantage for parties of the 
left within a democratic context. However, this advantage is substantially hampered as a 
result of the low levels of political knowledge and market resources within these left party 
constituencies (Korpi and Palme 2003; Iversen and Soskice 2011) and the collective action 
problems that arise with large, diverse groups (Rudra 2002). 
Labor unions have played a critical role in overcoming such challenges faced by 
left parties, acting to educate and organize these parties’ natural constituencies.  There is a 
broad scholarly consensus that, even controlling for income, union members have a greater 
preference for economic inequality reduction and generous social spending than non-union 
members (Iversen 2001; Checchi et al. 2007; Pontusson 2013); and that greater union 
presence translates into lower levels of wage and income inequality (e.g., see Wallerstein 
1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler et al. 2013). The negative 
association between union presence and wage and income inequality is primarily explained 
by reference to the ability of unions to extract compensation-related concessions from 
employers, the tendency of unions to compress the earnings distribution within their 
                                            
13 By definition, political resource theories “share a focus on the empowering role of resources for the 
realization of outcomes that advance actors' perceived interests” (Hicks and Misra 1993, 61). 
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membership (as well as for others covered by collectively bargained contracts),14 and union 
support for a redistributive public policy agenda (Bacarro 2008; Visser and Checchi 2009).  
This latter, indirect union effect is typically assumed to work through left government, with 
a country needing both strong left parties and strong labor unions to construct a 
comprehensive, universalistic welfare state, and therefore lower levels of income 
inequality (Esping-Andersen 1990; Esping-Andersen 1999; Kwon and Pontusson 2010; 
Simoni 2013). 
When acknowledging the conditional relationship between partisan behavior and 
union presence, scholars tend to make one of two arguments.  Either unions and left parties 
are complements, and thus greater unionization increases partisanship by moving left 
parties to the left (Kwon and Pontusson 2010); or unions and left parties are substitutes, 
with the latter engaging in greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities 
when unions are weak (Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011).  These 
seemingly contradictory arguments rest on the same underlying assumption; that 
politicians are primarily “policy-seeking”.15  The first argument implies that no matter how 
many voters are unionized, center or right party politicians will not appeal to union member 
preferences for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities.  The 
second argument implies that left party politicians will respond more to union member 
                                            
14 Union negotiated wages may also “spillover” to workers not explicitly covered by a collectively bargained 
contract if non-unionized firms voluntarily abide by such agreements (Rueda and Pontusson 2000). 
15 Scholars within the policy-seeking tradition “implicitly (assume) that the ultimate outcomes that flow 
from…policies matter to (politicians)” (Muller and Strom 1999, 8). 
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preferences for greater government intervention to reduce economic inequalities as the 
number of voters that are unionized declines.16   
If we maintain the assumption that politicians are policy-seeking, but accept that 
they are substantially office- and vote-seeking as well (an assumption underlying most of 
the work on political party behavior), then we deviate from both the “left party as 
complement” and the “left party as substitute” to unions theses.  Instead, we are lead to 
expect the union effect on partisan behavior to be conditioned by the overall level of 
unionization. Higher levels of unionization should create an incentive for all office- and 
vote-seeking politicians, no matter their partisan persuasion, to appeal to union member 
preferences, while lower levels of unionization should create a disincentive for such 
politicians to appeal to union member preferences.  However, given that left party 
politicians are likelier to share union members’ first-order preferences regarding 
government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than center or right party 
politicians, we can expect them to respond to union member preferences “sooner” (at lower 
levels of unionization) than center or right party politicians. In other words, pragmatic 
politicians seek an opportunity to simultaneously pursue their first-order policy preferences 
and attain or hold elected office.  This expectation suggests that at low levels of 
                                            
16 It is possible that union member preferences for government intervention to reduce economic inequalities 
increase as unionization declines and union organizations become weaker.  However, this still leaves open 
the question as to why an organization that must achieve electoral success to survive (a left leaning political 
party) and whose members (politicians) desire to hold elected office and be popular would appeal just as 
much to the preferences of a weaker union movement as they did to a stronger union movement.   Another 
possibility is a more complex causal chain in which a decline in union presence precipitates an increase in 
economic inequality, which then leads to greater demand (among non-union members) for government action 
to reduce economic inequalities.  While there are strong theoretical reasons to anticipate a positive association 
between economic inequality and a preference for redistribution, the empirical evidence has been notably 
mixed (e.g., see Moene and Wallerstein 2003; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Kelly and Enns 2010).   
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unionization, no pragmatic politician will appeal to union member preferences, but at high 
levels of unionization, all pragmatic politicians will appeal to union member preferences.  
However, at more moderate levels of unionization, a circumstance in which left, center, 
and right party politicians may substantially reveal their first-order preferences and still 
maintain electoral viability, pragmatic left party politicians will appeal to union member 
preferences, while pragmatic center and right party politicians will not. This leads us to the 
central hypothesis of this article: 
 
Hypothesis:  The negative effect of left government on income inequality is likely to increase 
(decrease) as unionization approaches relatively moderate (low or high) levels 
 
Thus far we have focused on the incentives for pragmatic politicians to appeal to 
union member preferences.  What is crucial for the partisan effect on income inequality, 
however, is not mere rhetorical appeals, but actual government policy.  If party policy 
positions tend to reflect the policy preferences of those voters within their electoral 
coalition, a crucial link between union member preferences and partisan behavior is the 
extent to which a political party depends on union members for votes.17  The above 
argument implies that no major political party will substantially depend on union member 
votes in weakly unionized countries, only left parties will do so in moderately unionized 
                                            
17 There is an ongoing scholarly debate regarding whether politicians are more responsive to the general 
electorate or partisan constituencies (Ezrow et al. 2011).  However, this research has largely focused on 
relatively short-term shifts in public opinion and political rhetoric more than actual government policies 
(Adams 2012).  Analyses focusing less on change and more on the general correspondence between the issue 
positions of party elites and those party’s voters find a significant correlation between the two (Dalton 1985; 
Iversen 1994).   
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countries, and all major political parties will do so in highly unionized countries.  In order 
to explore whether this is indeed the case, Table 1 uses European Values Study (EVS) and 
World Value Survey (WVS) data to examine the proportion of each major political party’s 
voters that are union members in the years 1981 to 2008 in 14 wealthy democracies.18  The 
countries are listed in descending order based on the average level of unionization in the 
country during the examined period.   
As conventional wisdom would anticipate, across all countries left parties depend 
on union member votes more than their main center and right party competitors.19 The only 
partial exception to this is in Belgium, where the left is fractured along ethnic lines.  Here, 
the centrist Christian People’s Party20 relies more on union member votes than the 
Francophone Socialists, but less than the Flemish Socialists. However, the degree to which 
political parties depend on union member votes in absolute terms and relative to their main 
party competitors varies significantly across countries.   In the two most weakly unionized 
countries, France and the United States, and the moderately unionized Italy, union 
members comprise less than 13 percent of the voters of all major political parties.  By 
contrast, in the four most heavily unionized countries, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and 
Norway, union members comprise more than 30 percent of the voters of all major political 
parties.  In fact, union members comprise more than 40 percent and 50 percent of the voters  
                                            
18 The EVS/WVS asks respondents whether they belong to a trade union (variable a067) and which political 
party they would vote for if the election were held tomorrow (variable e179).   
19 This analysis uses the party families outlined in the Comparative Manifestos Project. “Left” parties are 
those coded as belonging to the “Social Democratic” party family, while “center” or “right” parties are those 
coded as belonging to the “Agrarian”, “Liberal”, “Christian Democratic”, or “Conservative” party families.  
Center and right parties that received at least 10 percent of the vote in two or more elections during the 1981-
2008 period (and for which data is available) are included in the analysis. 
20 The Christian People’s Party changed its name to the Christian Democratic and Flemish Party in 2001. 
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Table 1. Proportion of Left, Center, and Right Party Voters that are Union Members, 
1981-2008 
 
Country Union Density† 
Union 
Members as % 
of Left Vote  
Union Members 
as  % of Non-Left 
Vote 
Left-Center (Right) 
Ratio 
          
France 
10.2 
6.8                               
(Socialists) 
3.4                                  
(UMP) 
2.0 
US 
14.7 
12.1                          
(Democrats) 
8.8                                   
(Republicans) 
1.4 
Netherlands 
24.6 
28.6                             
(PVDA) 
14.1                                
(VVD) 
2.0 
Germany 
28.7 
26.3                    
(SPD) 
15.2                            
(CDU/CSU) 
1.7 
Canada 
31.9 
19.8                                
(NDP) 
11.7                           
(Liberals) 
1.7 
  
  
  
10.8                 
(Progressive 
Conservative) 
1.8 
UK†† 
36.1 
15.9             
(Labour) 
8                                  
(Conservatives) 
2.0 
Italy 
38.2 
10                                  
(PSI) 
4.8                                  
(Forza Italia) 
2.1 
  
  
10                                                
(SDI)                                
2.1 
Austria 
42.2 
26.1                                               
(SPA) 
10.6                    
(AVP) 
2.5 
Ireland 
43.8 
19.4                                                                 
(Labour) 
9.6
(Fine Gail) 
2.0 
  
  
  
9.6                                      
(Fianna Fail) 
2.0 
Belgium 
51.1 
29.8                                                
(SP) 
21.8                
(CVP) 
1.4 (SP/CVP),                            
3.3 (SP/PVV-VLD) 
  
  
14.4                                                              
(PS) 
9.1
(PVV-VLD) 
0.7  (PS/CVP),                   
1.6 (PS/PVV-VLD) 
Norway 
56.3 
51.8                                                           
(Labor) 
40.9                 
(SP) 
1.3 
  
    
37                         
(Christian People's) 
1.4 
  
  
  
31.2                          
(Conservative) 
1.7 
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Table 1.  Continued. 
 
 
Country Union Density† 
Union Members 
as % of Left 
Vote  
Union Members as  
% of Non-Left 
Vote 
Left-Center (Right) 
Ratio 
Finland 
73.7 43.3                                                          
(Social 
Democrats) 
30.3                       
(Centre) 
1.4 
  
  
  
31.7                                   
(National Coalition) 
1.4 
Denmark 
75.2 57.8                                       
(Social 
Democrats) 
45.9                  
(Venstre Liberals) 
1.3 
  
  
  
38.7        
(Conservative) 
1.5 
Sweden 
79.6 56.3                                       
(Social 
Democrats) 
55.4                                  
(FP) 
1.0 
  
  
  
48.9                                      
(Centre) 
1.2 
  
  
  
35.5                                            
(Moderate 
Coalition) 
1.6 
 
† Average union density level, 1981-2008. 
†† Voting statistics do not include Northern Ireland. 
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for the centrist liberal parties in Denmark and Sweden, respectively.  In other words, voters 
for center and right parties in highly unionized countries are anywhere from 2.5 to over 4 
times more likely to be union members than voters for left parties in weakly unionized 
countries.  Such data implies that center and right governments in highly unionized 
countries are likelier to respond to union member preferences (for government action to 
reduce economic inequalities) more than left governments in weakly unionized countries.  
In the two most weakly unionized countries, France and the United States, and the 
moderately unionized Italy, union members comprise less than 13 percent of the voters of 
all major political parties.  By contrast, in the four most heavily unionized countries, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, union members comprise more than 30 percent 
of the voters of all major political parties.  In fact, union members comprise more than 40 
percent and 50 percent of the voters for the centrist liberal parties in Denmark and Sweden, 
respectively.  In other words, voters for center and right parties in highly unionized 
countries are anywhere from 2.5 to over 4 times more likely to be union members than 
voters for left parties in weakly unionized countries.  Such data implies that center and 
right governments in highly unionized countries are likelier to respond to union member 
preferences (for government action to reduce economic inequalities) more than left 
governments in weakly unionized countries.   
In addition to differences in absolute levels of reliance on union member support, 
also critical is the difference between left and center or right party reliance on union 
member support within the same country.  The theory outlined above leads us to expect 
larger partisan differences in moderately unionized countries than weakly and strongly 
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unionized countries.  While the correlation between unionization level and partisan 
differences is not perfect, these expectations are largely borne out.  We find the partisan 
differences to be smallest in the five most heavily unionized countries (the four Nordic 
countries and Belgium) and the second most weakly unionized country, the United States.  
By contrast, the two largest partisan divides are in the moderately unionized countries of 
Austria and Italy.21  Substantial partisan differences are found in the moderately unionized 
countries of the United Kingdom and Ireland as well, but also the more weakly unionized 
Netherlands and the least unionized country, France.   
In short, union members are a minor constituency of all major political parties in 
weakly unionized countries, a substantial constituency of only left parties in most 
moderately unionized countries, and a major constituency of all major political parties in 
strongly unionized countries.  Thus, if unionization matters for the partisan effect on 
income inequality, as most extant literature suggests it should, we are likely to find 
partisanship to be greatest at relatively moderate levels of unionization.    
Data and Measurement22 
 
To test whether unionization rates condition the partisan effect on income 
inequality in a non-linear manner, I examine 16 wealthy democracies between 1970 and 
                                            
21 There is a very large partisan divide in Belgium between the Flemish Socialists (SP) and the liberals (PVV-
VLD).  However, there is a substantially smaller partisan divide between SP and the Christian People’s Party 
(CVP) and between the other socialist party, the Francophone Socialists (PS), and both the PVV-VLD and 
CVP.  
22 Data and do file are available from author upon request. 
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2010.23  The dependent variable in this analysis is net income inequality.  The measure is 
from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) (Solt 2009).  SWIID 
attempts to combine the strengths and neutralize the weaknesses of inequality measures 
produced by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the United Nations University 
World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER).  The LIS data has 
consistent measurement concepts across countries, but is only produced at 5 year intervals.  
The UNU-WIDER data has inconsistent measurement concepts across countries, but is 
produced more regularly.  SWIID examines the country-years in which the two datasets 
overlap as well as the income concepts used in UNU-WIDER to arrive at estimates for 
inequality that are both wide ranging and consistent in the concepts that they measure.  The 
net income inequality measure is a Gini coefficient24 for post-tax and post-transfer 
household income inequality adjusted for household composition.  
I focus solely on the determinants of post-tax and post-transfer (net) income 
inequality as opposed to pre-tax and pre-transfer income (market) inequality or 
“redistribution” (the change in income inequality from before taxes and transfers to after 
taxes and transfers).  This is because the theoretical argument put forth here is agnostic 
regarding what types of policies are pursued to reduce, maintain, or increase a certain level 
of income inequality.   Whether a particular partisan government pursues policies that 
                                            
23 The countries included in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States.   
24 A Gini coefficient represents the area between the Lorenz curve (a plot of the cumulative percentage of 
total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest households and 
moving toward the wealthiest households) and a linear line that represents (hypothetical) perfect income 
equality.  Gini coefficients range from 0 to 100, with 0 identifying perfect income equality (all households 
have identical income), and 100 identifying perfect income inequality (one household has all of the income). 
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primarily impact wage or market income inequality (e.g., through the generosity of 
investments in education or worker training), redistribution (e.g., through the progressivity 
of the tax structure or the extent to which benefits are universalized), or a combination of 
the two is unclear (Kelly 2009).  The claim in this article is only that union members 
condition the behavior of politicians towards government intervention in the economy; and 
that this behavior has measurable consequences for income inequality. 
There are two main independent variables of theoretical interest, union presence 
and the partisan composition of government.  Since the focus is on the relative electoral 
power of union members, union presence is measured as the percentage of wage earners in 
employment that are union members (“union density”). This data is from the OECD and 
Visser’s Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and 
Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2010 database.  The partisan composition of government is 
measured by the proportion of cabinet seats held by parties of the left.25  This data is from 
the Comparative Political Data Set I (Armingeon et al. 2013).  As a robustness check, 
partisanship is also measured as the percentage of all legislative seats held by parties of the 
left.  This data is from the Comparative Political Parties Dataset (Swank 2013).  
Two interaction terms containing the union density and partisan composition of 
government variables are constructed.  The level of union density and the level of union 
                                            
25 In the dataset use here, all of the countries have at least one party of the “center” or “right” that has been 
represented in the cabinet.  However, two countries, Canada and the United States, do not have a party of the 
“left” that has been represented in the cabinet.  While Canada has a legitimate and relatively robust left party, 
the New Democratic Party, which has been able to gain a substantial portion of the national vote over 
successive elections, the United States does not.  In the absence of a clear left party, it is likely that the center 
party acts as the defacto party of organized labor, and thus behaves in the same manner discussed above 
regarding parties of the left.  Therefore, I have recoded the center party in the United States (the Democratic 
Party) as a party of the left.  Nonetheless, the overall conclusions of the analysis do not change substantially 
if this party is instead coded as a party of the center.   
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density squared are separately interacted with the level of government partisanship because 
the argument outlined above suggests that lower and higher levels of unionization should 
be associated with a smaller partisan effect on income inequality relative to moderate levels 
of unionization. The Union Density X Partisan Composition of Government variable is 
expected to have a significant negative sign, indicating that as unionization increases from 
lower to moderate levels, left parties have more of a negative effect on net income 
inequality relative to center and right parties.  The Union Density2 X Partisan Composition 
of Government variable is expected to have a significant positive sign, indicating that as 
unionization increases from moderate to higher levels, left parties have less of a negative 
effect on net income inequality relative to center and right parties.   
 
Control Variables 
 
Previous research has identified a host of institutional and socio-economic 
determinants of income inequality.26  The institutional variables most commonly explored 
in this literature are welfare state design27 and wage bargaining structure.  The welfare 
regime typology outlined by Esping-Andersen identifies three types of welfare states in 
                                            
26 Control variables are chosen based on their anticipated effect on market income inequality and 
redistribution (i.e., the first and the second stage of the distributional process).  At times, a variable will be 
anticipated to increase (decrease) market income inequality, but also increase (decrease) redistribution.  This 
does not necessarily mean that this variable is expected to have no effect on net income inequality, as it is 
possible that the effect on market income inequality (redistribution) is substantially greater than the effect on 
redistribution (market income inequality).  
27 Given the substantial controversy over which regime type most appropriately characterizes particular 
countries, only those 9 countries for which a broad scholarly consensus exists regarding their regime type 
will be included.  Therefore, welfare regime type will only be included in an alternative specification that 
serves as a robustness check.  See Appendix for details.    
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wealthy democracies (Esping-Andersen 1990).  Social democratic welfare states, 
paradoxically, tend to be both “de-commodifying” (i.e., reduce workers’ reliance on the 
market) and “labor activating” (i.e., encourage employment) (Bradley and Stephens 
2006).  By contrast, conservative welfare states, based on corporatist (i.e., welfare state 
benefits differentiated by occupation) and traditional familial (i.e., supporting the male as 
bread winner, female as caregiver model) principles, while frequently generous and de-
commodifying, tend to discourage employment and engage in limited redistribution 
(Iversen and Wren 1998).  Liberal welfare states that rely on means-tested or other benefits 
that provide only a basic level of economic security tend to incentivize employment 
without increasing skills or earnings and thus have only a modest impact on redistribution 
(Boix 1998; Korpi and Palme 1998).   The level of wage bargaining refers to the primary 
level (national, industry, or firm/workplace) at which unions and employers negotiate over 
compensation.  More centralized wage bargaining institutions tend to compress wages 
between different categories of workers (less skilled and more skilled), different firms, 
and/or different industries (if bargaining occurs at the national level) (Wallerstein 1999; 
Scheve and Stasavage 2009).    Relatedly, the support of more skilled workers for such a 
system that holds down their earnings relative to less skilled workers may be maintained 
by generous public provisions relating to worker training and unemployment benefits 
(Iversen and Soskice 2010).   
The socio-economic variables most frequently cited in the income inequality 
literature are national wealth, unemployment, female labor force participation, service 
sector employment, and social spending.  The overall impact of these variables on income 
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inequality is not straightforward.  Increasing national wealth may reduce market income 
inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and producing 
a more educated and skilled citizenry (Nielson and Alderson 1995), or increase market 
inequality if the rate of return on capital grows at a faster rate than the economy as a whole 
(Picketty 2014). While increasing national wealth likely results in higher government 
revenue which can be used for greater social spending, it may also lower demand for 
compensation (because of widely shared improvements in the quality of life).  Greater 
unemployment is likely to increase market income inequality, as less skilled individuals 
make up a disproportionate number of the unemployed and the greater surplus labor stock 
that higher unemployment implies may act to increase the bargaining power of capital 
relative to labor (Iverson 1996; Hall and Franzese 1998; Korpi 2002).  However, the 
positive impact of unemployment is likely to be attenuated by automatic economic 
stabilizers, such as unemployment insurance and means-tested benefits, which exist to 
varying degrees in all wealthy democracies (Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005).  Female 
labor force participation28 is likely to increase market income inequality if women who 
join the workforce are primarily from already wealthy households, but likely to decrease 
market income inequality if women who join the workforce are primarily from already 
poor households (Maxwell 1990).  If greater economic participation translates into greater 
political participation, then we might expect higher female labor force participation to lead 
to more inequality-reducing policies on the part of all political parties given that women 
tend to support redistribution more than men (Alesina and Guiliano 2009).  Because service 
                                            
28 Female labor force participation data is only available for the 1980-2010 period.  Therefore, this variable 
will only be included in an alternative specification that serves as a robustness check.  
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sector employment tends to be bifurcated between those jobs that require high skills and 
provide generous compensation (e.g., physicians and lawyers) and those that require little 
skill and provide meager compensation (e.g., retail store clerks and dishwashers), there is 
general consensus that market income inequality increases as a country becomes more 
service-oriented and less industry-oriented (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). However, if the 
reduction in the industrial sector results in economic insecurity and lower wages, we may 
expect people to demand (and government to respond with) compensation (Iversen and 
Cusack 2000).   As alluded to in the discussion of redistribution above, social spending 
may act to either increase or decrease market income inequality and redistribution 
depending on whether benefits are employment reducing or employment enhancing, how 
focused the benefits are at strengthening the skill level of the citizenry, and which 
households receive the most benefits. 
Scholars also frequently cite the impact on income inequality of policies and 
processes associated with economic globalization.  Most frequently discussed are 
international trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the degree of capital openness.  
Since international trade incentivizes firms to specialize in those functions that utilize their 
country’s comparative advantage, firms in wealthy capital abundant countries tend to focus 
relatively more on those industries or services that require little physical labor but a high 
level of skill.  Therefore, the so-called “losers” from trade are likely to be the less skilled 
(and therefore less generously compensated) workers (and the capital owners that employ 
them) (Boix and Adserà 2000). However, these losers from trade may demand and receive 
compensation from the government in the form of targeted social transfers or subsidies, 
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resulting in less of an increase in income inequality than would be anticipated without 
explicit government intervention (Garrett 1995; Cao et al. 2007).  FDI refers to investment 
involving a lasting interest in and control by a resident entity in one country of an enterprise 
resident in a different country, while capital openness refers to restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions.  Both of these factors are typically argued to increase market income 
inequality and reduce redistribution, as greater exit options for capital are likely to lead to 
more labor concessions and fewer redistributive taxing and spending schemes (Rodrik 
1997; Reuveny and Li 2003; Boix 2010). 
Data measurement and sources for all control variables are included in the 
appendix. 
Method 
 
To examine the impact that union members have on the partisan effect on net 
income inequality, I utilize single-equation time-series cross-sectional error correction 
models (ECMs) estimated with OLS and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator.  
The Rogers’ variance estimator allows for valid hypothesis tests in the presence of any 
pattern of correlation within units (countries), including serial correlation and correlation 
due to unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994).  However, this estimator also 
assumes that errors are uncorrelated between units.  This assumption could be violated if 
there are unmodeled factors that impact net income inequality in all or most countries at a 
particular point in time (Huber et al. 2006).  In order to address this possibility, dummy 
variables representing each decade are included in the analysis, with 2000 to 2010 serving 
as the baseline category.   
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ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other 
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data.29   
Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term effect of an 
independent variable on the dependent variable.  A short-term (or immediate) effect 
indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period produces a change in 
the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period.  By contrast, a long-term effect 
expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an independent variable in one 
time period produces a change in the dependent variable over many time periods.   
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way: 
 
ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,  
 
Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its differenced 
form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1).  The short-term effect of an independent 
variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the differenced version 
of the variable (β1).  The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by dividing the 
coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable (α1).  The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction rate” and 
represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable arrive 
                                            
29 While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef and Keele 2008), Enns et al. 
(2014) demonstrate that cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is 
integrated.  An augmented Dickey-Fuller test was conducted on the dependent variable used in this analysis 
(the Gini coefficient for net income inequality).  The null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root could 
not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater, indicating that the dependent variable is 
integrated. 
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back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable.  For example, an 
α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long term effect is felt after one time 
period, that 10 percent of the remaining long term effect is felt in the following time period, 
and so on.  Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to equilibrium. 
Results 
 
Model 1 in Table 2 is the baseline model. It includes all of the independent variables 
outlined above with the exception of female labor force participation and welfare regime 
type and covers the years 1970 to 2010.  The error correction rate is -.051 and significant 
at the 95 percent confidence level.  This informs us that any long-term effect on net income 
inequality will be incrementally distributed over time and not fully realized until 
approximately 20 years after a shift in the level of an independent variable.  There are only 
two control variables that reach statistical significance.  First, the coefficient for the level 
of trade is negative and significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  A one standard 
deviation, or 34 percentage points of GDP30, increase in trade eventually decreases net 
income inequality by 4.09, or nearly one standard deviation.  This finding has at least two 
possible explanations:  governments “overcompensate” losers from trade (i.e., provide 
more in the way of compensatory benefits than individuals have lost as a result of trade) 
and/or countries that trade the most are also those that invest most heavily in human capital 
(with such investments expanding the pool of skilled labor and thus enlarging the number 
of workers that are able to win from trade).  Second, the coefficient for the difference in  
                                            
30 Between 1970 and 2010, the average level of trade of the 16 countries examined here increased by 34.78 
percentage points of GDP. 
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Table 2. Determinants of Net Income Inequality in 16 (15) Wealthy Democracies 
 
Model 1 2 3 
  Main Model No France No Sweden 
Time 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
Net Income Inequality (t-1) -0.051** -0.065** -0.050** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Δ Govt. Partisanship (t) -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Govt. Partisanship (t-1) 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Δ Union Density (t) -0.030 -0.040 -0.044 
  (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) 
Union Density (t-1) 0.042** 0.020 0.034** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Union Density X Union Density (t-1) -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X Govt. Partisanship (t-1) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X Union Density X Govt. Partisanship (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.058 0.064 0.045 
  (0.054) (0.058) (0.057) 
GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1) -0.011 -0.013 -0.013 
  (0.013) (0.010) (0.014) 
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.017 0.012 0.015 
  (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.016 0.024* 0.015* 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) 
Δ Service Sector Employment (t) -0.009 -0.003 -0.016 
  (0.031) (0.031) (0.034) 
Service Sector Employment (t-1) 0.016 0.015 0.016 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) 
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Table 2.  Continued 
 
Model 1 2 3 
  Main Model No France No Sweden 
Time 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
Δ Social Spending (t) .0.037 .0.049 .0.016 
  (0.055) (0.063) (0.063) 
Social Spending (t-1)  0.001 0.006 -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
Δ The Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.051 0.044 0.027 
  (0.063) (0.066) (0.067) 
The Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1) 0.049 0.055 0.035 
  (0.063) (0.068) (0.071) 
Δ International Trade (t) 0.008 0.006 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
International Trade (t-1) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Δ Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t) 0.019* 0.017** 0.014** 
  (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) 
Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t-1) 0.010 0.012* 0.007 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Δ Capital Openness (t) 0.125 0.131 0.139 
  (0.108) (0.118) (0.105) 
Capital Openness (t-1) -0.013 -0.061 -0.009 
  (0.053) (0.065) (0.051) 
Constant 0.285 1.316 0.391 
  (1.470) (1.650) (1.521) 
Range of UD for Negative and Significant Left Govt Effect 29 to 70 31 to 70 30 to 68 
Peak Negative and Signficant Left Govt. Effect (Moderate 
UD) 
48 49 49 
Positive and Significant Left Govt. Effect (Low UD) 19 13 19 
Positive and Significant Left Govt. Effect (High UD) 75 78 None 
N 586 552 546 
R2 0.087 0.093 0.086 
 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10) 
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outward FDI flows is positive and significant at the 90 percent confidence level.  
This is in line with expectations and informs us that growth in outward FDI flows increases 
net income inequality in the short-term, although the size of the coefficient is substantively 
small. 
As anticipated, the UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN COMPOSTION OF 
GOVERNMENT variable has a significant negative coefficient, and the UNION DENSITY2 
X PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT variable has a significant positive 
coefficient.31  Given that the interaction terms contain the levels of, as opposed to the 
changes in, the partisan composition of government, the coefficients for these variables 
represent the long term effect that a left (center and right) government has on net income 
inequality relative to center and right (left) governments.    
Figure 2 charts the marginal effect of a shift in government partisanship to the left 
over the observed values of union density in the dataset used here.  A clear U-shaped 
relationship can be identified, whereby the negative effect of left government relative to 
center or right government on net income inequality increases as union density approaches 
moderate levels.  Left government has its largest negative effect on net income inequality 
relative to center and right governments when the union density level reaches 48 (a 
condition that existed in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s, near the start of Margaret 
Thatcher’s term as Prime Minister).  At such a time, a shift in government from one 
controlled completely by the center or right to one evenly divided between the left and the  
                                            
31 T-tests of the marginal effects confirm that UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN COMPOSTION OF 
GOVERNMENT and UNION DENSITY2 X PARTISAN COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT are 
significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
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Figure 2. Conditional Effect of Left Government on Net Income Inequality Across 
Range of Union Density Levels in 16 Wealthy Democracies  
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center or right results in a decrease in net income inequality of 4.25, or slightly over one 
standard deviation.  In the final two decades of the analysis, only Finland experienced a 
change in net income inequality exceeding this amount.32  A shift in government from one 
controlled completely by the center or right to one controlled completely by the left results 
in a decrease in net income inequality of 8.50, or slightly more than two standard 
deviations. This is approximately the difference between Japan, the tenth most equal 
country in the analysis, and Sweden, the most equal country in the analysis, in 2010.33   
Moving our attention away from moderate levels of union density towards higher 
and lower levels, we observe that left government does not reduce net income inequality 
relative to center and right governments when union density is less than 29 or more than 
70.  In 2010, the final year of the analysis, 9 of the 16 countries examined here fell in the 
former category34 while not a single country fell in the latter category.  However, Finland 
and Sweden were above a union density level of 70 as recently as 2008, while Denmark 
fell below this level only in 2006.  This suggests that partisan differences towards 
government intervention in the economy may be on the rise in these three countries.  At 
very low (less than 20) and very high (more than 76) levels of union density, the marginal 
effects indicate that left governments actually increase net income inequality relative to 
center and right governments.   
In an effort to determine the robustness of the above results, 7 additional models 
are included in Tables 2 and 3.  First, excluded from the analysis are those countries that  
                                            
32 Finland’s level of net income inequality increased from 21.04 to 25.54 between 1990 and 2010. 
33 2010 data is not available for Canada and Ireland. 
34 The countries are Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Net Income Inequality in 16 (9) Wealthy Democracies 
 
 
 
 
Model 4 5 6 7 8 
  
No Social 
Spending 
W/ Female 
Labor Part. 
W/ Welfare 
Regime†  
W/ Partisan 
Leg. 
Reduced 
Model 
Time 1970-2010 1980-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
Net Income Inequality(t-1) -0.050** -0.050** -0.159* -0.061** -0.048*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.084) (0.022) (0.016) 
Δ Govt. Partisanship (t) -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.007 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.001) 
Govt. Partisanship (t-1) 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.049*** 0.013*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) 
Δ Union Density (UD) (t) -0.028 0.003 0.017 -0.035 -0.030 
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) 
Union Density (UD) (t-1) 0.041** 0.054*** 0.006 0.120** 0.034** 
  (0.014) (0.017) (0.031) (0.041) (0.012) 
UD X UD (t-1) -0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UD X Govt. Partisanship (t-1) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
UD X UD X Govt. Partisanship (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.038 -0.040 0.039 0.059   
  (0.042) (0.056) (0.136) (0.055)   
GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1) -0.010 -0.018 0.029 -0.020   
  (0.013) (0.015) (0.039) (0.013)   
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.023 -0.027 0.069 0.008   
  (0.030) (0.051) (0.055) (0.033)   
Unemployment (t-1) 0.016 0.006 0.017 0.006   
  (0.012) (0.015) (0.042) (0.016)   
Δ Service Sector Employment (t) -0.008 0.011 -0.082 -0.011   
  (0.032) (0.013) (0.181) (0.031)   
Service Sector Employment (t-1) 0.016 0.024 0.043 0.015   
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.049) (0.011)   
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Table 3.  Continued. 
Model 4 5 6 7 8 
  
No Social 
Spending 
W/ Female 
Labor Part. 
W/ 
Welfare 
Regime†  
W/ Partisan 
Leg. 
Reduced 
Model 
Time 1970-2010 1980-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
Δ Social Spending (t)   -0.062 -.0.063 0.036   
    (0.088) (0.068) (0.063)   
Social Spending (t-1)    0.014 -0.069 0.004   
    (0.008) (0.071) (0.013)   
Δ The Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.055 0.106* 0.141 0.041   
  (0.065) (0.056) (0.083) (0.065)   
The Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1) 0.051 0.127*** 0.216 0.031   
  (0.063) (0.038) (0.118) (0.065)   
Δ International Trade (t) 0.007 0.007 0.014* 0.006 0.013** 
  (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
International Trade (t-1) -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.013*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.001) 
Δ Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) 
(t) 
0.019* 0.019* 0.019 0.018 0.013* 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.011) (0.007) 
Foreign Direct Investment (outflows) (t-
1) 
0.010* 0.009 0.011 0.007   
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.007)   
Δ Capital Openness (t) 0.123 0.063 0.080 0.102   
  (0.106) (0.131) (0.193) (0.106)   
Capital Openness (t-1) -.013 -0.016 -0.172 -0.024   
  (0.053) (0.056) (0.222) (0.054)   
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t)   -0.162       
    0.141       
Female Labor Force Participation (t-1)   0.008       
    0.013       
Liberal (t)     1.800     
      (1.087)     
Conservative (t)     1.086     
      (0.099)     
Constant 0.315 -0.294 7.255 -0.520 1.188** 
  (1.345) (1.152) (5.221) (1.631) (0.455) 
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Table 3.  Continued. 
 
Model 4 5 6 7 8 
  
No Social 
Spending 
W/ Female 
Labor Part. 
W/ Welfare 
Regime†  
W/ Partisan 
Leg. 
Reduced 
Model 
Time 1970-2010 1980-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010 
UD Levels (Negative and Significant 
Left Govt Effect) 
29 to 69 28 to 68 37 to 56 37 to 52 34 to 65 
Peak Negative and Signficant Left Govt. 
Effect 
49 49 51 51 49 
Positive and Significant Left Govt. 
Effect (Low UD) 
19 17 15 20 18 
Positive and Significant Left Govt. 
Effect (High UD) 
77 None None None 79 
N 587 467 336 586 595 
R2 0.087 0.115 0.142 0.088 0.071 
 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10) 
† Regression includes only 9 countries (see fn. 27 and the Appendix) 
 
consistently have the highest and lowest levels of union density in the dataset used here 
and thus may disproportionately impact the results.  In Model 2, France (which in all 41 
years has the lowest level of union density) is removed.  In Model 3, Sweden (which in 34 
of the 41 years has the highest level of union density) is removed.  Second, given that 
partisan governments play a critical role in determining levels of, and changes in, social 
spending, controlling for this variable may act to under or overestimate the relationship 
between partisanship and net income inequality.  Therefore, Model 4 drops this variable 
from the analysis.  Third, Model 5 includes the female labor force participation variables.  
Due to data limitations, this model is only able to cover the 1980 to 2010 period.  Fourth, 
Model 6 incorporates dummy variables for welfare regime type.  Countries for which there 
is little scholarly consensus regarding their welfare state type are excluded from the 
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analysis.35  Fifth, Model 7 measures the partisan composition of government with the 
proportion of legislative seats, rather than cabinet positions, held by parties of the left.  
Finally, Model 8 includes only those variables that were significant at the 90 percent level 
or greater in Model 1.36   
In 6 of these robustness checks, both the UNION DENSITY X PARTISAN 
COMPOSTION OF GOVERNMENT and the UNION DENSITY2 X PARTISAN 
COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT interaction terms are in the hypothesized direction 
and significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  The only difference is Model 7, which 
includes the alternative measure for partisan composition of government.  In that model, 
the quadratic interaction term just barely misses the cutoff for statistical significance at the 
99 percent confidence level (with a p-value of .013).  The “turning point” for the partisan 
effect on net income inequality proves robust across models.  In every model (including 
Model 1), left governments decrease net income inequality the most relative to center or 
right governments when the union density level is between 48 and 51.  Furthermore, the 
substantive effects of partisanship at these turning points do not differ by model (i.e., the 
95 percent confidence intervals for these estimates overlap).  Also robust is the range in 
which a negative effect of left government relative to center and right government is found.  
In each model, left government has a significant negative effect when the union density 
level is between 37 and 52 (with the range dropping as low as 28 in Model 5 and as high 
as 70 in Models 1 and 2).  If we exclude the models containing only 9 countries (Model 6) 
                                            
35 See fn. 27 and the Appendix.  
36 Both short-term and long-term coefficients are included for trade (the variable with a statistically 
significant long-term effect in Model 1). 
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and the alternative measure of the partisan composition of government (Model 7), this 
range expands significantly (with the remaining 6 models demonstrating a significant left 
government effect when the union density level is between 34 and 65).  Slightly less robust 
is the finding that left government increases net income inequality relative to center and 
right governments at low levels of union density.  In Model 2, which excludes the low 
union density country of France, left government does not begin to have a statistically 
significant positive effect on net income inequality until a union density level of 13.  This 
is down from a union density level of 19 in Model 1 and would only apply to only 11 of 
the 552 remaining country-years, all of which belong to the United States (2000 to 2010).37  
Far less robust is the finding that left government increases net income inequality relative 
to center and right governments at high levels of union density.  No such effect is found in 
Model 3, which excludes the high union density country of Sweden, Model 5, which 
includes female labor force participation and only covers the years 1980 to 2010, Model 6, 
which includes welfare regime and only includes 9 countries, or Model 7, which uses the 
alternative measure for partisanship. 
The findings in Model 1 regarding the long-term negative effect of trade and the 
short-term positive effect of outward FDI flows prove robust.  In each of the additional 
models the coefficient for the level of trade is negative and significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level, while in all but two models the coefficient for the difference in outward 
FDI outflows is positive and significant at the 90 confidence level (with the coefficient 
                                            
37 If the Democratic Party of the United States reverts to its original coding as a center party in this model, 
the positive effect of left government exists only until a union density level of 4.  Given that there is no 
country-year in the analysis with a union density level that low, this finding has little substantive meaning.  
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reaching the 95 percent confidence level in Models 2 and 3).  No other control variable 
consistently reaches statistical significance.  
If the ability and willingness of politicians to respond to union preferences is 
substantially determined by both first-order policy preferences and electoral incentives, 
then we might expect the conditioning union effect on partisanship to differ based on the 
electoral threshold necessary to hold elected office.  The lower electoral thresholds in 
proportional representation (PR) systems allow politicians to appeal to a narrower base in 
the electorate than politicians in majoritarian systems with higher electoral thresholds, 
where there are greater incentives to make electoral appeals to the median voter (Downs 
1957; Norris 2005; Iversen and Soskice 2006).  This would imply that left party politicians 
respond to union preferences “sooner” (at lower levels of unionization) and right and center 
party politicians respond to union preferences “later” (at higher levels of unionization) in 
countries with a PR system than left, center, and right party politicians in countries with a 
majoritarian system.  
In an effort to determine whether the conditional effects of unionization on 
partisanship found above differ based on the electoral system in place, I include two 
supplementary models, one for countries with a majoritarian system and one for countries 
with a PR system.38   Figures 3 plots the marginal effects of government partisanship on 
net income inequality at different levels of union density in majoritarian and PR electoral 
systems, respectively.  First, notice that the x axis on these two plots differ, as the levels of  
                                            
38 I utilize the country classification put forth by Iversen and Soskice (2006).  The countries characterized as 
having majoritarian systems are Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.  The countries characterized as having PR systems are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden.   
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Figure 3.  Conditional Effect of Left Government on Net Income Inequality Across 
Range of Union Density Levels in 7 Majoritarian and 9 Proportional Representation 
Countries.  
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union density shown correspond to those that exist in the country-years covered in each 
model.  Majoritarian systems have a relatively narrow spread in union density (ranging 
from about 11 to 54), while PR systems have a much wider spread (ranging from about 19 
to 84).  These different spreads have the consequence of producing very different 
distributions, with a more or less linear interactive effect in majoritarian systems and the 
familiar U-shaped distribution in the PR systems.  The theoretical expectations receive 
support. The significant and negative left government partisan effect can be identified over 
a much wider range of values of union density in the PR plot (union density levels 30 to 
60) than the majoritarian plot (union density levels 41 to 49).  The substantive size of this 
effect, however, does not significantly differ by electoral system.  Three additional 
similarities between the two plots should be recognized.  First, in confirmation of the 
central hypothesis of this article, as unionization approaches moderate levels, left 
government has more of a negative effect on net income inequality relative to center and 
right governments.  Second, the “turning point” for the negative left government effect is 
very similar in the two systems.  In majoritarian countries, the negative partisan effect of 
left government is greatest at a union density level of 49, while in PR systems the negative 
partisan effect of left government is greatest at only the slightly lower union density level 
of 47.  Third, unlike the plot generated by Model 1 which pooled together both types of 
electoral systems, in neither plot is there a positive left government effect at low levels of 
union density.39 
                                            
39 In the PR plot, left government has a positive effect on net income inequality relative to center and right 
governments when the union density level is 78 or higher.  For the same reasons as outlined above, the 
regression was run again with Sweden excluded.  While the results are substantially similar at lower and 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Why has no consistent partisan effect on income inequality been found in the 
scholarly literature?  I have argued here that a part of the explanation concerns a country’s 
level of unionization, which conditions the partisan effect on income inequality. This 
argument rests on three main pillars.  First, union members favor government intervention 
to reduce economic inequalities more than non-union members.  Second, politicians are 
both pragmatic (office- and vote-seeking) and ideological (policy-seeking).  Third, 
politicians in parties of the left, which have historic links with organized labor, have a 
greater first-order preference for government intervention to reduce economic inequalities 
than politicians in center or right parties.  With each of these three pillars in place, we can 
expect lower levels of unionization to produce fewer efforts at economic inequality 
reduction on the part of all partisan governments, reducing the partisan effect on income 
inequality; moderate levels of unionization to produce substantially greater efforts at 
economic inequality reduction on the part of left governments than center or right 
governments, increasing the partisan effect on income inequality;  and high levels of 
unionization to produce greater efforts at economic inequality reduction on the part of all 
partisan governments, reducing the partisan effects on income inequality.  In short, partisan 
effects on income inequality are likely to increase (decrease) as we approach relatively 
moderate (low or high) levels of unionization.  This theory was tested with a series of error-
correction models, using net income inequality as the dependent variable, linear and 
                                            
moderate levels of union density as the PR model that included Sweden, the positive effect of left government 
at high levels of union density disappears. 
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quadratic interaction terms consisting of the level of union density and the partisan 
composition of government, and a set of controls.  The empirical results confirm the 
theoretical expectation and hold regardless of whether there is a majoritarian or PR 
electoral system. 
Table 4 provides data on the level of unionization in the 16 countries examined in 
this analysis.  Column two contains the level and year at which unionization reached its 
peak, while column three contains the level and year at which unionization fell to its trough.  
There are several observations that deserve our attention.  First, all but one country 
(Belgium) reaches its peak unionization level prior to the twenty-first century, with half of 
the countries reaching this peak in the 1970s, the first decade of the analysis.  Second, there 
is a bimodal distribution in regards to the trough of unionization, with five countries (the 
four Nordic countries and Belgium) hitting this point in the 1970s (as unionization trended 
upwards) and the remaining eleven countries doing so in the 2000s (as unionization trended 
downwards), the last decade of this analysis.  Third, the levels of the various peaks and 
troughs differ substantially across countries.  Three countries (Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden) have peaks that meet or exceed 80, while six countries have peaks less than half 
of that level (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United States); 
and four countries have troughs that exceed 50 (the four Nordic countries), while five 
countries have troughs less than half that level (Australia, France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
and the United States). In short, wealthy democracies are experiencing a broad decline in 
unionization levels, but the timing, depth, and starting level of this decline differs 
substantially across countries. 
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Table 4.  Peak and Trough Unionization Levels in 16 Wealthy Democracies, 1970-
2010  
 
Country 
Peak                        
(Year) 
Trough                               
(Year) 
Australia 
50.2                            
(1976) 
18.1                               
(2010) 
Austria 
62.8                              
(1970) 
28.4                          
(2010) 
Belgium 
54.1                                               
(2006) 
39.9                       
(1970) 
Canada 
36.8                                          
(1982) 
27.2                                      
(2008) 
Denmark 
80.8                                                 
(1983) 
60.3                        
(1970) 
Finland 
80.7                                             
(1993) 
51.3                      
(1970) 
France 
21.7                                           
(1970) 
7.5                             
(2007) 
Germany 
36.0                                          
(1991) 
18.6                                 
(2010) 
Ireland 
54.8                                       
(1978) 
32.7                                               
(2010)                                
Italy 
50.5                                      
(1976) 
33.2                                               
(2006) 
Japan 
35.1                                      
(1970) 
18.2                                                              
(2008) 
Netherlands 
37.8                                             
(1975) 
18.6                            
(2010) 
Norway 
58.5                              
(1990) 
51.9                                           
(1972) 
Sweden 
83.9                             
(1993) 
67.7                                              
(1970) 
UK 
49.9                                  
(1981) 
26.4                                                          
(2010) 
US 
27.4                            
(1970) 
11.4                                  
(2010) 
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What consequences might such observations have for the partisan effect on income 
inequality?  The theoretical argument and empirical results outlined here suggests that 
declining unionization should not have the same effect on the partisan effect on income 
inequality across countries (at least in the short to medium term).  Rather, what is critical 
is the level of unionization from which each country is falling from.  Those countries with 
a relatively high peak level of unionization are likely to experience an increase in 
partisanship towards distributional issues as unionization declines, while those countries 
with a relatively moderate or low peak level of unionization are likely to experience a 
decrease in partisanship towards distributional issues as unionization declines.  While 
many scholars have argued that partisanship is decreasing or increasing across most or all 
wealthy democracies as a result of common domestic and international trends (Boix 1998; 
Garrett 1998; Pierson 2001; Boix 2010), these findings suggest that the impact of common 
trends will differ depending on each country’s starting point (Thelen 1993). 
The marginal effects of partisanship on income inequality in PR and majoritarian 
electoral systems demonstrate that partisanship persists at a wider range of unionization 
levels in the former than the latter.  This finding contradicts the traditional description of 
PR systems as comparatively “consensual” (Rogowski 1987; Rueda and Pontusson 2000), 
but lends support to recent work demonstrating that because of their lower electoral 
thresholds, PR systems have more ideologically disparate parties than majoritarian systems 
(Dow 2011).  Evidence indicating that partisan differences are present in majoritarian 
systems only at very moderate levels of unionization provides conditional support for the 
traditional argument that such systems limit partisanship by providing all office- and vote-
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seeking politicians with an electoral incentive to appeal to the median voter.  On the one 
hand, the results do indicate that politicians in majoritarian systems attempt to appeal to 
the same (median) voter most of the time.  On the other hand, the results also indicate that 
there are certain electoral conditions in such systems that allow politicians with divergent 
policy preferences to appeal to different voters.  This suggests that politicians from 
different party families may project their own preferred median voter onto the electorate 
when doing so is intellectually credible.  These results contribute to a growing body of 
literature that finds that electoral rules matter for government output and socio-economic 
outcomes, but that the extent to which they do so depends on a host of environmental 
factors such as the preferences of the politicians in government, the ideological and 
demographic characteristics of the electorate, and the competitiveness of the electoral 
system (Kang and Powell 2010; Ezrow 2011; Warwick 2011). 
The broader implication of this study is that because politicians strategically adjust 
to their environment, there is unlikely to ever be an “independent” partisan effect which is 
constant across space and time.  While such a statement should be uncontroversial among 
scholars who study the behavior of politicians and political parties, it is a crucial point that 
is often neglected in studies that examine the determinants of income inequality and other 
socio-economic outcomes.  In the future, it is important for us to take more seriously the 
modelling of environmental factors that are likely to increase or decrease the ideological 
distance and policy differences between politicians belonging to different political parties.   
The theoretical argument outlined above is in the tradition of scholars such as 
Garrett, Korpi, and Pontusson, who have emphasized the importance of social, economic, 
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and political conditions for the ability of politicians to pursue their first-order policy 
preferences.  It is important to note that such conditions may not merely be represented by 
variables that are more less trending in a predictable direction over time (e.g., unionization 
or economic globalization), but frequently unpredictable (or at least largely unpredicted) 
major world events such as the Great Depression, World War II, 9/11, and the Great 
Recession (Scheve and Stasavage 2009; Pontusson 2013; Picketty 2014).  If partisan 
politicians have policy preferences, then they should use such crises (which may rally 
support for the government in general and/or increase pressure for “government action”) 
to push through a predetermined policy agenda that existed independently of the event 
discussed.  Further work that asks under what conditions partisan politicians are able to 
pursue their first-order preferences, as well as under what conditions politicians may 
actually alter their first-order preferences, seems to be a promising avenue for future 
research. 
Before concluding, it is important to note two clear shortcomings of this analysis.  
First, I have implicitly assumed that all union members share more or less the same 
preferences and that these preferences are largely constant across countries and over time.  
However, scholars have found that union members frequently exhibit different preferences 
towards distributive issues based on their skill or income level and the sector that they work 
within (Garrett and Way 1999; Nijhuis 2009; Becher and Pontusson 2011; Iversen and 
Soskice 2010), and that the demographic makeup of union movements differs both across 
countries and over time (Iversen and Soskice 2009; Visser and Checci 2009; Pontusson 
2013).  Although data on union composition is relatively scarce, future research should 
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attempt to take such factors into account before estimating direct or indirect union effects.  
Second, the focus here has been on the partisan effect on income inequality. However, 
partisan governments impact income inequality primarily through the policies that they 
pursue, not simply by attaining or holding office (Rueda 2008). The central assertion that 
all partisan governments will be less likely to engage in government intervention to reduce 
economic inequalities when unionization is low, left parties will be likelier to engage in 
substantial government intervention to reduce economic inequalities than center or right 
parties when unionization is at moderate levels, and all political parties will be more likely 
to engage in government intervention to reduce economic inequalities when unionization 
is high, could be tested more directly by examining how unionization conditions the policy 
orientation of different types of partisan governments and, in turn, how any of those 
enacted policies impact income inequality.   Such an analysis will help us better determine 
the causes and consequences of partisan conflict over distribution and redistribution, as 
well as specific distributional outcomes. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND THE UNION EFFECT ON 
WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
For many years, one of the few areas of broad consensus in the literature on wage 
inequality in the wealthy democracies was that union strength accounts for much of the 
cross-national and over-time variation in wage inequality, with stronger unions resulting 
in less wage inequality (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn 2000; 
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006; Oliver 
2008; Martin and Swank 2012).40  However, recent evidence indicates that this union effect 
disappeared at some point in the 1990s (Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013).  
Despite the important theoretical and practical implications of this finding, scholars have 
yet to craft a comprehensive theory to explain the disappearance of the union effect; nor 
have they provided empirical tests of the few suppositions offered to explain it. 
What is responsible for the disappearance of the union effect on wage inequality?41  
I focus attention on one of the most obvious culprits; economic globalization.  While 
previous scholarship has examined how economic globalization impacts unions, this 
literature has tended to focus on the consequences that economic globalization has for the 
                                            
40 “Wage inequality” differs from “income inequality” in that the latter includes compensation derived from 
investments (e.g., capital gains) as well as labor. Unlike wage inequality, income inequality encompasses 
persons with and without gainful employment and is frequently measured at the household, rather than the 
individual, level.  This article focuses exclusively on the determinants of wage inequality, a term that is used 
synonymously with earnings inequality. 
41 Within the existing wage inequality literature, “wage” is a broad term that encompasses employee 
remuneration regardless of whether it is provided on a fixed hourly, weekly, monthly, or annual basis or in 
return for a particular good or service. 
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organizational characteristics of unions rather than on unions’ ability or willingness to 
utilize a given organization toward particular ends.  In particular, numerous scholars have 
argued that economic globalization reduces the number of union members relative to non-
union members42 or precipitates the breakdown of centralized wage bargaining 
institutions.43  However, none have seriously considered (theoretically or empirically) how 
economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage inequality44 – or, for that 
matter, many other socio-economic or political outcomes.45   
This article aims to explain the disappearance of the union effect on wage inequality 
and address such shortcomings in the literature by identifying and examining in detail the 
three interrelated processes by which unions impact wage inequality, which I label the 
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms; and by considering how economic 
globalization impacts each and all of these mechanisms by altering the bargaining power 
and thus also the preferences of different types of employers, union workers, and non-union 
workers.  The evidence I present suggests that economic globalization reduces the union 
effect by exacerbating wage differentials between employers (managers) and lower-paid 
union workers, higher-paid union workers and lower-paid union workers, and employers 
(managers) relative to many of the least paid non-union workers.  Given that economic 
globalization is expanding with no obvious interruptions in sight, the implication is that if 
                                            
42 See Dreher and Gaston (2007) for a brief review of this literature.   
43 See Western (1997) for the most prominent example. 
44 Economists frequently examine factors that influence unions’ wage extracting ability.  However, these 
scholars focus almost exclusively on factors associated with the business cycle (e.g., see McDonald and 
Solow 1981 and Messina et al. 2009). 
45 Notable exceptions include Beckfield (2006), Iversen and Soskice (2010), and Kwon and Pontusson 
(2010). 
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the traditional union effect on wage inequality has disappeared, it may very well have 
vanished for good.  
This article is divided into six sections.  The first section addresses in detail the 
employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.  The second section outlines recent 
evidence that the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades. The third 
section discusses how economic globalization can be expected to condition the employer, 
intra-union, and insider mechanisms and thus also the union effect more broadly.  The 
fourth section provides information on the dependent variables, independent variables, and 
estimation strategy employed in the empirical analysis.  The fifth section reports the results 
of the empirical analysis and the sixth section includes a discussion of the findings.  
The Union Effect on Wage Inequality 
 
Unions impact wage inequality through three interrelated processes; or what I term 
here the employer46, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.47  
The employer mechanism is emphasized in the power resource theory (PRT) 
literature and refers to unions’ ability to extract wage and other compensation-related 
concessions from employers (Stephens 1980; Korpi 1985).  In the absence of working class 
organizations, market power in capitalist economies is concentrated in the hands of the few 
(i.e., employers).  By organizing “subordinate classes” (i.e., employees), unions are able to 
                                            
46 In this article, “employer” refers not only to actual business owners, but also top managers (e.g., chief 
executive officers or high level bureaucrats) that may or may not have an ownership stake in a firm but 
nonetheless formulate and implement policies relating to investments and/or employee compensation.   
47 The focus in this article is on how unions impact wage inequality “directly”, or through employer-union 
and intra-union negotiations.  However, unions almost certainly impact wage inequality “indirectly” as well 
by supporting (or opposing) particular political parties, politicians, and public policies. 
 64 
 
redistribute some of this market power to their members (Bradley et al. 2003).  This may 
be done, for example, by representing most (potential) workers in a particular firm, 
industry, or region and therefore monopolizing a certain segment of the workforce 
(Freeman and Medoff 1984;  Mishel 1986) or by facilitating the ability of workers to jointly 
withhold their services until particular demands are met regarding compensation (Checci 
et al. 2007).  More generally, unions foster a class-based identity among employees through 
information campaigns and the politicization of distributional struggles (Thompson 1978; 
Pontusson et al. 2002; Iversen and Soskice 2011); and, by applying “normative power 
resources”, may ultimately instill a greater “taste for equality” in the wider citizenry (Korpi 
1985; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Plumper et al. 2009). 
The intra-union mechanism is emphasized in the varieties of capitalism (VoC) 
literature and refers to the tendency of unions to compress wages among their own 
members.  This may be done by providing equal pay for equal work or by workers in lower-
paid occupations receiving larger wage gains from union membership than workers in 
higher-paid occupations (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998; Pontusson et al. 2002; 
Card et al. 2003; Hall and Thelen 2007).  This latter phenomenon is explained as the result 
of the solidaristic norms within union organizations (Wallerstein 1999), a political 
exchange between highly skilled union workers and politicians, whereby the former agree 
to wage restraint in return for generous social insurance policies (Iversen and Soskice 
2010), and/or the democratic nature of union organizations, which tends to result in wage 
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agreements that benefit the median union member (Pontusson et al. 2002; Checci et al. 
2007).48   
The insider mechanism is emphasized primarily in the economics literature and 
refers to the (positive or negative) externalities that result from union wage gains (and other 
costs associated with collective bargaining).  If workers earn a wage premium49 as a result 
of union membership, then that necessarily implies that unions increase wage inequality 
between otherwise identical union and non-union workers (Friedman 1962; Freeman and 
Medoff 1984; Card et al. 2003).  However, the union wage premium also impacts the wage 
differentials between dissimilar union and non-union workers (Freeman 1980).  Union 
wage premiums for workers in lower-paid jobs shrink earnings differentials between these 
union workers and non-union workers (and employers) in higher-paid jobs; while union 
wage premiums for workers in higher-paid jobs aggravate wage differentials between these 
union workers and non-union workers in lower-paid jobs.  However, union wage gains may 
result in higher wages in the non-union sector as well and thus at least partly cancel out the 
union wage premium - and thus also the impact such a premium has on union/non-union 
wage differentials.  “Pour over effects” occur as a result of laws requiring that union-
bargained wages extend to non-union workers (Wallerstein and Western 2000) while 
“spillover effects” occur as a result of non-union employers voluntarily offering higher 
wages in an attempt to preempt potential union organizing efforts or to entice workers away 
                                            
48 A decision-making process that strengthens the median union member relative to the mean union member 
is likely to result in a wage agreement that is more beneficial to the former than the latter.  Since the median 
union wage tends to be lower than the mean union wage, this implies greater within union wage compression. 
49 A union wage premium refers to the (positive) difference in the wage of a union worker relative to a 
(hypothetical) non-union worker with an identical job profile. 
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from already unionized establishments (Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Rosenfeld and 
Western 2012).50   
While distinct theoretical propositions, the employer, intra-union, and insider 
mechanisms are clearly neither independent from one another nor are they mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, without an employer mechanism there is unlikely to be either an intra-
union mechanism or an insider mechanism; as the intra-union mechanism implies that less-
paid union workers have extracted greater wage gains from their employers than better-
paid union workers51 and the insider mechanism is a product of externalities resulting from 
any such union wage gains.  Therefore, the overall union effect on wage inequality can be 
said to be the net result of the gains of union workers relative to their employers, some 
union workers relative to other union workers, union workers relative to non-union 
workers, and non-union workers relative to their employers.  
The Disappearing Union Effect 
 
There has been a broad (implicit) consensus in the comparative political economy 
literature that the net result of the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms is to 
reduce wage inequality (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn 2000; 
Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006; Oliver 
                                            
50 There are numerous other externalities arising from union wage gains that have consequences for the 
overall wage distribution. For example, if the elevated costs of union labor increase unemployment, non-
union wages may fall in response to the larger supply of idle labor (Friedman 1962).  On the other hand, such 
union-induced unemployment may actually increase non-union wages in the long-term if the unemployed 
are induced to augment their skill level in an effort to improve their prospects for employment (Kahn 2000).  
Finally, union wage gains may motivate employers to invest in capital improvements to boost worker 
productivity, ultimately leading to higher wages throughout the broader economy (Erixon 2010). 
51 It is difficult to imagine a sustainable union movement in which lower-paid union workers achieve relative 
gains exclusively or even primarily by extracting wage gains from higher-paid union workers, the latter of 
which would then experience not only relative but also absolute losses as a result of union membership. 
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2008; Martin and Swank 2012).  Yet recent evidence provided by prominent scholars in 
this literature indicates that this union effect disappeared at some point in the 1990s 
(Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013).  These scholars have provided two 
contradictory explanations for the diminished union effect, neither of which has been tested 
empirically.  First, greater economic globalization, particularly trade with less developed 
countries (LDCs), has produced wage pressures that increasingly weak unions have been 
unable to resist (Golden and Wallerstein 2011).  This explanation implies that economic 
globalization reduces the union effect by harming the ability of unions to extract wage 
gains from their employers (i.e., via the employer mechanism).  While certainly plausible, 
left unconsidered is the impact that economic globalization has on different types of union 
workers and non-union workers (as well as non-union employers).  Second, in response to 
membership losses, unions in the manufacturing sector have become increasingly 
supportive of employer efforts to decouple wage developments in the manufacturing and 
service sectors (Pontusson 2013).  This explanation implies that the union effect has 
diminished as the result of greater intra-union and union/non-union wage dispersion (i.e., 
via the intra-union and insider mechanisms), but is primarily descriptive in nature.  Left 
unexplained is why unions in the manufacturing sector have stopped supporting solidaristic 
wage policies, unions in a sector exposed to international competition achieve greater wage 
gains than unions in more sheltered sectors, and employers in a sector exposed to 
international competition deliver greater wage gains for their workers than employers in 
relatively sheltered sectors.   
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Economic Globalization and the Union Effect 
 
Economic globalization – or the increasing exposure of states to the world 
economy52 - matters for the union effect because of its impact on the bargaining position, 
preferences, and behavior of employers as well as different types of union and non-union 
workers; and thus also the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.53  Due to their 
interdependent nature, the impact that economic globalization has on each of these union 
mechanisms necessarily has consequences for the others. 
 
Employer mechanism 
 
There are at least two ways in which economic globalization may impact the ability 
of unions to extract wage gains from their employers. First, the greater market competition 
that economic globalization implies reduces the “rents” available for union extraction 
(Abowd and Lemieux 1993).  This could occur as the result of more competition in the 
international marketplace (for firms that are exporting) or more domestic competition 
(arising from imports or inward flowing foreign direct investments). Second, since capital 
tends to be more mobile than labor, employers can invest abroad (rather than domestically) 
if labor costs become too high, but workers cannot easily move abroad if wages become 
too low (Rodrik 1997; Salvatore 1998; Brady and Wallace 2000).   
                                            
52 This definition is a slightly modified version of that provided by Li and Reuveny (2003).  
53 Immigration, while potentially consequential for the union effect on wage inequality and other socio-
economic outcomes, is likely to work through a very different set of mechanisms than the (potential) cross-
border flow of goods, services, and capital.  Therefore, in an effort to maintain theoretical clarity, the term 
“economic globalization” refers only to the latter phenomena in this article.   
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 Declining rents and/or greater opportunities for employers relative to workers is 
likely to have profound effects on the preferences and bargaining strategies of employers 
and unions.  Employers are likely to be more cutthroat in their efforts to keep labor costs 
down and threaten to exit the domestic market if their demands for lower labor costs are 
not met (Huber and Stephens 1998; Flanagan 2007; Rosenfeld and Western 2012).  Unions, 
on the other hand, will find themselves faced with a more pronounced “wage-employment 
trade-off”, whereby higher wages increasingly translate into less available employment 
(Dumont et al. 2005).  Since collective bargaining means that unions have at least some 
say in the outcome of this trade-off, many will choose to restrain wages in order to salvage 
union jobs (Rosenfeld and Western 2012).   
If economic globalization diminishes union bargaining power, produces more 
aggressive bargaining strategies on the part of employers, and weakens union preference 
for wage gains, then this leads us to the following expectation:  
 
The employer mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world 
economy, the ability and willingness of unions to reduce wage inequality between 
employers (managers) and union workers will decline 
 
Intra-union mechanism 
 
The primary way economic globalization impacts intra-union wage compression is 
through its effect on the collective interests of union workers and therefore union solidarity; 
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for while economic globalization harms the ability of some union workers to extract wage 
gains, it is unlikely to do so for others.   
In regard to available rents for union extraction, many sectors – such as education 
and transportation – are substantially sheltered from international competition, while other 
sectors – such as manufacturing – are not; and firms involved in the production of highly 
capital intensive and/or innovative goods or services – such as airplanes or wealth 
management - are likely to experience less of an increase in foreign competition as a result 
of economic globalization than firms involved in the production of less capital intensive 
and innovative goods or services – such as clothes, economy automobiles,54 or call center 
customer service. This suggests that employers and unions in some sectors and firms are 
impacted more by economic globalization than employers and unions in other sectors and 
firms.   
In regard to employers’ ability to offshore and shift investments abroad, many 
occupations - such as railroad engineers and longshoremen – produce a service that cannot 
be delivered over long distances (with current technology), while other occupations – such 
as those in manufacturing or call centers – produce a product that can; and occupations 
requiring highly specific skill sets – such as commercial aircraft piloting – are relatively 
scarce globally, while occupations requiring skill sets that are more easily acquired – such 
as product assembling – are not.  This suggests that union members in some occupations 
                                            
54 Of course, there are firms that produce some “premium” products and other “economy” products.  In such 
a case, the ability and willingness of unions to extract wage gains will likely be determined by the particular 
product mix, with firms generating more revenue from premium products being riper for wage extraction 
than firms generating more revenue from economy products. 
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(and those that employ them) are impacted less by economic globalization than union 
members in other occupations (and those that employ them).   
If economic globalization reduces the rents in some sectors and firms more than 
others and provides opportunities to offshore some occupations but not others, then the 
preferences and bargaining strategies of different types of employers and union workers 
are likely to diverge considerably as economic globalization expands.  Employers in more 
sheltered, capital intensive, and/or highly innovative sectors will be less cutthroat in their 
efforts to keep labor costs down, and will either not threaten to exit the domestic market at 
all or not do so to the same extent as employers in less sheltered, capital intensive, and/or 
innovative sectors (Silver 2003).  The same can be said for employers in their interaction 
with union workers providing services that cannot be delivered over long distances or that 
hold a highly specific skill set that is scarce globally.  In addition, unions representing 
workers in sectors or firms experiencing minimal global competition or union workers in 
occupations experiencing minimal threat from foreign workers will not confront an 
increasingly steep wage-employment trade-off as a result of economic globalization, and 
are therefore unlikely to moderate their wage demands in response to it.    
If some union workers are losing their ability to demand higher wages while other 
union workers are not, then union movements should grow increasingly divided over the 
desirability and acceptability of particular wage bargaining agreements.55  Union workers 
                                            
55 While these strains in union solidarity may eventually lead to wholesale reform of collective wage 
bargaining institutions (e.g., the devolution of wage bargaining from the national to the sectoral level), such 
reforms tend to occur as discrete events, not in incremental stages (Western 1997).  In the meantime, unions 
need to hash out new collective bargaining agreements in old institutional contexts.  If or when there is 
successful institutional reform, preferences should continue to diverge as a country grows more exposed to 
the world economy, even as wage bargaining institutions (once again) remain relatively stable.   
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with an increasingly steep wage-employment trade-off should offer wage concessions in 
exchange for employment guarantees, while union workers with a weaker and more stable 
wage-employment trade-off should be able to (successfully) resist such wage restraint 
(Western 1997).  The overall effect of this dynamic for the intra-union mechanism depends 
on whether traditionally higher-paid union workers disproportionately occupy the former 
or latter category.  If the former, then intra-union wage dispersion will diminish as better-
paid union workers engage in wage restraint.  If the latter, then intra-union wage dispersion 
will grow as better-paid union workers resist wage restraint (and thus also wage 
compression) (Wallerstein et al. 1997).  Given that the union workers that are maintaining 
the ability and willingness to demand higher wages are generally also those that hold 
substantial market power in a less open and competitive economy (i.e., those in relatively 
sheltered sectors and/or those holding a relatively scarce skill set56), economic 
globalization should result in larger wage gains for already higher-paid union workers than 
for already lower-paid union workers, and therefore reduce intra-union wage compression.  
This leads us to the following expectation: 
 
The intra-union mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world 
economy, the ability and willingness of unions to reduce wage inequality between union 
members will decline  
 
 
                                            
56 It is unclear whether union workers providing services in which proximity is critical are, in the aggregate, 
lower- or higher-paid than union workers providing services in which proximity is less important.  For 
example, retail store clerks and nurses’ aides are likely paid less than most workers in the manufacturing 
sector (who occupy positions that can be offshored), while university professors and railroad engineers are 
likely paid more.  
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Insider Mechanism 
 
If lower-paid union workers are not receiving as much of a benefit from union 
membership as previously, then this will result in fewer pour over and spillover effects.  In 
regard to pour over effects, the wage restraint increasingly practiced by lower-paid union 
workers will result in lower-paid non-union workers covered by union contracts receiving 
less of a benefit from union bargaining than previously (as they practice wage restraint by 
proxy).  In regard to spillover effects, there will be less of an incentive for (potential) lower-
paid non-union workers to join unions and thus also for employers to offer higher wages 
to these workers in an effort to preempt union organizing efforts or to entice such 
individuals away from already unionized establishments (Flanagan 2007).  This leads us to 
the following expectation:  
 
The insider mechanism hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world 
economy, the tendency of unions to reduce wage inequality between lower-paid non-union 
workers and their employers (managers) will decline57 
 
Briefly summarized, economic globalization, through its effects on the competitive 
environment confronted by employers and unions and thus also these actors’ preferences, 
                                            
57 If lower-paid union workers have traditionally earned a substantial wage premium, then the wage restraint 
increasingly practiced by these workers implies two additional (and contradictory) trends.  First, shrinking 
wage dispersion between lower-paid union workers and similar lower-paid non-union workers.  Second, 
growing wage dispersion between lower-paid union workers and dissimilar but higher-paid non-union 
workers.  However, the net result of these two contradictory trends is not obvious and therefore leads to no 
firm expectations.   
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reduces the ability and willingness of traditionally lower-paid union workers to extract 
wage gains from their employers while having no such effect on the ability and willingness 
of traditionally higher-paid union workers.  This results in greater earnings dispersion 
between traditionally lower-paid union workers and employers as well as traditionally 
lower-paid union workers and traditionally higher-paid union workers.  Furthermore, this 
decline in the bargaining power of lower-paid union workers diminishes wage compression 
resulting from pour over and spillover effects.  In other words, while the exact impact that 
economic globalization has on the union effect depends on which union mechanism it is 
flowing through, all of these consequences lead to the same general expectation:  
 
General Hypothesis: As a country becomes more exposed to the world economy, the union 
effect on wage inequality will decline 
Data and Methods58   
 
The dependent variable employed in most studies examining the determinants of 
wage inequality in wealthy democracies is the 90/10 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross 
earnings of a full-time dependent employee at the ninetieth percentile to that of a full-time 
dependent employee at the tenth percentile) provided by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).  Unfortunately, this variable will not allow us to 
test the employer mechanism hypothesis or the intra-union mechanism hypotheses, as 
union workers tend to be situated modestly above or modestly below the median wage 
                                            
58 Data and do file are available from the author upon request. 
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earner (Checchi et al. 2010).  In an effort to better capture the dynamics that were postulated 
in these hypotheses, I will instead utilize the other two wage ratios provided by the OECD: 
the 90/50 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross earnings of a full-time dependent employee at 
the ninetieth percentile to that of a full-time dependent employee at the median) and the 
50/10 wage ratio (the ratio of the gross earnings of a full-time dependent employee at the 
median to that of a full-time dependent employee at the tenth percentile).  However, the 
90/10 wage ratio will be employed to test the insider mechanism (more on each of these 
dependent variables and their accompanying theoretical expectations below).  
A shortcoming of all of the wage inequality data is its severely unbalanced nature.  
The primary purpose of this article is to determine what contributed to the disappearance 
of the union effect on wage inequality in the 1990s.  However, there are only a limited 
number of countries for which there are multiple observations both before and after that 
period.  Table 5 summarizes the availability of wage inequality data for the 18 countries 
typically examined in time-series cross-sectional analyses of the determinants of wage 
inequality in wealthy democracies.59  Countries are grouped by the year in which their 
wage inequality data series begins.  Group 1 has wage ratio data that begins during or 
before the mid-1970s; Group 2 has wage ratio data that begins between the mid-to-late 
1970s and 1990; Group 3 has wage ratio data that begins in the early to mid-1990s; and 
Group 4 has wage ratio data that begins in 1995 or later.   All countries have wage data 
available through 2010.  Columns three through five provide the level of the respective 
wage ratios in each country in the last year of the data series (2010) and columns six 
                                            
59 Table 1 includes linearly interpolated data for missing observations in the wage inequality dataset.  
Interpolated observations account for approximately 9.1 percent of all observations. 
 76 
 
Table 5.  Wage Inequality, Union Strength, and Economic Globalization Data for 18 
Wealthy Democracies  
 
Country 
First 
Year 
of 
Wage 
Ratio 
Data† 
90/10 
Wage 
Ratio        
(2010) 
90/50 
Wage 
Ratio        
(2010) 
50/10 
Wage 
Ratio        
(2010) 
Union 
Density 
Level of 
Wage 
Bargain-
ing 
Econ. 
Global 
Index 
Capital 
Open- 
ness 
                  
Group 1                 
United 
Kingdom 
1970 
3.58 1.98 1.81 35.9 1.6 60.8 2.4 
United States 1973 5.01 2.37 2.12 14.9 1 36.7 2.4 
Australia 1975 3.33 2 1.67 33 2.9 61.2 1.4 
Japan 1975 2.96 1.83 1.62 24 1 23 2.3 
Sweden 1975 2.23 1.62 1.38 78.8 3.5 69.9 1.8 
Group Avg.   3.42 1.96 1.72 37.3 2 50.3 2.1 
                  
Group 2                 
Finland 1977 2.52 1.74 1.45 73.3 4.2 64.8 1.9 
Denmark 1980 2.8 1.68 1.66 74.2 3.3 75.4 1.7 
New Zealand 1984 2.83 1.81 1.56 36.5 1.9 63.8 2 
Italy 1986 2.22 1.53 1.45 38.3 2.9 52 1.3 
Group Avg.   2.59 1.69 1.53 55.6 3.1 64 1.7 
                  
Group 3                 
Germany 1992 3.33 1.8 1.86 28.3 3 45.4 2.4 
Ireland 1994 3.63 2 1.81 43.4 3.9 94.8 1.3 
Group Avg.   3.48 1.9 1.84 35.9 3.5 70.1 1.9 
                  
Group 4                 
France 1995 2.97 1.99 1.5 10.3 2 47.3 1.4 
Switzerland 1996 2.7 1.84 1.47 22 3 79.8 2.4††  
Canada 1997 3.71 1.89 1.97 31.6 1 72.1 2.4 
Norway 1997 2.3 1.47 1.56 56.3 3.7 69.2 1.2 
Belgium 1999 2.38 1.73 1.37 51.1 4.5 89.9 1.7 
Netherlands 2002 2.89 1.78 1.62 24.5 3.3 87.7 2.4 
Austria 2004 3.39 1.94 1.74 41.8 3 68.9 1.9 
Group Avg.   2.91 1.81 1.6 33.9 2.9 73.6 1.9 
                  
Total Avg.   3.04 1.83 1.65 39.9 2.8 64.6 1.9 
 
† Wage ratios are available through 2010 for all 18 wealthy democracies. 
†† Capital mobility data missing for Switzerland before 1996. 
 77 
 
through nine provide the average level of the main variables of theoretical interest (more 
on these below) by country for all years for which the data is available between 1980 and 
2010.  
There are several important points to note.  First, previous analyses of wage 
inequality have typically examined all available country-years beginning in the early-to-
mid 1970s (e.g., see Pontusson et al. 2002 and Rueda 2008).  However, only five countries 
(Group 1) have wage inequality data stretching back that far.  This group of countries have 
relatively high wage inequality and the lowest average levels of wage bargaining and the 
economic globalization index.  Therefore, an analysis that includes all available country-
years beginning in the early-to-mid 1970s likely produces results that are skewed toward 
five countries that are not representative of wealthy democracies in general.  Second, seven 
countries (Group 4) do not have wage inequality data available until 1995 or later (with the 
data for two of those countries, Austria and the Netherlands, starting after 2000).  Such a 
small number of observations inhibit the ability to conduct time-series analysis and make 
it difficult (or impossible) to determine if the union effect on wage inequality diminished 
in these countries during the 1990s.  Furthermore, two additional countries (Group 3) have 
only a very small number of observations (three and one, respectively) before 1995.  Third, 
Group 4 has the lowest average level of union density and the highest average level of the 
economic globalization index.  Indeed, three of the four countries with the highest average 
level of the economic globalization index (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) are 
in this group (the lone exception being Ireland, which is in Group 3).  In short, at least in 
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regard to the variables of theoretical interest to us here, there does appear to be a systematic 
difference between the countries with relatively short and relatively long wage data series.  
In an effort to be sure that any observed over-time variations in the union effect are 
the result of changes within countries, not only differences between them, the primary 
models will include only those countries in Group 1 and Group 2 (minus New Zealand60) 
and cover the 1980 to 2010 period.  These countries and this time period were chosen 
because they allow us to examine a more diverse set of countries than if we examined 
Group 1 alone, include all of the control variables in the full models (see below), and 
maintain a substantial number of observations both before and after the assumed critical 
juncture of the early to mid-1990s.  This should provide us with confidence that the 
observed results are not disproportionately driven by particular types of countries or 
specific time periods.  However, in an effort to determine the robustness of the above 
results, additional models will be presented that include all eleven countries in Group 1, 
Group 2, and Group 3.   
 
Main Variables of Theoretical Interest 
 
The empirical analysis will utilize the two most common measures for union 
strength in the wage inequality literature; union density and the level of wage bargaining.  
Union density refers to the proportion of employed individuals that belong to a union.  The 
                                            
60 New Zealand is missing private service sector employment and public sector employment data.  In order 
to include all of the control variables in the full models, New Zealand was excluded from the primary analysis.  
However, New Zealand (along with Germany and Ireland) are included in an additional model serving as a 
robustness check. 
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level of wage bargaining refers to the primary level at which unions and employers 
negotiate over compensation, ranging from firm-level, to sectoral-level, to national level 
bargaining. The level of wage bargaining is measured here with an ordered categorical 
variable ranging from 1 to 5.  Higher values indicate a more centralized wage bargaining 
system.61  Data for all of these union measures are from the Database on Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
(ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0. 
Economic globalization is measured with an economic globalization index that 
captures the actual cross-border flows of goods, services, investments (foreign direct 
investments and portfolio investments), and monetary transfers; and a capital openness 
measure that captures the potential for domestic employers to invest abroad and for foreign 
employers to invest domestically by considering the legal restrictions on cross-border 
financial transactions.62  The economic globalization index ranges from 0 to 100, with 
higher values indicating greater cross-border flows, and is provided by Dreher (2006).  The 
capital openness measure ranges from -1.9 to 2.4, with higher values indicating fewer 
restrictions on cross-border financial transactions, and is provided by Chinn and Ito (2008).   
 
 
 
                                            
61 See appendix A for details. 
62 Excluded from the analysis are the much more limited measures for economic globalization that are 
commonly used in models of wage inequality in wealthy democracies; total trade and trade with LDCs.  These 
measures do not capture the increased market competition that arises from foreign owned but domestically 
located multi-national corporations (MNCs), nor do they consider the willingness and ability of employers 
to offshore or invest abroad.   
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Control Variables  
 
In addition to union strength and economic globalization, the socio-economic 
factors most frequently cited in the determinants of wage inequality literature are national 
wealth, private service sector employment, public sector employment, unemployment, 
female labor force participation, education, and immigration.  The most commonly cited 
political factor is government partisanship.63  Theoretical expectations, data measurement, 
and sources for all control variables can be found in Appendix A. 
 
Estimation Strategy  
 
To examine whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage 
inequality, I utilize single-equation time-series cross-sectional error correction models 
(ECMs) estimated with OLS and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator.  The 
Rogers’ variance estimator allows for valid hypothesis tests in the presence of any pattern 
of correlation within units (countries), including serial correlation and correlation due to 
unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994).  However, this estimator also assumes 
that errors are uncorrelated between units.  This assumption could be violated if there are 
unmodeled factors that impact wage inequality in all or most countries at a particular point 
                                            
63 The ability of partisan governments to impact socio-economic outcomes is almost certainly constrained 
(facilitated) by the political and institutional environment in which such governments operate (e.g. see Clark 
et al. 1998 and Castater 2015).  Therefore, it is probably inappropriate to anticipate left party participation in 
government to have an effect on wage inequality that is relatively constant across countries and over time.  
Surprisingly, however, previous scholarly work on the determinants of wage inequality in wealthy 
democracies has neglected the issue of a conditional partisan effect; and an adequate exploration of the issue 
here would carry us well beyond the scope of this article.    
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in time (Huber et al. 2006).  In order to address this possibility, dummy variables 
representing each decade are included in the analyses.64   
ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other 
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef 
and Keele 2008).65   Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term 
effect of an independent variable on a given dependent variable.  A short-term (or 
immediate) effect indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period 
produces a change in the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period.  By 
contrast, a long-term effect expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an 
independent variable in one time period produces a change in the dependent variable over 
many time periods.   
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way:  
 
ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,  
 
Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its first-
difference form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1).  The short-term effect of an 
independent variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the first-
difference version of the variable (β1).  The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by 
                                            
64 Results for the time dummies are not reported below but are available from the author upon request. 
65 While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data, Enns et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is integrated.  An augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test was conducted on the dependent variables used in this analysis.  The null hypothesis that 
all panels contain a unit root could not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater, indicating 
that the dependent variables are integrated. 
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dividing the coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the 
lagged dependent variable (α1).  The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction 
rate” and represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable 
arrive back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable.  For 
example, an α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long-term effect is felt after 
one time period, that 10 percent of the remaining long-term effect is felt in the following 
time period, and so on.  Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to 
equilibrium. 
I begin by examining the full model of the 90/10 wage ratio separately for the 1980 
to 1994 period and the 1995 to 2010 period.  Since a version of this wage ratio66 was 
employed by the scholars who observed the disappearance of the union effect, we should 
find one or more of the union strength measures to have a statistically significant effect in 
the earlier time period but not in the latter.  The union strength measure(s) found to have a 
time-varying effect on wage inequality in these models will in subsequent models be 
separately interacted with the level form of the economic globalization index and the level 
form of the capital openness measure.  The level rather than the first-difference form of 
these variables are chosen because the theoretical explanations provided above are in 
regard to whether a state is more or less exposed to the global economy; not whether a state 
happens to become more or less exposed in a particular year.  The interaction terms are 
expected to have significant and positive coefficients, indicating that unions become less 
                                            
66 Golden and Wallerstein (2011) utilize a differenced natural logarithmic version of the 90/10 wage ratio 
[ln(p90-p10/p10)]; while Pontusson (2013) examines both the level of the 90/10 wage ratio and the long-
term change in the 90/10 wage ratio.   
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wage inequality reducing as a state becomes more exposed to the global economy.  The 
coefficient for the union strength measure that is a component of the interaction terms 
informs us of the impact that a one unit increase in this measure has on wage inequality 
when both the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are zero. 
Since there are no country-years in which a state has had no actual cross-border flows of 
goods, services, investments, and monetary transfers, this result has little substantive 
meaning by itself.  However, the central contention in this article is that a major cause of 
the recent disappearance in the union effect on wage inequality is the increasing exposure 
of states to the world economy.  Such an argument clearly implies that unions reduce wage 
inequality when they are minimally exposed to the global economy. Therefore, we should 
expect the coefficient of the union strength measure that is a component of the interaction 
terms to have a significant negative sign.   
If we assume that the wage gains of lower-paid union workers spillover to low-paid 
non-union workers and the wage gains of higher-paid union workers spillover to non-union 
workers near the median, then we would expect lower-paid union workers to matter more 
for the bottom half of the wage distribution and higher-paid union workers to matter more 
for the upper half of the wage distribution.  The employer mechanism hypothesis 
anticipates that economic globalization will reduce the wage extraction ability of all union 
workers, and thus diminish the union effect on both the 90/50 wage ratio (the upper half of 
the wage distribution) and the 50/10 wage ratio (the lower half of the wage distribution).  
The intra-union mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will almost 
exclusively reduce the wage extracting ability of lower-paid union workers, and thus 
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condition the union effect on the 50/10 wage ratio to a greater extent than the union effect 
on the 90/50 wage ratio.  In order to test this expectation, I employ the “skew” variable 
(the 90/50 wage ratio divided by the 50/10 wage ratio) conceptualized by Lupu and 
Pontusson (2011).  The insider mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic 
globalization will reduce the wages of low-paid non-union workers relative to their 
employers as a result of fewer pour over and spillover effects.  The 90/10 wage ratio will 
be utilized to test this hypothesis, under the assumption that the ninetieth percentile of wage 
earners primarily consists of professionals and employers (managers).  Finally, the general 
hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will diminish the union effect on all 
three wage ratios. 
Results 
 
The first two models in Table 6 employ the 90/10 wage ratio to examine whether 
the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades as previous research 
suggests.  Model 1 focuses exclusively on the 1980 to 1994 period while Model 2 focuses 
exclusively on the 1995 to 2010 period.  Both models include all of the variables referenced 
above but exclude the interaction terms.  Only those variables of main theoretical interest 
are included in the table.67  The results provide support for the contention that the union 
effect on wage inequality disappeared at some point in the 1990s.  In the model that covers 
the 1980 to 1994 period (Model 1), union density is found to have a negative and 
statistically significant long-term effect on wage inequality (p-value = .023).  By contrast,  
                                            
67 See Appendix B for full results.   
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Table 6.  Determinants of Wage Inequality in 8 Wealthy Democracies, 1980 to 2010 
(1980 to 1994; 1995 to 2010)  
 
Model 
1                                    
(Full) 
2                         
(Full) 
3            
(Reduced) 
4                    
(Reduced) 
5                            
(Reduced) 
6               
(Reduced) 
Years 
1980-
1994 
1995-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
Countries 
Groups 
1&2†                        
Groups 
1&2†                           
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1) 
-
0.139*** 
-0.060* -0.027** -0.100*** -0.068*** -0.268** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.029) (0.019) (0.096) 
Δ Union Density (t) 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003* 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Union Density (t-1) -0.004** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.007 -0.001         
  (0.001) (0.007)         
Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1) -0.007 0.008         
  (0.008) (0.007)         
Δ EG Index 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EG Index (t-1) 0.002 -0.004** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X EG Index (t-1)     0.000** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.000** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Capital Openness (t) -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 0.006 -0.005 0.001 
  (0.029) (0.038) (0.040) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) 
Capital Openness (t-1) 0.001 0.009 -0.030*** -0.003 -0.008* -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Union Density X Capital Openness (t-
1) 
    0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 106 128 234 234 234 234 
R2 0.361 0.248 0.133 0.120 0.163 0.217 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)  
† Excludes New Zealand (see fn. 60) 
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union density does not have a statistically significant long-term (or short-term) effect in 
the model that covers the period since 1995 (Model 2).  Indeed, the coefficient on the 
lagged level version of the union density variable is positive in this model.  The level of 
wage bargaining is not found to have a significant effect on wage inequality in either Model 
1 or Model 2, suggesting that if economic globalization is conditioning the union effect on 
wage inequality, it is doing so primarily through union density.   
The last four models in Table 6 examine whether economic globalization is 
conditioning the union effect.  All four models cover the entire 1980 to 2010 period and 
include two interaction terms, each consisting of the union strength measure found to have 
a time-varying effect on wage inequality in Model 1 and Model 2 (the lagged level version 
of the union density variable) and the lagged level version of one of the economic 
globalization variables described above; the economic globalization index and the capital 
openness measure, respectively.  Model 3 is a reduced model of the 90/10 wage ratio, 
Model 4 is a reduced model of the 90/50 wage ratio, Model 5 is a reduced model of the 
50/10 wage ratio, and Model 6 is a reduced model of the skew variable.68    
As anticipated, the union density measure that serves as a component of the 
interaction terms is found to have a negative and statistically significant effect (at the 99 
                                            
68 Since including the interaction terms with all of the control variables would demand a lot of the relatively 
small dataset utilized in this analysis, only the results of the reduced models are reported here.  These full 
models included all of the control variables outlined above along with a union density squared term to control 
for the possibility that the union effect on wage inequality has diminished due to the declining union density 
levels that have been observed in nearly all wealthy democracies since the 1990s.  If a non-interaction control 
variable was found to have a statistically significant long-term effect (at the 90 percent confidence level) in 
a given full model, both its first-difference and lagged level form were included in the reduced model.  If the 
first-difference version of a non-interaction control variable was found to have a statistically significant effect 
(at the 90 percent confidence level), only this version of the variable was included in the reduced model.  The 
results of these full models are available from the author upon request.   
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percent confidence level) across Models 3, 4, and 5. This signifies that in the hypothetical 
situation in which the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are 
zero, unions significantly reduce all three wage ratios.69  The employer mechanism 
hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization will weaken the tendency of unions to 
reduce both the 90/50 and 50/10 wage ratios.  This expectation finds support.  The 
interaction term containing the economic globalization index is positive and statistically 
significant in both Model 4 and Model 5 (at the 90 percent confidence level and 99 percent 
confidence level, respectively).  The interaction term containing the capital openness 
measure is not statistically significant in either model.   
In order to examine whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on 
the 90/50 and 50/10 wage ratios in a similar manner, Figure 4 plots the marginal union 
effect on each of these wage ratios when the capital openness measure is held at its mean 
level for the entire 1980 to 2010 period (1.93).70  The x axis in the figure corresponds to 
the levels of the economic globalization index observed between 1980 and 2010 in the 
countries examined in Table 2.  The short dash vertical line signifies the average score of 
the economic globalization index in the 1980 to 1994 period; and the long dash vertical 
line signifies the average score of the economic globalization index in the 1995 to 2010 
period.  Broadly, we observe that while economic globalization conditions the union effect  
 
                                            
69 The error correction rates in the models of the three wage ratios are statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level or greater.  The value of these error correction rates inform us that a shift in the level of an 
independent variable produces an effect on wage inequality that is incrementally distributed over time and 
not fully realized for approximately 37 years in Model 3, approximately 10 years in Model 4, and 
approximately 15 years in Model 5. 
70 The averages and ranges utilized in this empirical analysis are for the eight countries (Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK, and the US) and time period (1980 to 2010) examined in Models 3 
through 6. 
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Figure 4.  Conditional Effect of Union Density on Wage Inequality Across Range of 
Economic Globalization Index and Capital Openness Levels in 8 Wealthy 
Democracies, 1980 to 2010  
*Estimates derived from Model 4 (left graph) and Model 5 (right graph). 
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on both the upper and lower parts of the wage distribution, the impact is much greater on 
the latter than the former.  The union effect on the 90/50 wage ratio is present until the 
economic globalization index reaches 77, substantially higher than the average economic 
globalization index score for both the 1980 to 1994 period and the 1995 to 2010 period.  
By contrast, the union effect on the 50/10 wage ratio is only present until the economic 
globalization index reaches 49, only slightly higher than the average economic 
globalization index score in the 1980 to 1994 period and lower than the average economic 
globalization index score in the 1995 to 2010 period.  Indeed, when the economic 
globalization index exceeds 72, unions are found to significantly increase the 50/10 wage 
ratio (at the 95 percent confidence level).  In short, although the (traditional) union effect 
on the lower half of the wage distribution has disappeared since the 1990s, the union effect 
on the upper half of the wage distribution has not. 
The finding that economic globalization conditions the union effect on the lower 
half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the union effect on the upper half of 
the wage distribution suggests that economic globalization also conditions the union effect 
on the “structure” of the wage distribution.  Model 6 confirms this intuition.  While the 
union strength variable that serves as a component of the interaction terms is statistically 
insignificant, the interaction term containing the economic globalization index is found to 
be negative and statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level).  This informs 
us that as a state becomes more exposed to the world economy, unions begin to shrink the 
upper half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the lower half.  In particular, 
when the capital openness measure is held at its mean level for the entire 1980 to 2010 
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period, this “anti-skew effect” becomes statistically significant (at the 95 percent 
confidence level) as the economic globalization index exceeds 69, a condition that first 
existed in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the 1990s and Australia in 2006.  Given that 
economic globalization appears to increase the distance between the higher-paid and lower-
paid union effect, the implication is that economic globalization diminishes the willingness 
and/or ability of unions to compress the union wage distribution, and thus provides support 
for the intra-union hypothesis.  The interaction term containing capital openness is not 
found to be statistically significant in Model 6. 
Finally, the insider mechanism hypothesis anticipates that economic globalization 
will weaken the tendency of unions to reduce the 90/10 wage ratio, as low-paid non-union 
workers increasingly lose relative to their employers.  This expectation finds support in 
Model 3, where both the interaction term containing the economic globalization index and 
the interaction term containing the capital openness measure are positive and statistically 
significant (at the 95 percent confidence level and 99 percent confidence level, 
respectively).   
Figure 5 plots the marginal union effect on the 90/10 wage ratio at different levels 
of the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure, respectively.  The 
graphs on the top row illustrate the conditioning effect of each of the economic 
globalization variables when the other economic globalization variable is held at its mean 
level for the 1980 to 1994 period.  The graphs on the bottom row illustrate the conditioning 
effect of each of the economic globalization variables when the other economic  
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Figure 5.  Conditional Effect of Union Density on Wage Inequality Across Range of 
Economic Globalization Index and Capital Openness Levels in 8 Wealthy 
Democracies, 1980 to 1994; 1995 to 2010  
*Estimates derived from Model 3. 
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globalization variable is held at its mean level for the 1995 to 2010 period.71  The dashed 
vertical lines signify the average level of the economic globalization variable along the x 
axis for the period covered in the graph. 
When the economic globalization index and the capital openness measure are at 
their average for the 1980 to 1994 period (46.8 and 1.5, respectively), a one standard 
deviation increase in union density (24.2 percentage points) decreases the 90/10 wage ratio 
by 1.49, or by about 2.02 standard deviations.   This is slightly greater than the difference 
between the average level of the 90/10 wage ratio in Sweden (the country with the lowest 
average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis) and the United Kingdom (the county with the 
second highest average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis) for the entire 1980 to 2010 period.  
Although the union effect on the 90/10 wage ratio is found to consistently decline between 
1980 and 1994, unions still significantly reduce this wage ratio (at the 95 percent 
confidence level or higher) at all existing levels of the economic globalization index and 
the capital openness measure during this period.  By contrast, when the economic 
globalization index and capital openness measures are at their average for the 1995 to 2010 
period (63.6 and 2.3, respectively), the effect of a one standard deviation increase in union 
density is .7, or .94 standard deviations, less than half of that of the earlier period.  This is 
now equivalent to the difference in the average level of the 90/10 wage ratio in Sweden 
and Australia (the country with the fourth highest average 90/10 wage ratio in the analysis) 
for the entire 1980 to 2010 period.  Between 1995 and 2010, unions are found to no longer 
significantly reduce the 90/10 wage ratio (at the 95 percent confidence level) when the 
                                            
71 The x axes in Figure 5 correspond to the levels of the economic globalization index and the capital openness 
measure, respectively, for the time period covered in the given graph. 
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economic globalization index exceeds 71, a condition that existed in four of the eight 
countries examined in Table 2 (Australia, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden) by the end of 
the first decade of the twenty-first century.  Furthermore, while unions continue to 
significantly reduce the 90/10 wage ratio at all existing levels of the capital openness 
measure between 1995 and 2010, they just barely do so when this measure hits its upper 
bound limit (2.46), a condition that existed in seven of the eight countries examined in 
Table 6 (the lone exception being Australia) during the entire first decade of the twenty-
first century.   
The primary purpose of the interaction terms included here was to determine 
whether economic globalization conditions the union effect on wage inequality, but the 
inherently symmetrical nature of interaction terms allows us to simultaneously observe 
whether unions condition the economic globalization effect on wage inequality as well 
(Berry et al. 2012).  Somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient on the economic globalization 
index that is a component of the interaction term is negative and statistically significant (at 
the 95 percent confidence level or higher) in the models containing the tenth percentile of 
wage earners (i.e., Model 3 and Model 5); while, once again, most of the interaction terms 
in these models are positive and statistically significant (at the 95 percent level or higher).  
These results inform us that economic globalization strengthens the relative economic 
position of many of the lowest-paid non-union workers when union density is at low to 
moderate levels and that greater union density actually diminishes this negative economic 
globalization effect.  While the exact mechanisms behind this result will have to be 
examined in future research, one tentative explanation is that the higher labor costs that 
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greater union density implies may, over time, increase the tendency of domestic employers 
to (threaten to) exercise their exit option and/or decrease the desire of foreign investors to 
invest in a given host country (Silver 2003).  Either or both of these scenarios might be 
expected to decrease demand for less skilled labor and thus also lead to greater wage 
inequality.   
In regard to the control variables, six are found to be statistically significant at the 
95 percent confidence level or higher in at least one of the wage ratio models (full results 
are reported in Appendix B):  immigration, female labor force participation, education, 
private service sector employment, and left government.  Greater immigration and female 
labor force participation increase all three wage ratios, informing us that an influx of 
workers competing for lower-paid jobs exacerbates wage inequality generally; a higher 
proportion of individuals with a secondary education decreases all three wage ratios, 
demonstrating that an increased supply of educated workers reduces the “skill wage 
premium”; a higher proportion of individuals in the private service sector decrease the 
wage ratios containing wage earners at the ninetieth percentile (i.e., the 90/10 and 90/50 
wage ratios), suggesting that expansion in private service sector employment implies a 
larger relative supply of low-end service sector jobs (e.g., in retail) than high-end service 
sector jobs (e.g., in the legal and medical professions); greater left party participation in 
government decreases the wage ratios containing wage earners at the tenth percentile (i.e., 
the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), providing evidence that partisan policy platforms matter 
most for workers at the lower-end of the wage distribution (likely through higher 
reservation wages, minimum wages, and investments in education and/or worker training); 
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and unemployment significantly reduces the 50/10 wage ratio owing to the 
disproportionate number of lower-paid workers losing (gaining) employment when 
unemployment rises (falls).72   
The models in Table 7 replicate the interaction models in Table 2 but include New 
Zealand and the two countries in Group 3 (Germany and Ireland).73  Model 7 replicates 
Model 3, Model 8 replicates Model 4, and so on. We once again observe that the union 
density measure that serves as a component of the interaction terms (the lagged level 
version of the union density variable) is found to have a negative and statistically 
significant effect (at the 99 percent confidence level) across all three wage ratios.  
Furthermore, the coefficient on the interaction terms containing the economic globalization 
index remains positive and statistically significant (at the 99 percent confidence level) in 
the models of the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios (i.e., Model 7 and Model 9).  However, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term containing the 
economic globalization index has now been replaced by a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction term containing the capital openness measure in 
the model of the 90/50 wage ratio (Model 8), while the same interaction term has turned 
statistically insignificant in the model of the 50/10 wage ratio (Model 9).74  These results,  
 
                                            
72 Contrary to expectations, the squared union density term has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient (at the 99 percent confidence level) in the model of the 90/50 wage ratio (Model 4).  One potential 
explanation for this finding is the tendency of unions to increasingly represent higher-paid workers as 
unionization declines (see Han and Castater 2014 and Castater and Han 2015). 
73 The private service sector employment and public sector employment data are unavailable for New Zealand 
and Germany and thus are dropped from the models in Table 7. 
74 In regard to the control variables in the models in Table 7, the most robust findings are for female labor 
force participation (long-term positive effect on the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), left government (long-
term negative effect on the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios), and the union density squared term (positive effect 
on the 90/50 wage ratio).  See Appendix C for full results.   
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Table 7. Determinants of Wage Inequality in 11 Wealthy Democracies, 1980 to 2010   
 
Model 
7                     
(Reduced) 
8                   
(Reduced) 
9                           
(Reduced) 
10                     
(Reduced) 
Years 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 
Countries Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3                                Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3 
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.040** -0.042*** -0.079*** -0.165*** 
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.025) (0.048) 
Δ Union Density (t) 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Union Density (t-1) -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ EG Index 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EG Index (t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union Density X EG Index (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Capital Openness (t) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 
  (0.039) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) 
Capital Openness (t-1) -0.018 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013 
  (0.020) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) 
Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1) 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) -0.002       
  (0.004)       
N 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.078 0.065 0.120 0.135 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10)  
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while moderately different than those reported in Table 6, continue to provide support for 
the employer and insider mechanism hypotheses, as an interaction term is found to be 
statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level) in all three wage ratio models.75  
The results for the skew model (Model 10) are also similar to those observed in Table 6, 
as the union density variable that is a component of the interaction terms and the interaction 
term containing the capital openness measure remain statistically insignificant while the 
coefficient on the interaction term containing the economic globalization index remains 
negative and statistically significant (at the 95 percent confidence level).  This finding lends 
further support to the intra-union hypothesis, or that the willingness and ability of unions 
to reduce wage inequality between union members declines as a country becomes more 
exposed to the world economy. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Unlike previous scholarship, this article provides a comprehensive explanation of 
the conditional nature of the union effect on wage inequality and conducts empirical tests 
to determine the validity of the theoretical claims that are offered.   I began by identifying 
and consolidating the three processes by which unions have been argued to impact wage 
inequality, which I labeled the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.  I then 
argued that economic globalization – broadly defined as the exposure of states to the world 
economy – weakens or alters the expression of each of these mechanisms, and thus also 
the union effect on wage inequality more generally.  More specifically, economic 
                                            
75 However, it should be noted that economic globalization does not significantly reduce any of the wage 
ratios in the models in Table 7 at low levels of union density.    
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globalization, through its effects on the competitive environment confronted by different 
types of employers and union workers, reduces the ability and therefore willingness of 
unions to compress the employer/union, union/union, and employer/non-union wage 
distributions (and, by implication, the union/non-union wage distribution as well).  A series 
of single-equation time-series cross-sectional error-correction models including interaction 
terms, a set of controls, and different wage ratios provided robust evidence for these 
theoretical claims.   
Has the union effect on wage inequality disappeared in recent decades?  That 
depends on what exactly we mean by “the union effect on wage inequality”.  While the 
union effect has declined in general, unions appear to still be able to impact the upper half 
of the wage distribution.  Furthermore, as a country becomes more exposed to the global 
economy, unions increasingly reduce the “skew” of the wage distribution, or compress the 
upper half of the wage distribution to a greater extent than the lower half.  Indeed, such a 
phenomenon requires a qualification of the general hypothesis provided above, for while 
economic globalization was found to reduce the union effect on the extent of wage 
inequality, it was also found to increase the union effect on the structure of wage inequality.  
Finally, while the union effect on the lower half of the wage distribution apparently 
disappears as a country becomes more exposed to the world economy, the evidence 
presented here suggests that the union effect on this part of the wage distribution may 
actually reverse when a country becomes highly exposed to the world economy.  In short, 
the meaning of the “the union effect” depends on which aspects of wage inequality are 
being considered; and increasingly changes as economic globalization proceeds. 
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At first glance, some might infer that such changes in the union effect must be 
substantially responsible for the well documented rise in wage inequality across the 
wealthy democracies in recent decades. After all, if union strength used to account for 
much of the cross-national and over-time variation in wage inequality, with stronger unions 
resulting in less wage inequality, and this union effect has diminished or perhaps even 
reversed, then wage inequality must be higher than it would have been otherwise.   
However, such an interpretation would be neglecting to consider the consistent decline in 
union strength over the last three decades.76  This trend suggests, to the contrary, that union 
decline is no longer contributing to the rise in wage inequality, and, in some cases, may 
even be decreasing wage inequality.  What accounts for this latter phenomenon is not 
exactly clear, although it is likely related to the increasingly precarious nature of much low 
wage non-union employment. 
  While the union effect on wage inequality is in most cases diminishing, this does 
not necessarily mean that the union effect on other aspects of economic inequality is also 
diminishing; or that union membership is providing fewer (relative) benefits to individual 
workers.  Indeed, the theoretical arguments outlined here suggest that as economic 
globalization expands, unions should matter more for the employment security of workers 
in lower-paid jobs and continue to matter for the wages of workers in traditionally higher-
paid jobs.  Furthermore, in an age of “permanent austerity”, unions may be increasingly 
                                            
76 As a number of scholars have noted, union density began a sharp decline across most wealthy democracies 
in the early 1980s after climbing steadily throughout much of the post-World War II period. While several 
European countries initially escaped this fate, the ICTWSS database informs us that by the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, every wealthy democracy included in Table 5 with the exception of Belgium (and 
perhaps Norway) was experiencing such a decline. 
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important for the provision of fringe benefits, such as those relating to healthcare and 
retirement.  Under what conditions unions are willing and able to provide such non-
monetary benefits to their workers has received surprisingly little attention in the political 
science literature, but is certainly worthy of future research.   
A broad implication of this study is that because unions and the workers they 
represent are situated within a particular environmental context, there is unlikely to ever 
be an “independent” union effect that is constant across space and time.  The union effect 
on wage inequality and other socio-economic outcomes is likely to be influenced by a range 
of factors in addition to economic globalization, such as those relating to political 
globalization (e.g., European integration), the partisan or ideological orientation of 
government, and the congruence between public opinion and the traditional union agenda 
of greater wage compression and redistribution (Beckfield 2006; Scheve and Stasavage 
2009; Jacobs and Myers 2014; Castater 2015).  Further work needs to be done to determine 
under what conditions particular union members or union organizations are able to achieve 
their distributional goals, as well as under what conditions these goals may be altered.  
Before concluding, it is important to note three clear shortcomings of this analysis. 
First, data limitations restricted most of the empirical analysis to a relatively small subset 
of wealthy democracies and the 1980 to 2010 period.  Therefore, we cannot state with 
confidence that economic globalization has conditioned the union effect across all wealthy 
democracies, or that union strength translated into less wage inequality throughout most of 
the post-World War II period (as the argument presented here clearly implies).  Second, 
the theoretical expectations outlined above are built on strong micro-foundations that 
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cannot be directly tested with macro-level data such as that used here.  Therefore, additional 
empirical analyses, utilizing survey data and multi-level models, will need to be conducted 
to more fully determine the validity of the theoretical claims.  Third, while arguing that 
economic globalization is substantially responsible for the diminished union effect on wage 
inequality, I have implicitly assumed that the job profile of union workers is more or less 
constant across countries and over-time.  However, a growing body of research 
demonstrates the dubious nature of this assumption.  Most relevant for this analysis, recent 
evidence indicates that unions are increasingly representing higher-skilled and better paid 
workers (Beecher and Pontusson 2011; Han and Castater 2014; Castaer and Han 2015).77  
This implies a further weakening of the intra-union mechanism and a growing tendency of 
the insider mechanism to increase wage inequality.  Furthermore, the limited data available 
on the sectoral composition of national union movements reveals a profound shift in the 
types of sectors that are unionized.  Increasingly, unions are representing fewer workers in 
the traditional union stronghold of manufacturing and representing more workers in the 
sheltered public sector.78  This would suggest that the tendency of economic globalization 
to condition the union effect on wage inequality in the way described here is probably 
fading, although a different type of mediating role for economic globalization (through 
downward pressure on tax rates and government expenditures) may very well be growing 
stronger.   
                                            
77 For other work on cross-national and over-time variation in the composition of union movements, see 
Iversen and Soskice 2009; Nijhuis 2009; Visser and Checchi 2009; and Castater and Han 2015. 
78 According to the ICTWSS database, manufacturing union density and public sector union density were 
almost identical, on average, across the wealthy democracies in the 1980s.  However, between the 1980s and 
2000s, the average manufacturing union density level declined by over 20 percent while the average public 
sector union density level rose by nearly 5 percent.  This occurred at the same time that manufacturing 
employment was falling relative to public sector employment.   
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CHAPTER IV 
GENDERING THE UNION EFFECT ON WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the few areas of broad consensus in the comparative political economy 
literature is that stronger unions translate into less wage inequality.  Indeed, the rapid 
decline in union density (the proportion of workers that belong to a union) and the 
decentralization of wage bargaining institutions are among the most commonly cited 
explanations for the rise in aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies in recent 
decades (Wallerstein 1999; Freeman and Oostendorp 2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; 
Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Martin and Swank 2012).  Receiving 
far less attention, however, has been whether certain types of union workers have 
undergone a more substantial decline than others.  Most relevant to us here is evidence that 
male unionization has fallen substantially more than female unionization; and that a large 
and growing share of union members are women as a result.79  If female unionization 
reduces female wage inequality to the same extent as male unionization reduces male wage 
inequality, then this would imply that aggregate union decline has contributed not only to 
a rise in wage inequality in general, but to a rise in male wage inequality in particular.  Yet 
occupational segregation across the wealthy democracies suggests that the union effect on 
female wage inequality may in fact differ from the union effect on male wage inequality; 
and different degrees and types of such segregation across liberal market economies 
                                            
79 Data on female and male union density is presented below. 
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(LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs) as well as liberal, conservative, and 
social democratic welfare states (Sainsbury 1996; Esping-Andersen 1999; Chang 2000; 
Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005), further suggest that the size of the difference between the union 
effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male wage inequality may depend 
on which of these regime types unions are situated within. 
To assess whether there are differences within and across market institution and 
welfare state regimes in the union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on 
male wage inequality, I utilize European Values Study survey data and conduct a time-
series cross-sectional analysis of 15 wealthy democracies between 1980 and 2010.  The 
evidence I present demonstrates that the union effect on female wage inequality and the 
union effect on male wage inequality are substantially determined by a product of market 
institution and welfare state design – the occupational composition of female and male 
union members.  In particular, the union effect on female wage inequality is less 
widespread than the union effect on male wage inequality in LMEs (with liberal welfare 
states) – the regime in which workers in professional occupations are particularly well 
represented among female union members; while the union effect on female wage 
inequality is more substantial than the union effect on male wage inequality in CMEs with 
conservative welfare states – the regime in which workers in traditionally lower-paid 
occupations are particularly well represented among female union members.  Nonetheless, 
union effects are generally more widespread and substantial in CMEs with conservative 
welfare states than either LMEs or CMEs with social democratic welfare states.  These 
findings suggest that the consequences of union decline for aggregate economic inequality 
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and gender economic inequality depend (indirectly) on the market institution and welfare 
state regime that such union decline is occurring within.   
This article is divided into five sections.  The first section provides descriptive 
statistics on female and male union strength.   The second section generates hypotheses of 
a conditional union effect on female and male wage inequality that is dependent on market 
institution and welfare state regime type. The third section provides information on the 
dependent variables, estimation strategy, and independent variables employed in the 
empirical analysis.  The fourth section reports the results of the empirical analysis and the 
fifth section includes a discussion of the findings.  
Gender-Specific Union Strength 
 
As mentioned at the outset, there is a broad consensus in the comparative political 
economy literature that stronger unions result in less wage inequality; and that union 
weakening is a primary explanation for the rise in aggregate wage inequality in the wealthy 
democracies in recent decades (e.g., see Iversen 1996; Kahn 1998; Wallerstein 1999; Kahn 
2000; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Pontusson et al. 2002; Golden and Londregan 2006; 
Oliver 2008; Martin and Swank 2012).  One of the most common measures for union 
strength in this literature is union density, or the proportion of employed individuals that 
belong to a union.  In order to examine whether union weakening has been equally 
distributed among women and men, Figure 6 utilizes data from the Institutional 
Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts 
(ICTWSS) to separately plot the level of female union density (the proportion of female 
workers that belong to a union) and male union density (the proportion of male workers 
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Figure 6. Female and Male Union Membership in 17 Wealthy Democracies by 
Decade Average, 1970s to 2000s  
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that belong to a union) as well as the proportion of all union members that are female for 
17 wealthy democracies by country-decade average.80  The plots demonstrate that male 
union density has experienced a sharper and steadier decline than female union density; 
and that these union density trends have contributed to an increasing share of union 
members that are female.  Indeed, by the 2000s, seven countries (Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) – all of them LMEs or 
CMEs with social democratic welfare states - had higher female than male union density; 
and five of these countries (Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) had a union membership that was majority female.  While these trends certainly 
suggest that aggregate union decline has contributed more to a rise in male wage inequality 
than female wage inequality, the extent to which this is so will depend on the relative 
magnitude of the union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male wage 
inequality.  
Variation in the Union Effect 
 
Unions have been argued to impact wage inequality through three interrelated 
processes; or what I term here the employer81, intra-union, and insider mechanisms.82  The 
employer mechanism refers to the process of unions extracting wage concessions from 
                                            
80 Female and male union density data are unavailable for France and Italy and the proportion of union 
members that are female data are unavailable for France.  
81 In this context, “employer” refers not only to actual business owners, but also top managers (e.g., chief 
executive officers or high level bureaucrats) that may or may not have an ownership stake in a firm but 
nonetheless formulate and implement policies relating to employee compensation.   
82 The focus here is on how unions impact wage inequality “directly”, or through employer-union and intra-
union negotiations.  However, unions impact wage inequality “indirectly” as well by supporting (or opposing) 
particular political parties, politicians, and public policies. 
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employers (Stephens 1980; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Korpi 1985; Mishel 1986; Bradley 
et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007); the intra-union mechanism refers to the process of unions 
compressing wages among their own members (Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998; 
Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002; Card et al. 2003; Checci et al. 2007; Hall and 
Thelen 2007; Iversen and Soskice 2010); and the insider mechanism refers to the process 
of union wage gains producing (positive or negative) externalities (Freeman 1980; 
Friedman 1962; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Card et al. 2003; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; 
Wallerstein and Western 2000; Rosenfeld and Western 2012).  While distinct theoretical 
propositions, these three mechanisms are neither independent from one another nor are 
they mutually exclusive; as the intra-union mechanism implies that less-paid union workers 
have extracted greater wage gains from their employers than better-paid union workers83 
and the insider mechanism is the product of externalities resulting from any such union 
wage gains.   
Despite the broad (implicit) consensus that the net result of the employer, intra-
union, and insider mechanisms is to reduce wage inequality, a growing body of evidence 
indicates that the magnitude of this union effect differs across countries and over time; and 
that circumstances exist in which this union effect is not present at all (Becher and 
Pontusson 2011; Golden and Wallerstein 2011; Pontusson 2013; Han and Castater 2014).  
One explanation for the varying union effect is differences in the occupational composition 
of unions (Becher and Pontusson 2011; Han and Castater 2014).  In particular, unions 
                                            
83 It is difficult to imagine a sustainable union movement in which lower-paid union workers achieve relative 
gains exclusively or even primarily by extracting wage gains from higher-paid union workers, the latter of 
which would then experience not only relative but also (substantial) absolute losses as a result of union 
membership. 
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dominated by workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations are expected to reduce wage 
inequality more than unions dominated by workers in traditionally better-paid occupations.  
Most obviously, this is because unions with fewer workers in traditionally lower-paying 
jobs means fewer numbers of such workers experiencing wage gains relative to (union and 
non-union) employers and (union and non-union) workers in traditionally better-paying 
jobs.  While accurate, this rather straightforward reasoning may actually underestimate the 
influence of union occupational composition on the union effect; as union composition 
helps determine the wage gains of specific types of union workers. 
 One of the primary expressions of the intra-union mechanism is union workers in 
traditionally lower-paid occupations extracting larger wage gains from employers than 
union workers in traditionally higher-paid occupations (Pontusson et al. 2002; Card et al. 
2003).84 This phenomenon is explained as the result of the solidaristic norms within union 
organizations (Wallerstein 1999), union workers in traditionally higher-paying jobs 
practicing wage restraint in return for generous social insurance policies (Iversen and 
Soskice 2010), and/or the democratic nature of union organizations (Pontusson et al. 2002; 
Checci et al. 2007).  It is through this last route that we would expect union occupational 
composition to matter most for the relative wage gains of different types of union workers.  
Prior to negotiating with employers, unions develop particular wage bargaining goals (e.g., 
regarding wage levels for certain occupational categories) through internal compromise 
between different types of union workers (Carruth and Oswald 1987).  Since unions are 
relatively democratic organizations, these compromises need to consider the preferences 
                                            
84 The other primary expression of the intra-union mechanism is the provision of equal pay for equal work 
(Huber and Stephens 1998; Kahn 1998).   
 109 
 
of different types of union workers (Pontusson et al. 2002; Checci et al. 2007).  As one 
might expect, union workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations generally favor (intra-
union) wage compression more than union workers in traditionally better-paid occupations 
(Hall and Thelen 2007; Oliver 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2010; Becher and Pontusson 
2011; Han and Castater 2014).  How these preferences are aggregated into collective action 
depends on several factors, including the formal decision-making rules within the union 
and the unions’ institutional culture (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Checci et al. 2007; Ahlquist 
and Levi 2013).  Nonetheless, a reasonable assumption is that wage agreements better 
reflect the preferences of a particular occupational group when that group has substantial 
representation within the union - both in absolute terms and relative to other occupational 
groups with different preferences. Thus, we would expect unions dominated by workers in 
traditionally lower-paid occupations to produce more egalitarian wage bargaining 
agreements than unions dominated by workers in traditionally better-paid occupations. 
Gender Occupational Segregation and Union Composition 
 
While all wealthy democracies exhibit substantial gender occupational segregation, or a 
large proportion of workers employed in occupations dominated by one sex (Anker et al. 
2003), the form and extent of this segregation differ substantially across market institutions 
and welfare state types.  CMEs, which are characterized as consisting of workers with 
“specific skills”, strong employment protections, and a large public sector, generate greater 
gender occupational segregation than LMEs, which are characterized as consisting of 
workers with “general skills”, weak employment protections, and a small public sector 
(Estevez-Abe 2006).  To a greater extent than their counterparts in LMEs, women in CMEs 
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are overrepresented in low-end private service sector occupations85 and underrepresented 
in managerial positions (Iversen and Rosenbluth 2011).86  However, among CMEs, 
substantial variation exists between those with social democratic and conservative welfare 
states.  Social democratic welfare states, which include robust active labor market policies, 
publicly provided childcare services, paid maternity and paternity leave, and strong gender 
equality norms, produce more well-educated and higher earning women than conservative 
welfare states, which include “labor clearing” policies, financial support only for female 
caregivers, and norms accepting of a gendered division of labor (Sainsbury 1996; Esping-
Andersen 1999; Chang 2000; Korpi 2000; Soskice 2005). 
The differences in gender occupational segregation across market institutions and 
welfare states suggests that differences may also exist across regimes in the occupational 
composition of female and male union members, and thus also the female and male union 
effect.  Of most relevance in this regard is the degree of vertical gender occupational 
segregation within unions, or the extent to which lower-paid (higher-paid) occupations are 
better represented among female or male union members.  To explore this matter, Table 8 
includes data from the European Values Study (EVS) on the types of occupations held by 
female and male union members with countries separated by regime type.87 The survey 
 
                                            
85 It is argued that “women-specific risks” – namely, career interruptions due to family caregiving – produce 
a disincentive for women to acquire (less portable) “specific skills” and for employers to hire women for jobs 
that require such skills (Estevez-Abe 2006).  
86 It is argued that the restrictions on working hours present in many CMEs exacerbate gender-based 
discrimination in the selection of managers, as women are unable to demonstrate a commitment to the firm 
(rather than family caring responsibilities) by working long hours. 
87 For the market institution and welfare state types, I utilize the country classifications put forth by Iversen 
and Stephens (2008), with two minor modifications.  First, I rename their “Christian Democratic” welfare 
state “Conservative”.  Second, following Esping-Andersen (1990), I categorize Japan as a conservative 
welfare state, rather than leaving it outside of the welfare state typology. 
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Table 8.  Female and Male Union Composition and Union Density (by Occupation 
Type) in 14 Wealthy Democracies  
 
Country 
%                    
Union                  
Profess-
ional                      
(Women) 
%           
Union                       
Professio
nal                      
(Men) 
%        
Union        
Lower-
Paid                
(Women) 
%             
Union           
Lower-
Paid                
(Men) 
Union 
Density            
Profession
al     
(Women) 
Union 
Density            
Professio
nal     
(Men) 
Union 
Density            
Lower-
Paid     
(Women) 
Union 
Density            
Lower-
Paid     
(Men) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
LMEs 
(Liberal)                 
Australia 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Canada 43.7 
17 28.2 43.7 17 12.2 6.5 24 
Ireland 26.7 
15.1 29.9 27.6 15.6 20.1 6.5 19 
New 
Zealand NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
United 
King. † 
24 
14.9 32 23 20.2 15.9 8.1 20.1 
United 
States 
49.2 
44.5 12.3 7 11.3 17.4 4.7 8.4 
LME Avg. 
35.9 22.9 25.6 25.3 16 16.4 6.5 17.9 
  
                
CMEs 
(Cons)               
Austria 
1 1.8 62.5 40.1 3.4 6 20.2 31.8 
Belgium 
4.3 6.2 33.5 28.9 5.2 8.9 13.7 24.1 
Germany 
2 1.4 47.5 27.6 7.1 4.6 15.6 29.1 
Japan 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Nether/ 
11.5 14.1 16.5 8.9 22.9 26.2 11.4 22.4 
Switz. 
NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
CME 
(Cons) 
Avg. 4.7 5.9 40 26.4 9.7 11.4 15.2 26.9 
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Table 8.  Continued. 
 
Country 
%                    
Union                  
Profession
al                      
(Women) 
%           
Union                       
Profession
al                      
(Men) 
%        
Union        
Lower-
Paid                
(Women
) 
%             
Union           
Lower
-Paid                
(Men) 
Union 
Density            
Profession
al     
(Women) 
Union 
Density            
Profession
al     (Men) 
Union 
Density            
Lower-
Paid     
(Women
) 
Union 
Densit
y            
Lower
-Paid     
(Men) 
                  
CMEs (Social Democratic)             
Denmark 1.3 3.7 26.9 23.3 14.2 26.7 42.7 58.4 
Finland 7.6 5.6 17 9 45.8 37.5 43.6 38.4 
Norway 11.4 16.5 22.7 14.4 49.3 38.9 35.7 42.3 
Sweden 7.4 9.5 11.8 10.8 59.8 43.6 70.3 68.8 
CME (SD) 
Avg. 6.9 8.8 19.6 14.4 42.3 36.7 48.1 52 
                  
CME Avg. 5.8 7.4 29.8 20.4 26 24.1 31.7 39.4 
                  
Mixed (Conservative)               
France 14.3 20.7 21.5 15 9.4 12.2 2.6 7.6 
Italy 32.2 13.6 12.9 29.3 11.8 6.6 3.2 13.7 
Mixed 
Avg. 23.3 17.2 17.2 22.2 10.6 9.4 2.9 10.7 
                  
Total Avg. 16.9 13.2 26.8 22 20.9 19.8 20.3 29.2 
 
 
The presented statistics are averages for each country using all available observations between 1981 and 
1999. 
† Data do not include Northern Ireland. 
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data includes all available observations for 14 wealthy democracies88 over the 1981 to 1999 
period.89 Columns 1 and 2 consist of averages of the proportion of female and male union 
members, respectively, that are in professional occupations; and columns 3 and 4 consist 
of averages of the proportion of female and male union members, respectively, that are in 
traditionally lower-paid occupations.90 Since the effect of the occupational composition of 
union members on wage inequality is partly determined by the composition of union 
members relative to non-union members, columns 5 and 6 consist of union density 
averages for female and male workers, respectively, in professional occupations and 
columns 7 and 8 consist of union density averages for female and male workers, 
respectively, in traditionally lower-paid occupations. 
In general, we observe larger differences in the occupational composition of union 
members across regimes than between female and male union members within each 
regime, although some significant gender-based intra-regime differences do exist.91  By far 
                                            
88 Data is not available for Australia, New Zealand, Japan, or Switzerland for the survey waves examined 
here (see fn. 90). 
89 The EVS conducted four waves of surveys between 1981 and 2008; in 1981, 1990, 1999, and 2008.  In 
2008, however, the potential answers to the question regarding the respondent’s job type changed 
substantially (see variables x036 and x036d in the EVS Longitudinal Data File 1981 – 2008).  Since the 
number of respondents that answer that they belong to a trade (labor) union (variable a067) may be relatively 
small in a particular country in a given wave and the 2008 survey does not cover countries outside of Europe, 
I have chosen to pool together the three waves between 1981 and 1999 and exclude the fourth wave from the 
analysis. 
90 The EVS asks respondents whether they belong to a trade (labor) union (variable a067) and what type of 
job they hold in their particular profession or industry (variable x036).  Respondents answering “yes” to the 
first question and “employer/manager” or “professional worker” to the second question are categorized here 
as union workers in professional occupations; and respondents answering “yes” to the first question and 
“junior level non-manual”, “semi-skilled manual”, or “unskilled manual” to the second question are 
categorized here as union workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations. 
91 Since there are no female or male union density data available for the mixed market economies (with 
conservative welfare states) (France and Italy), these countries will be excluded from the forthcoming 
discussion and the empirical models to follow.  Nonetheless, in terms of the occupational composition of 
female and male union members and the occupation-specific female and male union density, we can observe 
in Table 8 that mixed market economies most closely resemble LMEs. 
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the largest share of union members that are in professional occupations can be found in 
LMEs (with liberal welfare states).  In this regime, professionals consist of over one-third 
of female union members and one-fifth of male union members.  In no other regime do 
professionals consist of even one-tenth of female or male union members.  However, 
traditionally lower-paid workers do have a sizable presence within unions in this regime, 
representing approximately one-fourth of both female and male union members.  We 
observe by far the largest class imbalance in union membership in CMEs with conservative 
welfare states, where female union members in traditionally lower-paid occupations 
outnumber female union members in professional occupations by over eight to one and 
male union members in traditionally lower-paid occupations outnumber male union 
members in professional occupations by over four to one.  In CMEs with social democratic 
welfare states, the proportion of professionals and workers in traditionally lower-paid 
occupations among union workers is relatively low for both women and men (although the 
union density level for each of these gender-specific occupational groupings is relatively 
high), suggesting that union members consist of a large share of workers in traditionally 
medium-paid occupations within this regime.92   
If unions with a large absolute and relative presence of workers in traditionally 
lower-paid (professional) occupations reduce wage inequality the most (least); and this 
tendency is strengthened when unions disproportionately represent traditionally lower-paid 
(professional) workers, the observations derived from the EVS data lead us to different 
                                            
92 The remaining difference in the proportion of union members (after taking professional and traditionally 
lower-paid workers into account) does not entirely consist of workers in traditionally medium-paid 
occupations, as union members may also consist of the unemployed or retirees (Western 1997; Anderson and 
Lynch 2007). 
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expectations regarding the relative size of the union effect on female and male wage 
inequality depending on regime type.  On the one hand, the union effect on male wage 
inequality is likely to be greater than the union effect on female wage inequality in LMEs 
– as there are fewer professionals among male union members than female union members 
within this regime.  On the other hand, the union effect on female wage inequality is likely 
to be greater than the union effect on male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative 
welfare states – as there are more workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations among 
female union members than male union members within this regime.93  The relatively low 
levels of both professional and traditionally lower-paid workers among union members in 
CMEs with social democratic welfare states does not lend itself to any clear expectations 
regarding differences in the union effect within that regime.  Therefore, two hypotheses 
regarding intra-regime differences are offered:   
 
Hypothesis 1:  The union effect on male wage inequality is greater than the union effect on 
female wage inequality in LMEs 
 
                                            
93 The precise method by which we would expect the union effect on female wage inequality and the union 
effect on male wage inequality to differ within a particular market institution and welfare state regime 
depends on the extent to which wage bargaining agreements are produced by unions that disproportionately 
represent one gender (as a consequence of individual unions representing female and/or male dominated 
occupations).  If wage bargaining agreements are the product of unions that substantially represent both 
female and male workers, then any difference in the union effect on female wage inequality and the union 
effect on male wage inequality will be because female (male) union workers disproportionately benefit from 
a particular wage bargaining agreement.  If, instead, wage bargaining agreements are the product of unions 
that disproportionately represent one gender (which is perhaps often the case given substantial horizontal and 
vertical gender occupational segregation), then the union effect on female wage inequality and the union 
effect on male wage inequality will differ because of distinct female-dominated union and male-dominated 
union bargaining agreements.  
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Hypothesis 2: The union effect on female wage inequality is greater than union effect on 
male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative welfare states 
 
 Given the particularly large class imbalance among both female and male union 
members in CMEs with conservative welfare states, a third hypothesis focusing on inter-
regime differences is also offered:   
 
Hypothesis 3: The union effect on female wage inequality and the union effect on male 
wage inequality are greater in CMEs with conservative welfare states than in LMEs or 
CMEs with social democratic welfare states 
 
Data and Methods 
 
Female and Male Wage Inequality 
The dependent variables most commonly employed in studies examining the 
determinants of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies are three ratios 
including the wages of full-time dependent employees provided by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD):  the ratio of the ninetieth percentile 
earning to that of the tenth percentile earning (90/10 ratio), the ratio of the ninetieth 
percentile earning to that of the median earning (90/50 ratio), and the ratio of the median 
earning to that of the tenth percentile earning (50/10 ratio).  A wage ratio with a larger 
value signifies a greater distance between those with higher and lower earnings, and thus 
higher wage inequality.  It should be stated explicitly that these measures focus exclusively 
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on income from labor and do not explicitly measure the earnings at the very top or very 
bottom of the earnings distribution (e.g., the top or bottom 1 percent).  In other words, the 
data do not capture the earnings of many top managers (who may have earnings above the 
ninetieth percentile) or marginalized workers (who may have earnings below the tenth 
percentile).  Furthermore, because this variable includes only full-time dependent 
employees, it necessarily excludes business owners, the unemployed, the self-employed, 
and part-time workers.  For these reasons, the three wage ratios almost certainly and 
substantially understate the extent of economic inequality in wealthy democracies.   
The OECD provides three different versions of each wage ratio, one that includes 
only women, one that includes only men, and another that pools together women and men.  
Previous analyses of the determinants of wage inequality have focused exclusively on the 
pooled wage data.  This analysis will instead focus exclusively on the gender-specific wage 
data.  To examine whether there are substantial differences between female and male wage 
inequality, Figure 7 provides graphical depictions and correlation coefficients for the level 
and first-difference (year over year change) form of each like female and male wage ratio 
for the 18 wealthy democracies94 typically examined in time-series cross-sectional analyses 
of the determinants of aggregate wage inequality.  Included are all available observations 
for these countries between 1980 and 2010.   
The levels of each wage ratio are found to be strongly and positively correlated, 
with the correlation coefficient ranging from .884 for the 50/10 wage ratios to .945 for the 
                                            
94 The 18 Countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States.   
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Figure 7.  Bivariate Correlations of the Female and Male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 
Wage Ratios, Respectively, in their Level and First-Difference (Year to Year 
Change) Form 
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90/10 wage ratios.  However, a quite different result is found for the first-difference form 
of the variable.  Here, the correlation coefficients range from a meager .019 for the 90/50 
wage ratios to only a moderately stronger .273 for the 50/10 wage ratios.  The very different 
coefficients for the level and first-difference forms of the wage ratios could be interpreted 
as informing us that countries with relatively high (low) levels of female wage inequality 
also have relatively high (low) levels of male wage inequality, but the extent of the annual 
increase or decrease of female (male) wage inequality tells us little, if anything, about the 
extent of the annual increase or decrease in male (female) wage inequality.  This would 
suggest that, controlling for country specific features, female and male wage inequality 
have different determinants and/or are impacted by particular factors in dissimilar ways, 
and thus it is appropriate to model each of these wage distributions separately.  Summary 
data for the female and male wage ratios are included in Appendix D. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
 
Due to limitations in the gender-specific union density and wage ratio data, the 
empirical analysis is restricted to 15 wealthy democracies95 between 1980 and 2010.96  To 
                                            
95 The 15 countries examined are those 18 included in fn. 95 minus France, Italy, and Switzerland.  These 
three countries do not have any overlapping union density and wage ratio data and thus are automatically 
dropped from the regression analysis. 
96 A majority of the countries in the analysis only have overlapping gender-specific union density and wage 
ratio data after 1990, and only four countries – Australia, Japan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom – have 
overlapping union density and wage ratio data before 1980.  In an effort to maintain a maximum number of 
observations while diminishing any possible bias toward particular countries, the empirical analysis has been 
restricted to the 1980 to 2010 period.  Nonetheless, empirical analyses of the 1975 to 2010 and 1990 to 2010 
periods provide substantively similar (although not identical) results to those reported below.  Results are 
available from the author upon request.  
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examine the (conditional) effect of female and male union strength and other socio-
economic and political factors on female and male wage inequality, I utilize the single-
equation time-series cross-sectional error correction model (ECM), the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) model, and the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator 
ECMs are flexible time-series models that have at least two advantages over other 
statistical models. First, they can be applied to both integrated and stationary data (DeBoef 
and Keele 2008).97   Second, they are able to estimate both the short-term and long-term 
effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable.  A short-term (or immediate) 
effect indicates that a change in an independent variable in one time period produces a 
change in the dependent variable only in the concurrent time period.  By contrast, a long-
term effect expresses dynamic causality and indicates that a shift in an independent variable 
in one time period produces a change in the dependent variable over many time periods.   
A single-equation ECM can be expressed in the following way:  
 
ΔYt = α0 + α1Yt-1 + β1ΔXt + β2Xt-1 + εt,  
 
Each independent variable is included in the equation twice, once in its first-
difference form (∆Xt) and once in its lagged level form (Xt-1).  The short-term effect of an 
independent variable can be determined simply by observing the coefficient for the first-
                                            
97 While ECMs may be applied to both integrated and stationary data, Enns et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
cointegration tests only produce correct inferences when the dependent variable is integrated.  Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller tests were conducted on each of the dependent variables in this analysis (the female and male 
90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage ratios, respectively).  In every case, the null hypothesis that all panels contain 
a unit root (i.e., are integrated) could not be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level or greater. 
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difference version of the variable (β1).  The long-term effect, by contrast, is determined by 
dividing the coefficient for the lagged version of the variable (β2) by the coefficient for the 
lagged dependent variable (α1).  The latter coefficient is known as the “error correction 
rate” and represents the speed at which the independent variable and the dependent variable 
arrive back at equilibrium after a shift in the level of the independent variable.  For 
example, an α1 of -.1 would indicate that 10 percent of the full long-term effect is felt after 
one time period, that 10 percent of the remaining long-term effect is felt in the following 
time period, and so on.  Higher absolute values of α1 indicate a faster movement back to 
equilibrium.  
A SUR model allows us to employ sample information in one regression to improve 
the precision of the parameter estimates in other regressions.  This can be done when the 
error terms in multiple regressions exhibit contemporaneous cross-equation error 
correlation, each regression contains a different dependent variable, and there is at least 
one unlike independent variable across the regressions (Zellner 1962; Moon and Peron 
2006; Zellner 2006).98  The latter two conditions are met by our use of six distinct 
dependent variables (the female and male versions of the 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage 
ratios, respectively) and multiple gender specific independent variables (union density, 
unemployment, and education).  The first condition is met with the result of a Breusch-
Pagan test, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the regression errors are 
independent (at the 99 percent confidence level).   
                                            
98 SUR models reduce to single-equation estimators when the error terms in the two or more equations are 
uncorrelated (Zellner 2006). 
 122 
 
Finally, the Rogers’ robust-cluster variance estimator provides valid hypothesis 
tests in the presence of any pattern of correlation within units (countries), including serial 
correlation and correlation due to unmodeled country-specific factors (Rogers 1994).  
However, this estimator also assumes that errors are uncorrelated between units.  This 
assumption could be violated if there are unmodeled factors that impact wage inequality in 
all or most countries at a particular point in time (Huber et al. 2006).  In order to address 
this possibility, dummy variables representing each decade are included in the analyses.99   
 
Main Independent Variables 
 
Each model in the empirical analysis will contain four interaction terms:  the first-
difference and lagged level form of the gender-specific union density variable each 
separately interacted with a dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare 
states (Δ Union Density X CME (SD) and Union Density (t-1) X CME (SD)) and a dummy 
variable for LMEs (Δ Union Density X LME (Lib.) and Union Density (t-1) X LME (Lib)).  
Since CMEs with conservative welfare states serve as the baseline category, the 
coefficients on the non-interacted first-difference and lagged level union density variables 
inform us of the short- and long-term effect, respectively, of gender-specific union density 
within this regime. The coefficients on the interaction terms containing the dummy for 
CMEs with social democratic welfare states inform us of the difference between the union 
effect in CMEs with social democratic welfare states and CMEs with conservative welfare 
                                            
99 Results for the time dummies are not reported below but are available from the author upon request.  
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states; while the coefficients on the interaction terms containing the dummy for LMEs 
inform us of the difference between the union effect in LMEs and CMEs with conservative 
welfare states.100   
In an effort to make the investigation as expansive as possible, three aspects of the 
results will be considered when determining whether a particular hypothesis has or has not 
received empirical support.  First, the direction, statistical significance, and magnitude of 
the interaction terms.  This will inform us of the difference between the union effect in 
CMEs with conservative welfare states and the union effect in each of the other two 
regimes (for a given gender-specific wage ratio).  Second, the direction and statistical 
significance of the union effect in each regime in each model (determined via marginal 
effects).  This will inform us of whether a statistically significant union effect exists for a 
particular gender on a specific wage ratio but not the other gender on the same (but gender-
specific) wage ratio.  Third, the magnitude of statistically significant union effects on each 
like wage ratio within each regime.  This will inform us of whether the substantive union 
effect is greater for a particular gender on a given (but gender-specific) wage ratio.   
 
 
 
 
                                            
100 CMEs with conservative welfare states were chosen as the baseline category to provide an easily 
identifiable test of Hypothesis 3, which anticipates the coefficients on the union variables that serve as 
components of the interaction terms to be negative and statistically significant and the coefficients on the 
interaction terms to be positive and statistically significant.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that the statistical 
significance and magnitude of the union effects in each regime are not affected by which regime serves as 
the baseline category.  
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Control Variables   
 
The other socio-economic and political factors considered in this analysis are those 
that are typically included in models of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies: 
the level of wage bargaining, international trade, national wealth, service sector 
employment, unemployment, female labor force participation, education, immigration, and 
left party participation in government.101  Theoretical expectations102, data measurement, 
and sources for all variables can be found in Appendix E. 
Results 
 
Table 9 contains “full” models of the female and male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 wage 
ratios, respectively.  These models include all of the socio-economic and political factors 
outlined above (including the dummy variables for LMEs and CMEs with social 
democratic welfare states) but exclude the interaction terms.  The odd numbered models 
are of female wage inequality and the even numbered models are of male wage inequality.  
Only the gender-specific union variables and those found to be statistically significant (at 
the 90 percent confidence level or higher) are included in the table.103  In terms of the main  
                                            
101 Public sector employment (public employment as a share of total employment) is another factor typically 
included in models of aggregate wage inequality in wealthy democracies.  However, in order to test the 
hypotheses outlined above, the statistical models in this article include other (indirect) measures of public 
sector employment - dummy variables indicating the presence of particular market institution and welfare 
state regimes. Therefore, a unique public sector employment variable is excluded from the analysis.   
102 While there are theoretical reasons to suppose that some of these factors will impact the female wage 
distribution differently than the male wage distribution, this is less clearly the case with other factors.  
Therefore, gender is only explicitly mentioned in the theoretical expectations when there is a strong 
theoretical prior that a particular factor has a disproportionate impact on the wage distribution of women or 
men. 
103 Full results can be found in Appendix F. 
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Table 9.  Determinants of Female and Male Wage Inequality in 15 Wealthy 
Democracies between 1980 and 2010 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Full)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Full)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.096*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)  -0.005 0.002 -0.004* -0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)  -0.002 -0.003** -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
LME (Lib.) 0.055** 0.089*** 0.017** 0.024** 0.019* 0.027*** 
  (0.023) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
CME (SD) 0.033 0.087* -0.008 0.005 0.031 0.045** 
  (0.063) (0.050) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) 
Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.015* -0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Δ International Trade -0.003** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.022*** 0.007 0.012*** 0.001 -0.000 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.026*** 0.010 0.009*** 0.004 0.005 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.002 0.007** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female Labor Force Participation (t-
1) 
0.008* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Female (Male) Education (t-1)  -0.001 0.008*** 0.001 0.002** -0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Immigration (t-1) -0.001 -0.003** -0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
R2 0.201 0.136 0.223 0.118 0.129 0.186 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10) 
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variables of theoretical interest, male union density significantly reduces male wage 
inequality in the long-term (at the 90 percent confidence level or greater) across all three 
male wage ratios but female union density only significantly reduces female wage 
inequality in the short-term (at the 90 percent confidence level) in the model of the 90/50 
wage ratio.  Indeed, this phenomena of a variable impacting female and male wage 
inequality in the same general direction but for different wage ratios and/or time horizons 
is found for international trade, unemployment, and immigration as well.  Three additional 
variables – GDP per capita, female labor force participation, and left government – are 
found to significantly influence two or more female wage ratios but not any male wage 
ratios; while the proportion of individuals with a tertiary education acts to significantly 
increase all three male wage ratios but decrease the female 50/10 wage ratio.  Not 
surprisingly, the dummy variable for LMEs has a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient in all six models while the coefficient for the dummy variable for CMEs with 
social democratic welfare states is statistically insignificant in five of the six models.  This 
result indicates that in terms of wage inequality, larger differences exist between market 
institutions than welfare states, per se.   
Given the relatively small number of observations in each of the models (225), the 
interaction terms are added to slimmed down, more efficient models in Table 10.   In 
addition to the interaction terms, these “reduced” models include those variables found to 
be statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level or greater in the full models in 
Table 9.104  Model 7 is the reduced version of Model 1, Model 8 is the reduced version of  
                                            
104 If a variable has a statistically significant long-term effect, both its first-difference and lagged level form 
are included in the reduced models.  Furthermore, to keep the results for the female and male wage 
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Table 10.  Conditional Union Effect on Female and Male Wage Inequality in 15 
Wealthy Democracies between 1980 and 2010 
 
Model 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Reduced)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Reduced) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.080*** -0.107*** -0.084*** -0.103*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)  0.035 0.023 0.010 -0.007 0.010 0.020* 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)  -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LME (Lib.) 0.018 -0.013 0.011 0.053 -0.004 -0.066** 
  (0.056) (0.081) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) (0.028) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X 
LME (Lib.) 
-0.036 -0.016 -0.010 0.009 -0.009 -0.018* 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X 
LME (Lib.) 
0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CME (SD) -0.234*** -0.207* -0.096*** -0.079* -0.045 -0.052 
  (0.096) (0.107) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X 
CME (SD) 
-0.043 -0.035 -0.015 0.001 -0.009 -0.022* 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X 
CME (SD) 
0.005*** 0.005** 0.001** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ International Trade -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.024*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.002     
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)     
 
                                            
distributions as comparable as possible, measures found to be statistically significant in a model of a 
particular female (male) wage ratio are included in the reduced model not only for that female (male) wage 
ratio but also the like male (female) wage ratio.  
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Table 10.  Continued. 
Model 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Reduced)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Reduced)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.023*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.005 0.004 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.000 0.004**     0.000 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.002)     (0.001) (0.001) 
Female (Male) Education (t-1)  -0.002 0.005* 0.001 0.001 -0.002** 0.002* 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Immigration (t-1) -0.001 -0.003** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.001*** -0.000     -0.001*** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) LME 
(Lib.) 
-0.001 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) LME 
(Lib.) 
-0.002** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) CME 
(SD) 
-0.008 -0.012 -0.006* -0.006 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) CME 
(SD) 
0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
R2 0.222 0.145 0.236 0.127 0.134 0.191 
 
(Note:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; ***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10) 
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Model 2, and so on.  Once again, only the gender-specific union variables and those found 
to be statistically significant (at the 90 percent confidence level or higher) are included in 
the table.105  Beginning with the error correction rates, we observe that all six are significant 
at the 99 percent confidence level.  The values of the error correction rates inform us that 
a shift in the level of an independent variable produces an effect on female and male wage 
inequality that is incrementally distributed over time and not fully realized for 
approximately 9 to 13 years.  As anticipated, unions are found to reduce wage inequality 
across most of the female and male wage ratios in CMEs with conservative welfare states.  
More specifically, gender-specific union density has a negative and statistically significant 
long-term effect (at the 95 percent confidence level or higher) in four of the six models.  
Not surprisingly given the union composition survey data, all of these statistically 
significant coefficients are in models that include the lower parts of the wage distributions 
(i.e., models of the 90/10 and 50/10 wage ratios, respectively).  However, no support is 
found for Hypothesis 2, as female and male union strength are found to significantly impact 
the same wage ratios within this regime  
Turning our attention to the interaction terms, we observe that Hypothesis 3, which 
states that the female and male union effect are greatest in CMEs with conservative welfare 
states, receives broad support: the interaction term containing the lagged level form of the 
union density variable and the dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare 
states has a positive and statistically significant coefficient (at the 90 percent confidence 
level or higher) in five of the six models; and the interaction term containing the lagged 
                                            
105 Full results can be found in Appendix G. 
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level form of the union density variable and the dummy variable for LMEs has a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient (at the 99 percent confidence level) in one model 
(Model 12).106  These results indicate that the long-term union effect in CMEs with 
conservative welfare states is significantly greater than the long-term union effect in CMEs 
with social democratic welfare states across nearly all parts of the female and male wage 
distributions and the long-term union effect in LMEs when we consider the lower half of 
the male wage distribution.  The much stronger result for CMEs with social democratic 
welfare states may be the result of the particularly small number of union workers in 
traditionally lower-paid occupations within that regime. 
Included at the bottom of Table 10 are the effects of female and male union strength in 
LMEs and CMEs with social democratic welfare states, respectively.  Consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, male union strength is found to significantly reduce wage inequality across 
a larger portion of the male wage distribution than female union strength does across the 
female wage distribution in LMEs.  More specifically, male union density significantly 
reduces the male 90/10 and 90/50 wage ratios (at the 95 percent confidence level) while 
female union density “only” significantly reduces the female 90/10 wage ratio (at the 95 
percent confidence level).  This would suggest that, within LMEs, unions are able to 
increase the relative wages of those in the middle part of the male wage distribution to a 
greater extent than those in the middle part of the female wage distribution – perhaps due 
to the particularly small number of female union members in traditionally medium-paid 
                                            
106 The only interaction term with the lagged level union density variable to have a negative coefficient is 
that including the dummy for LMEs in Model 10; but this coefficient does not approach statistical 
significance (p-value = .41).   
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occupations within this regime.107  As anticipated based on the union composition survey 
data, weaker gender differences are found in CMEs with social democratic welfare states.  
Both female and male union density significantly reduce one wage ratio (at the 90 percent 
confidence level or higher), although it is a short-term effect on the 90/50 wage ratio for 
women and a long-term effect on the 50/10 wage ratio for men.  It is not clear what would 
cause such a pattern of diverging female and male union effects within this regime.   
In order to examine the substantive effects of female and male union strength, 
Figure 8 graphs the impact of a one standard deviation change in female and male union 
density108 in each of the three regimes on the female and male 90/10, 90/50, and 50/10 
wage ratios, respectively.109  All bars signify negative (inequality reducing) effects.  In an 
effort to make the results for each model as comparable and intuitive as possible, these 
effects have been converted into standard deviation changes in the corresponding wage 
ratio.  Consistent with Hypothesis 3, union strength is generally found to have the largest 
substantive effects in CMEs with conservative welfare states.  Within this regime, a one 
standard deviation increase in gender-specific union density reduces gender-specific wage 
inequality by approximately 1.5 standard deviations or more in three models (Models 7, 8, 
and 11).  In no other regime does a union effect even exceed 1.2 standard deviations. In 
CMEs with conservative welfare states, the female union effect is only .3 standard 
deviations larger than the male union effect in the models of the 90/10 wage ratios but over  
                                            
107 In LMEs, approximately 61.5 percent of female union members are either professionals or workers in 
traditionally lower-paid occupations.  For no other regime- and gender-specific union grouping does this 
figure even reach 50 percent.   
108 The standard deviations utilized in this analysis are derived from the country-years covered in Table 10.  
109 Substantive effects include short-term and long-term coefficients that are statistically significant at the 90 
percent confidence level or greater.   
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Figure 8.  Total (Long-Term Plus Short-Term) Effect of a One Standard Deviation 
Shift in Female and Male Union Density. 
*Results derived from models in Table 10. 
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1.7 standard deviations larger in the models of the 50/10 wage ratios. While this latter result 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 2, it should be noted that it is primarily due to an 
unusual significant and positive short-term coefficient (at the 90 percent confidence level) 
for male union density in Model 12.  If this marginally significant short-term result is 
excluded, then the difference between the female and male union effect in the models of 
the 50/10 wage ratios shrinks to less than .1 standard deviations.  In LMEs, a one standard 
deviation rise in male union density is associated with a substantially large reduction in the 
male 90/50 wage ratio (1.2 standard deviations), while a similar rise in female union 
density has no significant effect on the female 90/50 wage ratio.  While this finding lends 
support to Hypothesis 1, the slightly larger substantive effect of female union density 
compared to male union density in the models of the 90/10 wage ratios (1.1 standard 
deviations to .8 standard deviations, respectively) runs counter to this hypothesis.  Finally, 
the gender-specific union effects in CMEs with social democratic welfare states – in the 
two instances in which the union effects in this regime are statistically significant – are 
relatively modest, never reaching two-thirds of a standard deviation.  
The primary purpose of the interaction terms included here was to determine 
whether the occupational composition of union members conditions the union effect on 
female and male wage inequality, but the inherently symmetrical nature of interaction 
terms allows us to simultaneously observe whether female and male union strength 
condition the market institution and welfare state regime effect on wage inequality as well 
(given that dummy variables for market institution and welfare state regimes were used as 
indirect measures for union composition) (Berry et al. 2012).  The coefficient on the 
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dummy variable for CMEs with social democratic welfare states is negative and 
statistically significant (at the 90 percent confidence level or higher) in the models 
containing wage ratios with the ninetieth percentile of wage earners (i.e., the gender-
specific 90/10 and 90/50 wage ratios, respectively).  Since both female and male union 
strength have been diminishing across nearly all wealthy democracies in recent years, we 
can interpret the positive and statistically significant interaction terms containing the 
dummy for CMEs with social democratic welfare states as informing us that policies 
associated with the social democratic welfare state reduce the relative wages of top earners 
more compared with policies associated with the conservative welfare state as female and 
male union density decline within the former regime.  This finding suggests a sort of 
“substitution effect”, whereby policies associated with social democratic welfare states 
play a more important role in restraining the wages of top earners as unions become less 
able – or less willing – to do so.  Interestingly, a similar result is found in only one model 
of LMEs – that for the male 50/10 wage ratio.  This may indicate that particular features 
associated with LMEs – such as minimum wages and means tested benefits - have been 
particularly important for lower earning men as male union density has declined sharply 
and steadily within this regime.110 
There are four important points to note regarding the other socio-economic and 
political determinants of female and male wage inequality included in the models.  First, 
and as alluded to above when discussing the results in Table 9, several factors impact 
                                            
110 In the dataset utilized here, male union density declined by about 29 percentage points in LMEs between 
the 1970s and 2000s.  Over that same period, female union density in LMEs declined by about 13 percentage 
points; male union density in CMEs declined by about 10 percentage points; and female union density in 
CMEs rose by about 9 percentage points.    
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female and male wage inequality in the same general direction, but do so in dissimilar 
ways.  In particular, unemployment increases female wage inequality exclusively in the 
short-term but increases male wage inequality exclusively in the long-term; while 
immigration and international trade reduce different parts of the female and male wage 
distributions.  Second, two factors – GDP per capita and left government – impact female 
wage inequality but not male wage inequality. More specifically, economic growth allows 
the highest earning women to make wage gains relative to lower earning women while left 
government helps the lowest earning women to make wage gains relative to higher earning 
women.  Third, only one factor – education – is found to impact female and male wage 
inequality in opposite directions.  The proportion of males with a tertiary education is found 
to increase the wage ratios including the highest earning men (i.e., the male 90/10 and 
90/50 wage ratios); while a rise in the proportion of females with a tertiary education is 
found to decrease wage inequality among the lower half of the wage distribution.  Finally, 
none of the substantive effects of these other socio-economic and political factors match 
the magnitude of the statistically significant union effects provided in Figure 8.  While a 
one standard deviation shift in gender-specific union density often impacts a particular 
wage ratio by more than one standard deviation, the impact of a one standard deviation 
shift in left government in Model 11 – the next largest effect outside of those for the gender-
specific union density variables – is less than three-fourths of a standard deviation.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Does female union strength reduce female wage inequality to the same extent that 
male union strength reduces male wage inequality?  In an effort to answer this question, I 
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focused attention on differences in the occupational composition of female and male union 
members - a condition that is itself determined by market institution and welfare state 
design.  I began by providing descriptive statistics demonstrating that male union strength 
has experienced a sharper and steadier decline than female union strength.  I then outlined 
the three processes by which unions have been argued to impact wage inequality, which I 
labeled the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms; and considered how 
differences in the occupational composition of union members is likely to influence the 
intra-union mechanism and thus also the union effect on wage inequality more broadly.  
EVS survey data informed us that the occupational composition of female and male union 
members differs within and (especially) across market institution and welfare state 
regimes.  A series of single-equation time-series cross-sectional error-correction models 
and seemingly unrelated regression models covering 15 countries between 1980 and 2010 
provided evidence that the union effect on female wage inequality is less widespread than 
the union effect on male wage inequality in LMEs, the regime in which workers in 
professional occupations are particularly well represented among female union members; 
while the union effect on female wage inequality is more substantial than the union effect 
on male wage inequality in CMEs with conservative welfare states, the regime in which 
workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations are particularly well represented among 
female union members.  Nonetheless, both female and male union effects were generally 
more widespread and substantial in CMEs with conservative welfare states than in either 
LMEs or CMEs with social democratic welfare states. 
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The findings in this article have several implications for the broader gender and 
economic inequality literature.  First, the popular perception of unions as organizations 
dedicated to the protection of working class male “insiders” at the expense of vulnerable 
female “outsiders” (Rueda 2005, 2007) has become antiquated.  In a number of LMEs and 
CMEs with social democratic welfare states, female union density is now greater than male 
union density and female union members now outnumber male union members; and in at 
least four LMEs - Canada, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States - female 
workers in professional occupations are better represented among union members and/or 
more highly unionized than male workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations.  Future 
research might examine how such changes in the gender and occupational composition of 
national union movements has impacted internal and external labor politics and the 
perception of unions among the wider citizenry.   
Second, before we can determine whether declining union strength is contributing 
to a rise in aggregate economic inequality or a reduction in gender economic inequality, 
we have to first consider whether (de)unionization trends vary across different types of 
union workers; and whether certain types of union workers impact wage inequality more 
or less than others.  The evidence provided here suggests that a focus on declining 
unionization in general conceals a disproportionate decline in male union strength and a 
corresponding (and radical) shift in union composition; and that the extent to which these 
trends matter for aggregate economic inequality and gender economic inequality depends 
on the market institution and welfare state regime that such changes are occurring within.  
Furthermore, the finding that unions reduce female and male wage inequality more when 
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they represent many workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations suggests that trends 
in the occupational composition of female and male union members can inform us of 
developments in the union effect on female wage inequality, male wage inequality, and 
gender economic inequality.  While recent evidence indicates that the overall union effect 
on wage inequality is diminishing as a result of unions representing fewer low-skilled 
workers (Han and Castater 2014), future work could be done to determine whether these 
occupational changes are disproportionately found among women or men; and if so, what 
impact this has on the female and male wage distributions as well as the gender wage gap. 
Third, the evidence here strongly suggests that institutional, political, and supply 
and demand factors do not impact the wages and wage distributions of women and men in 
identical ways.  In particular, unemployment was found to increase female wage inequality 
in the short-term but male wage inequality over the long-term, international trade and 
immigration were found to impact the upper part of the female wage distribution but (also) 
the lower part of the male wage distribution, GDP per capita and left government were 
found to impact the female wage distribution but not the male wage distribution, and the 
proportion of individuals (women or men, respectively) with a tertiary education was found 
to decrease female wage inequality but increase male wage inequality.  Such distinctive 
ways for factors to impact female and male wage inequality likely account for the 
negligible positive correlation between the (year over year) change in the like female and 
male wage ratios observed in Figure 1 – and implore scholars to more seriously consider 
gender when examining the determinants of aggregate economic inequality in the wealthy 
democracies.     
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Before concluding, it is important to note three clear shortcomings of this analysis. 
First, the focus here has been somewhat narrowly concentrated on one indirect way in 
which gender influences the union effect on wage inequality – through the vertical gender 
occupational segregation of union members.  Yet there are other ways that gender may 
impact the union effect as well, such as indirectly through the horizontal gender 
occupational segregation of union members (e.g., female-dominated public sector unions 
versus male-dominated private sector unions) or directly through differences in the 
preferences of female and male union members even after controlling for occupation.  
Additional work could and should be done to determine whether such factors influence the 
union effect on female and male wage inequality as much or more than the vertical gender 
occupational segregation of union members considered here.  Second, this article posits a 
causal relationship flowing from market institution and welfare state design to union 
composition to female and male wage inequality.  However, the measure used to 
empirically assess this relationship – a simple dummy variable noting the presence or lack 
thereof of a particular market institution or welfare state regime – is rather crude.  This 
measure was chosen out of practical necessity, as there is a dearth of data on the 
occupational composition of union members in general and female and male union 
members in particular.  Nonetheless, the use of this measure precluded identification of 
any intra-regime or over-time variation in female and male union composition and thus 
also the union effect on female and male wage inequality – variation that recent work on 
the skill composition of union members suggests almost surely exists.  Finally, this article 
has focused primarily on the gender-specific union effect on female and male wage 
 140 
 
inequality.  The other factors considered in this analysis – particularly those found to have 
a statistically significant effect on the female and/or male wage distributions – deserve 
additional attention.  In general, further investigation is needed into why certain factors 
impact female wage inequality in one way but male wage inequality in another way (or not 
at all).  Of particular interest to scholars of comparative political economy may be the 
finding that the partisan composition of government matters for the female wage 
distribution but not the male wage distribution. Future research could consider whether the 
left government effect on female wage inequality is driven by governments explicitly 
targeting working poor women, which policies act to compress (exacerbate) the female 
wage distribution but not the male wage distribution, and if this partisan effect is 
conditional on particular socio-economic and political institutions – including labor unions 
with a large and growing female presence.    
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
Empirical and Theoretical Contributions 
 
Previous research on the determinants of economic inequality in the wealthy 
democracies found that differences in the size and constitution of labor unions accounted 
for much of the cross-national and over time variation in economic inequality.  Despite 
numerous theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose the contrary, most of this research 
assumed the union effect on economic inequality to be independent of the particular socio-
economic and political environment unions were situated within and the types of workers 
actually unionized.  The broad purpose of this dissertation has been to push back against 
these assumptions and examine whether the union effect on economic inequality is 
conditioned by certain factors external and internal to unions.  The evidence presented 
suggests that unions are able to impact economic inequality the most when unionization is 
relatively high or relatively moderate and accompanied by a left leaning government 
(chapter 2);111 a country is minimally exposed to the global economy and unions primarily 
represent workers in occupations most vulnerable to market competition (chapter 3); and 
                                            
111 The analysis in Chapter 2 focused on how unions impact income inequality through the political 
mechanism, or by conditioning the partisan effect on income inequality.  However, the symmetry of 
interaction (Berry et al. 2012) informs us that if unions condition the partisan effect on income inequality 
then this necessarily implies that partisan governments condition the union effect on income inequality as 
well (through some combination of the employer, intra-union, and insider mechanisms).  This may be done, 
for example, through government intervention in the collective bargaining process (e.g., see Thelen 1993 and 
Jacobs and Myers 2014) or through the formation and completion of social pacts (e.g., see Baccaro and Lim 
2007 and Avdagic et al. 2011).   
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unions represent many workers in traditionally lower-paid occupations but few workers in 
professional occupations (chapter 4). 
Although nearly all scholars of comparative political economy acknowledge that 
unions matter for economic inequality, few recognize the multitude of ways that unions 
come to matter.  For example, scholars in the power resource theory tradition emphasize 
how unions allow workers to extract more generous compensation from employers and 
help in the election of left leaning governments but neglect internal union conflicts over 
compensation and negative externalities arising from collective bargaining; while those in 
the varieties of capitalism tradition emphasize distributional conflicts between private and 
public sector union members, blue and white collar union members, or less and more 
skilled union members, but neglect the important role unions play in furthering the interests 
of all of these types of workers relative to their employers, supporting class-based political 
parties, and generating positive outcomes for many non-union members.  A major aim of 
this dissertation has been to recognize and delve more deeply into the different ways that 
unions impact economic inequality.  To further this goal, I identified the four primary 
processes by which unions impact economic inequality, which I labeled the employer, 
intra-union, insider, and political mechanisms.  Unions influence the wages and benefits 
provided by union employers (the “employer mechanism”); the wages and benefits 
provided to different types of union workers (the “intra-union mechanism”); the 
employment opportunities, wages, and benefits offered to different types of non-union 
members (the “insider mechanism”); and the types of policies governments implement (the 
“political mechanism”).  It needs to be emphasized that we cannot understand the totality 
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of the union effect on economic inequality - or on any other socio-economic outcome - 
without considering each of these four mechanisms, the many and varied ways that they 
are expressed, and how they interact within particular contexts.   
Omissions and Suggestions 
 
In an effort to achieve analytical precision and theoretical clarity, every research 
project must necessarily omit a number of factors relevant to the subject matter under 
consideration; and this dissertation is no exception.  In this section, I will discuss two of 
the most important – and interesting – omissions from the previous chapters and provide 
suggestions for how to incorporate these factors into future research on labor unions and 
economic inequality.  First, the focus throughout this dissertation has been on different 
aspects of unions: the breadth of their membership, their preferences, their internal 
conflicts, the types of workers they represent, and so on.   Little attention, however, has 
been given to other interest groups operating within the same economic and political 
system and how unions impact, and are impacted by, these interest groups.  One 
particularly notable omission is employer organizations.  As mentioned several times 
above, one of the primary measures of union strength in the economic inequality literature 
is the level of wage bargaining, or whether unions negotiate with employers primarily at 
the firm, sectoral, or national level.  It is assumed that union organizations that bargain at 
a “higher” level – i.e., negotiate on behalf of a larger share of the workforce – are stronger 
than those that do not, as the “encompassing” nature of these organizations implies a 
relatively cohesive and coherent workers’ movement (e.g., see Craypo 1986).  Yet such an 
encompassing union organization would be incapable of negotiating on behalf of so many 
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workers if a similarly encompassing employers’ organization was not present.  Thus, at 
least some of the outcomes attributed to unions in this dissertation must also, necessarily, 
be the result of employers’ organizations as well.  Furthermore, evidence that employers’ 
organizations initially formed in response to the rise in working class organizations (Martin 
and Swank 2011), that dysfunction within employers’ organizations ultimately weakens 
unions (Thelen and van Wijnbergen 2003), and that the revealed preferences of employer 
organizations are at least partly the result of union strength (Thelen 2001; Paster 2013), 
suggest a symbiotic relationship between employers’ organizations and unions that 
deserves much greater attention than that which was received here.   
Given the apparent interdependent nature of unions and employer organizations, it 
is probably inappropriate to speak of independent “union effects” and “employer 
organization effects” on economic inequality (as is done, for example, by Martin and 
Swank 2012).  On the other hand, conflict between unions and employers’ organizations 
over employment, compensation, and public policy recommend against treating these two 
groups as analytical equals – as a measure such as the level of wage bargaining implicitly 
does.  Rather, one might instead consider the “structure” of wage bargaining institutions – 
or how union/employer organization relations are constituted – to determine whether 
particular configurations exist that provide a relative advantage or benefit to one or the 
other of these (broadly conceived) economic actors.  For example, it may be the case that 
a highly centralized employer organization facilitates the provision of generous social 
insurance policies when accompanied by an equally centralized union organization but not 
otherwise; or institutionally fragmented unions are able to achieve substantial wage 
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concessions from their employers when employer organizations are equally fragmented, 
but not when employer organizations are highly centralized and thus able to formulate a 
collective response to union demands. If the configuration of union-employer relations 
does matter for socio-economic and political outcomes, then we would still be able to speak 
of union effects and employer organization effects, but not without considering the relative 
strength of both unions and employers’ organizations.  
Second, following most of the literature on the causes and consequences of 
economic inequality, each of the core chapters in this dissertation focused exclusively on 
one of two types of economic inequality; income inequality or wage inequality.  However, 
this has meant that other types of economic inequality have been neglected; most notably 
wealth inequality (e.g., see Jantti et al. 2013; Sierminska et al. 2013; Fredriksen 2014) and 
conceptions of economic inequality that incorporate consumption and/or unpaid non-
market work (e.g., see Folbre et al. 2013).  While income and wage inequality are highly 
and positively correlated across the wealthy democracies (Hoeller et al. 2014), this is not 
necessarily the case with income and wage inequality on the one hand and these additional 
types of economic inequality on the other.  For example, Fredriksen (2014) finds that 
Sweden – often the most equal country in terms of income and wage inequality – has, along 
with the United States, the highest level of wealth inequality among the 11 wealthy 
democracies she examines; and Folbre et al. (2013) find that if we consider the value of 
unpaid work, household market income inequality rises as women enter the paid 
workforce, suggesting that countries with relatively low female labor force participation 
(e.g., CMEs with conservative welfare states) have less economic inequality relative to 
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countries with more female labor force participation (e.g., LMEs and CMEs with social 
democratic welfare states) than typically acknowledged.  Such evidence informs us that 
theories used to explain variation in wage and income inequality are probably not as helpful 
in explaining variation in other types of economic inequality; and, therefore, much 
theorizing still needs to be done on how unions influence economic inequality more 
broadly understood.  In terms of wealth inequality, we should consider whether unions, by 
successfully improving their members’ working conditions and the generosity of publically 
provided social insurance policies, sometimes disincentivize the accumulation of private 
wealth (Esping-Andersen 2009).  In terms of incorporating consumption and/or unpaid 
non-market work into our analyses of economic inequality, we need to more seriously 
consider factors at the household (rather than just the individual) level.  This is particularly 
the case in models of income inequality, a phenomenon that tends to be measured at the 
household level.  Two of the more obvious factors that deserve consideration are the 
proportion of households with multiple wage earners and the number of dependents, on 
average, living within each household (Esping-Andersen 2007, 2009).112  Including such 
factors into our analysis will help us better understand how economic inequality is 
impacted by the decline in marriage, lower birthrates, children remaining in their parents’ 
household well into adulthood, and middle-aged adults assuming caring responsibilities for 
their elderly parents (Adserà 2004; Giuliano 2007; Isengard and Szydlik 2012). 
                                            
112 While most of the comparative politics literature on the determinants of income inequality neglects such 
household level factors, this is not universally the case.  For example, Bradley et al. (2003) model “single-
mother families”, or the percentage of households with children under 18 that have a female head of 
household – and find it to be significantly and positively associated with pre-tax and pre-transfer (household) 
income inequality. 
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Avenues for Future Research 
 
In the conclusion of each of the three core chapters of the dissertation I proposed 
several potentially promising avenues for future research.  Many of these proposals focused 
on unions as a cause; fewer focused on unions as an effect.  It is the latter of which I will 
expand further on here.   
Given widespread scholarly agreement that unions matter for a host of socio-
economic and political outcomes, it is surprising how little attention has been given in the 
comparative political economy literature to understanding variation in the macro and micro 
level characteristics of unions.  While a number of scholars have sought to explain cross-
national and over time variation in aggregate unionization and wage bargaining 
centralization (e.g., see Western 1997; Lee 2005; Dreher and Gaston 2007; and Ahlquist 
2010), much less work has been done on explaining variation in other important union 
characteristics, such as union composition and union preferences.113 
As has been discussed throughout this dissertation, union composition has changed 
substantially in the wealthy democracies over the last several decades, as unions 
increasingly represent workers in the public sector, the service sector, higher-earning 
occupations, and women.  An intriguing research agenda would be to explore the factors 
driving these changes in union composition.  For example, we might ask whether those 
socio-economic factors most frequently cited as contributing to aggregate union decline – 
such as economic globalization and deindustrialization – may more properly be said to 
contribute to private sector union decline; while a different set of factors – such as those 
                                            
113 Two notable and recent exceptions are Ahlquist and Levi (2013) and Ahlquist et al. (2014). 
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relating to public opinion, partisanship, and political globalization – are more relevant in 
explaining public sector union decline, persistence, or even growth.  We could also ask 
whether certain cultural factors are diminishing the attractiveness of unions for workers in 
lower earning occupations; or whether unions are more attractive to women than men 
because of particular fringe benefits that unions provide.   
If we conceptualize unions as unitary actors and hold much of their environment 
constant, such changes in union composition are almost certain to have consequences for 
the preferences and behavior of unions.  Yet unions, of course, are made up of individual 
members and are situated in very different environmental contexts both across countries 
and over time.  Do different environmental conditions - such as those relating to 
unionization, collective bargaining centralization, the public sector, immigration from the 
Global South, and economic inequality – affect the attitudes of particular types of union 
members in different ways?  If so, then it may well tell us something about what is 
happening to worker solidarity across the wealthy democracies, help explain the shifting 
political landscapes we are witnessing across much of Europe, and provide us with some 
firmer micro-foundations for our theories on the (conditional) effect of unions on a number 
of macro-level outcomes.   
Real World Implications and Concluding Remarks 
 
The introduction of this dissertation referenced some of the large body of literature 
establishing a causal link between higher levels of economic inequality and outcomes 
widely perceived of as negative in the contemporary world.  The findings reported above 
suggest that unions are becoming less and less able – and perhaps less and less willing - to 
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mitigate those undesirable outcomes associated with economic inequality.  Unionization is 
declining across nearly all wealthy democracies, diminishing the political influence of 
unions; influence that has traditionally been used to elect politicians sympathetic to a 
redistributive agenda or to pressure politicians unsympathetic to that agenda to implement 
it anyway or face the electoral consequences.  Economic globalization is expanding 
unabated, strengthening the bargaining power of employers relative to union and non-union 
workers alike, particularly those in low to moderate paying occupations exposed to 
international competition – some of the individuals most in need of the wage and non-wage 
benefits that union membership has historically provided.  Unionization is declining most 
rapidly among private sector workers and those in low to moderate paying occupations – 
the individuals who have in the past most benefited from union membership and thus are 
substantially responsible for the long-standing association between union strength and 
economic inequality.  
Yet while union strength is diminishing and unions ability and/or willingness to 
reduce economic inequality is waning, that traditional redistributive union agenda appears 
to be gaining steam – apparently and ironically because of the rise in economic inequality 
that a weakening union movement has helped to bring about.  There is evidence that as the 
wealthy gain relative to the working and middle classes, the latter increasingly join with 
the poor in a political coalition in favor of government action to reduce economic 
inequalities (Lupu and Pontusson 2011); and that in response, left parties often engage in 
such government action (Pontusson and Rueda 2010).  Furthermore, growing movements 
for higher minimum wages across the United States (substantially organized by a flagging 
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union movement), the introduction of a minimum wage in Germany by a center-right 
government, an increase in the minimum wage in the United Kingdom by a center-right 
government, and the electoral success of formerly peripheral populist parties throughout 
Europe suggest that there is growing recognition of, and substantial dissatisfaction with, 
rising economic inequality and a widespread desire to counteract it.  Whether such 
movements can be sustained or will be enough to negate or overwhelm the growing 
political power of domestic and international capital - and the deregulation, tax reforms, 
and public spending reductions that it often desires - remains to be seen.  Nonetheless, if 
economic inequality and its concomitant dissatisfaction continue to grow, it may, in a 
further irony, ultimately increase demand for the formation or strengthening of 
organizations dedicated to resisting it – something, it would seem, like labor unions.  
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APPENDIX 
Welfare Regime is measured with two dummy variables, one for conservative regimes and 
the other for liberal regimes, with the baseline category represented by the social 
democratic regimes.  The conservative regimes are Austria, Belgium, France, and Italy; the 
liberal regimes are Canada and the United States; and the social democratic regimes are 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. These 9 countries were chosen and coded based on a 
comprehensive review of the welfare state literature provided by Arts and Gelissen (2002).    
The Level of Wage Bargaining is measured with an ordered categorical variable, where 
higher values indicate a more centralized wage bargaining system. The variable is coded 
as follows: 1 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the local or company level; 2 = 
bargaining is intermediate or alternating between sector and company bargaining; 3 = 
bargaining predominantly takes place at the sector or industry level; 4 = bargaining is 
intermediate or alternating between central and industry bargaining; and 5 = bargaining 
predominantly takes place at central or the cross-industry level and there are centrally 
determined binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements negotiated at lower 
levels.  Data is from the Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage 
Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2011.    
National wealth is measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) 
and is in 2005 constant U.S. dollars. The data is from the Penn World Table (v.7.1).   
Unemployment is measured as the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed.  
Data is from the Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).   
Service Sector Employment is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is 
employed in the service sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture).  Data is from the 
Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).   
Social Spending is measured as social assistance grants and welfare benefits paid by the 
general government as a percentage of GDP.  Data is from the Comparative Politics Dataset 
I (Armingeon et al. 2013).   
Female Labor Force Participation is measured as the proportion of the total labor force 
that is female.  Data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).  
International trade is measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP.  Data is 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).   
Capital Openness is measured with the Chinn-Ito index, which is based on the binary 
dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions reported by the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).  Higher values signify greater capital 
account openness.  Data is from Chinn and Ito (2008).   
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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is measured as outward FDI flows as a percentage of 
GDP.  Data is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD).   
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APPENDIX A:  DATA 
National Wealth (GDP per capita):  One the one hand, greater national wealth may reduce 
wage inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and 
generating tax revenue necessary to sustain costly egalitarian policies (Nielson and 
Alderson 1995; Martin and Swank 2012).  On the other hand, economic growth in the 
wealthy democracies has become increasingly associated with investment in, and 
production of, technologies that require greater skills to utilize and that make previous jobs 
requiring less skills redundant (Koske et al. 2014).  Since the aggregate result of these two 
contrary rationales is unknown, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that a 
rise in national wealth (GDP per capita) will have on wage inequality.  National wealth is 
measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and is in 2005 
constant U.S. dollars (in thousands). Data is from the Penn World Table (version 7.1).   
 
Private service sector employment:  The private service sector is frequently characterized 
as containing jobs that are bifurcated into those that require high skills and provide 
generous compensation (e.g., physicians and lawyers) and those that require little skill and 
provide meager compensation (e.g., retail store clerks and dishwashers) (Alderson and 
Nielson 2002).  Given that this implies increased demand for workers both at the high and 
low end of the wage distribution, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that 
a rise in private service sector employment will have on wage inequality. Private service 
sector employment is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is employed 
in the service sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture) minus the proportion of total 
employment in the public sector.  The variable is constructed by the author from data in 
the Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013) and the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic Outlook.   
 
Public Sector Employment:  The relatively compressed nature of the public sector wage 
distribution relative to the private sector wage distribution implies that an “intra-public 
sector mechanism” may be present (Pontusson et al. 2002).  However, the existence of a 
wage premium for at least some public sector workers and/or public sector spillover effects 
imply a public sector insider mechanism as well.  Previous work suggests that the aggregate 
effect of these mechanisms is to reduce wage inequality (Rueda 2008).  Therefore, a rise 
in public sector employment is anticipated to decrease wage inequality.  Public sector 
employment is measured as public employment as a share of total employment.  Data is 
from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic 
Outlook. 
 
Unemployment:  The highly substitutable nature of less skilled workers makes them more 
vulnerable to unemployment than highly skilled workers (Hall and Franzese 1998).  A 
surplus supply of idle workers with less skills should reduce the bargaining power of these 
workers and thus increase wage inequality (Korpi 2002).  However, if the unemployed 
consist of a disproportionate number of less skilled workers, then wage earners (i.e., 
individuals in employment) must consist of a disproportionate number of more skilled 
workers, which suggests less wage inequality.  Since the aggregate result of these two 
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contrary rationales cannot be determined a priori, there is no strong expectation regarding 
the impact that a rise in unemployment will have on wage inequality.   Unemployment is 
measured as the percentage of the civilian labor force that is unemployed.  Data is from the 
Comparative Politics Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).   
 
Female Labor Force Participation:  All wealthy democracies exhibit a gap between the 
earnings of men (who are paid more) and women (who are paid less).  There are numerous 
explanations for this gap, including gender discrimination, differing skill levels, gender 
occupational segregation, and hours worked (Blau and Kahn 1992; Pontusson et al. 2002; 
Magnussen 2009; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2011).  While an increase in the supply of 
women workers might reduce gender discrimination in the long-term, in the short- to 
medium-term it implies greater competition for jobs requiring less skills and/or that are 
dominated by women, as well as greater variation in hours worked. Therefore, a rise in 
female labor force participation is anticipated to increase wage inequality.  Female labor 
force participation is measured as the proportion of the total labor force that is female.  Data 
is from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
 
Education:  As the supply of more educated labor grows, the wage premium attached to 
that education should decline (Alderson and Doran 2013).  Since earnings and education 
tend to be positively correlated, a rise in the proportion of individuals with secondary 
education is anticipated to decrease wage inequality.  Education is measured as the 
proportion of individuals fifteen years of age and older who completed their secondary 
education. Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years.  Data is from Barro 
and Lee (2013).   
 
Immigration:  Growth in immigration in wealthy democracies implies both an increase in 
the supply of less skilled labor (e.g., certain types of manual laborers and customer service 
representatives) and higher skilled labor (e.g., scientists and information technology 
professionals) (Card 2001; Mahroum 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).  Since the 
aggregate result of these two contrary forces is unknown, there is no strong expectation 
regarding the impact that a rise in immigration will have on female and male wage 
inequality.  Immigration is measured as proportion of the population that is foreign born. 
Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years.  Data is from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).   
 
Left government:  The expectation that government partisanship should matter for wage 
inequality arises somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political party typology, 
whereby left parties are defined as those most strongly favoring government action to 
reduce economic inequalities (Lijphart 1997).  Therefore, an increase in left party 
participation in government is anticipated to decrease wage inequality. Left government 
is measured as left party legislative seats as a proportion of all legislative seats.  Data is 
from the Comparative Political Parties Dataset: Electoral, Legislative, and Government 
Strength of Political Parties by Ideological Group in 21 Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2011 
(Swank 2013). 
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APPENDIX B:  FULL RESULTS (TABLE 2) 
 
Model 
1                                    
(Full) 
2                 
(Full) 
3            
(Reduced) 
4                    
(Reduced) 
5                            
(Reduced) 
6               
(Reduced) 
Years 
1980-
1994 
1995-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
Countries 
Groups 
1&2†                        
Groups 
1&2†                         
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.139*** -0.060* -0.027** -0.100*** -0.068*** -0.268** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.029) (0.019) (0.096) 
Δ Union Density (t) 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003* 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Union Density (t-1) -0.004** 0.000 -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.002*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.007 -0.001         
  (0.001) (0.007)         
Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1) -0.007 0.008         
  (0.008) (0.007)         
Δ EG Index 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EG Index (t-1) 0.002 -0.004** -0.002** -0.001 -0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X EG Index (t-1)     0.000** 0.000* 0.000*** -0.000** 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Capital Openness (t) -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 0.006 -0.005 0.001 
  (0.029) (0.038) (0.040) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) 
Capital Openness (t-1) 0.001 0.009 -0.030*** -0.003 -0.008* -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1)     0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.003 -0.003 -0.002       
  (0.018) (0.008) (0.006)       
GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1) -0.013** 0.009*         
  (0.004) (0.004)         
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APPENDIX B.  Continued. 
Model 
1                                    
(Full) 
2                 
(Full) 
3            
(Reduced) 
4                    
(Reduced) 
5                            
(Reduced) 
6               
(Reduced) 
Years 
1980-
1994 
1995-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
1980-
2010 
Countries 
Groups 
1&2†                        
Groups 
1&2†                         
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Groups 
1&2†                      
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 
Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
Δ Private Service Sector Employment (t) -0.004 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.001     
  (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)     
Private Service Sector Employment (t-1) -0.000 -0.002* -0.001** -0.001**     
  (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)     
Δ Public Sector Employment (t) 0.009 -0.032**   -0.003     
  (0.009) (0.012)   (0.004)     
Public Sector Employment (t-1) 0.001 0.002   -0.001*     
  (0.003) (0.003)   (0.001)     
Δ Unemployment (t) -0.013* 0.005   0.005* -0.004** 0.004** 
  (0.017) (0.009)   (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Unemployment (t-1) -0.003 0.005         
  (0.002) (0.005)         
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t) -0.028 0.037* -0.010 -0.012 0.006 -0.013** 
  (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) 
Female Labor Force Participation (t-1) 0.005 0.011*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Δ Education (t) -0.004 0.045*** 0.018 0.000 0.005** -0.001 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.010) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Education (t-1)  -0.000 -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Immigration (t) 0.296*** 0.146** 0.065** -0.016 0.041*** -0.063*** 
  (0.053) (0.061) (0.021) (0.018) (0.011) (0.015) 
Immigration (t-1) 0.006** 0.010*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.003*** -0.003*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Left Govt. (t) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001   -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.001***   -0.001*** 0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X Union Density (t-1)       0.000***   0.000* 
        (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0.803*** 0.275*** 0.131* 0.274** 0.145** 0.196* 
N 106 128 234 234 234 234 
R2 0.361 0.248 0.133 0.120 0.163 0.217 
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APPENDIX C:  FULL RESULTS (TABLE 3) 
Model 
7                     
(Reduced) 
8                   
(Reduced) 
9                           
(Reduced) 
10                     
(Reduced) 
Years 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 
Countries Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3                                Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3 
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
90/10 Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.040** -0.042*** -0.079*** -0.165*** 
  (0.014) (0.009) (0.025) (0.048) 
Δ Union Density (t) 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
Union Density (t-1) -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.002*** -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ EG Index 0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EG Index (t-1) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union Density X EG Index (t-1) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Capital Openness (t) -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.005 
  (0.039) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) 
Capital Openness (t-1) -0.018 -0.012** 0.001 -0.013 
  (0.020) (0.004) (0.011) (0.008) 
Union Density X Capital Openness (t-1) 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) -0.002       
  (0.004)       
Δ Unemployment (t)   0.003** -0.002 0.003** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
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APPENDIX C.  Continued. 
Model 
7                     
(Reduced) 
8                   
(Reduced) 
9                           
(Reduced) 
10                     
(Reduced) 
Years 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 1980-2010 
Countries Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3                                Groups 1,2,&3 Groups 1,2,&3 
Dependent Variable 
Δ 90/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 90/50 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ 50/10 Wage 
Ratio 
Δ "skew" 
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t) 0.026 -0.004 0.018* -0.015** 
  (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) 
Female Labor Force Participation (t-1) 0.007*** -0.000 0.003** -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Education (t) 0.004 -0.004 0.003* -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Education (t-1)  -0.001 -0.000* -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Immigration (t) -0.022 0.007 -0.013 0.011 
  (0.074) (0.007) (0.042) (0.026) 
Immigration (t-1) 0.003 0.000 0.002* -0.001 
  (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Left Govt. (t) -0.001   -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001)   (0.001) (0.000) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.001**   -0.001** 0.000 
  (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Union Density X Union Density (t-1)   0.000***   0.000** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) 
Constant 0.025 0.182*** 0.113** 0.210** 
N 294 294 294 294 
R2 0.078 0.065 0.120 0.135 
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APPENDIX D:  FEMALE AND MALE WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
  
90/10 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
90/50 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
50/10 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
Country           
(Years) 
Mean % Change Mean % Change Mean % Change 
Australia 
(1975-2010) 
2.61 22.30 1.61 21.00 1.62 1.13 
Austria        
(2004-2010) 
3.23 3.82 1.83 2.94 1.76 1.26 
Belgium             
(1999-2010) 
2.25 2.20 1.63 3.24 1.38 -1.01 
Canada     
(1997-2010) 
3.54 5.76 1.86 5.38 1.90 0.32 
Denmark          
(1996-2010) 
2.37 15.67 1.54 3.62 1.54 11.64 
Finland          
(1977-2010) 
2.10 1.45 1.54 8.05 1.36 -6.15 
France       
(1995-2010) 
2.59 0.12 1.82 4.41 1.43 -4.09 
Germany          
(1992-2010) 
2.91 4.29 1.64 -0.41 1.77 4.72 
Ireland           
(1994-2010) 
3.38 -2.18 1.94 2.47 1.74 -4.54 
Italy            
(1986-2010) 
2.16 4.29 1.42 6.99 1.52 -2.50 
Japan        
(1975-2010) 
2.29 -2.59 1.59 -0.74 1.44 -1.92 
Netherlands 
(2002-2010) 
2.76 2.10 1.76 2.12 1.57 0.00 
New            
Zealand (1984-
2010) 
2.35 24.52 1.55 18.30 1.52 5.24 
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APPENDIX D.  Continued. 
 
  
90/10 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
90/50 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
50/10 Ratio 
(Women) 
  
Country           
(Years) 
Mean % Change Mean % Change Mean % Change 
Norway       
(1997-2010) 
1.85 17.41 1.31 4.89 1.41 11.93 
Sweden              
(1975-2010) 
1.84 6.38 1.41 9.40 1.30 -2.72 
Switzerland 
(1996-2010) 
2.31 18.57 1.64 14.80 1.41 3.33 
United 
Kingdom               
(1970-2010) 
2.90 15.27 1.77 8.99 1.63 5.75 
United States     
(1973-2010) 
3.69 50.92 1.99 29.23 1.85 16.79 
Average 2.62 10.57 1.66 8.04 1.56 2.18 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.56 13.18 0.19 7.99 0.18 6.25 
 
 
  
90/10 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
90/50 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
50/10 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
Country           
(Years) 
Mean % Change Mean % Change Mean % Change 
Australia 
(1975-2010) 
2.97 49.70 1.79 24.00 1.66 20.70 
Austria        
(2004-2010) 
3.10 6.57 1.97 1.54 1.57 4.94 
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APPENDIX D.  Continued. 
 
  
90/10 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
90/50 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
50/10 Ratio 
(Men) 
  
Country           
(Years) 
Mean % Change Mean % Change Mean % Change 
Belgium             
(1999-2010) 
2.36 1.66 1.74 1.67 1.36 0.00 
Canada     
(1997-2010) 
3.52 3.50 1.78 9.78 1.98 -5.74 
Denmark          
(1996-2010) 
2.63 11.89 1.70 1.93 1.55 9.74 
Finland          
(1977-2010) 
2.53 4.19 1.71 1.72 1.48 2.40 
France       
(1995-2010) 
3.23 -6.18 2.09 -2.60 1.54 -3.71 
Germany          
(1992-2010) 
3.02 -1.25 1.78 4.32 1.70 -5.31 
Ireland           
(1994-2010) 
3.87 -6.57 2.01 2.60 1.92 -8.98 
Italy            
(1986-2010) 
2.34 6.05 1.62 4.48 1.45 1.50 
Japan        
(1975-2010) 
2.75 11.50 1.71 10.97 1.61 0.44 
Netherlands 
(2002-2010) 
2.84 3.72 1.80 1.31 1.57 2.39 
New            
Zealand (1984-
2010) 
2.70 35.68 1.71 26.25 1.57 7.48 
Norway       
(1997-2010) 
2.29 21.24 1.52 6.15 1.50 14.17 
Sweden              
(1975-2010) 
2.21 12.39 1.63 5.14 1.35 6.88 
Switzerland 
(1996-2010) 
2.50 17.54 1.77 15.97 1.41 1.28 
United 
Kingdom               
(1970-2010) 
3.16 36.44 1.79 26.31 1.76 7.97 
United States     
(1973-2010) 
4.38 51.40 2.08 25.67 2.10 20.45 
Average 2.91 14.42 1.79 9.29 1.62 4.26 
Standard 
Deviation 
0.58 17.77 0.16 9.89 0.21 8.33 
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APPENDIX E:  DATA 
 
Female union density is measured as union membership as a proportion of all female 
wage and salary earners in employment.  Linear interpolation is used to impute data for 
missing years.  Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, 
State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0. 
 
Male union density is measured as union membership as a proportion of all male wage and 
salary earners in employment.  Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing 
years.  Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State 
Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0. 
 
The Level of Wage Bargaining:  As with union density, the level of wage bargaining (the 
primary level at which unions negotiate over compensation with employers, ranging from 
the firm level to the national level) is an indicator of union strength that is often found to 
be negatively associated with wage inequality in wealthy democracies (e.g., see 
Wallerstein 1999; Pontusson et al. 2002).  Therefore, a rise in the level of wage bargaining 
is anticipated to decrease female and male wage inequality.  The level of wage bargaining 
is measured with an ordered categorical variable and is coded as follows: 1 = bargaining 
predominantly takes place at the local or company level; 2 = bargaining is intermediate or 
alternating between company and industry level; 3 = bargaining predominantly takes place 
at the industry level; 4 = bargaining is intermediate or alternating between industry and 
national level; and 5 = bargaining predominantly takes place at the national level and there 
are centrally determined binding norms or ceilings to be respected by agreements 
negotiated at lower levels.  Data is from Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, 
Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts (ICTWSS), 1960-2012, version 4.0. 
 
International Trade:  As a wealthy (“capital abundant”) country becomes more exposed to 
the world economy, workers and owners in the capital intensive sector make gains (through 
exports) while workers and owners in the labor intensive sector experience losses (through 
imports) (Stolper and Samuelson 1941; Oatley 2011).  Since workers in the capital 
intensive sector tend to be more skilled than workers in the labor intensive sector, such an 
argument implies that demand (and thus wages) will rise for the former and fall for the 
latter (Boix and Adserà 2000; Thelen and Wijnbergen 2003).  Given that men are likelier 
to be in the private manufacturing sector, which produces tangible goods for exports and 
must compete directly with imports, a rise international trade is anticipated to increase 
male wage inequality more than female wage inequality.  International trade is measured 
as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP.  Data is from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI).   
 
National Wealth (GDP per capita):  One the one hand, greater national wealth may reduce 
wage inequality by slowing population growth (and thus also the supply of labor) and 
generating tax revenue necessary to sustain costly egalitarian policies (Nielson and 
Alderson 1995; Martin and Swank 2012).  On the other hand, economic growth in the 
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wealthy democracies has become increasingly associated with investment in, and 
production of, technologies that require greater skills to utilize and that make previous jobs 
requiring less skills redundant (Koske et al. 2014).  Since the aggregate result of these two 
contrary rationales is unknown, there is no strong expectation regarding the impact that a 
rise in national wealth will have on female and male wage inequality.  National wealth is 
measured as GDP Per Capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP) and is in 2005 
constant U.S. dollars (in thousands). Data is from the Penn World Table (version 7.1).   
 
Service Sector Employment:  A larger share of jobs in the service sector implies a smaller 
share of jobs in the (male-dominated) manufacturing sector.  If men (that would have been) 
formerly employed in medium-skill manufacturing jobs disproportionately seek out low-
skill manual labor and service sector jobs, then this will increase the supply of labor at the 
low end of the wage distribution. In such a condition, a rise in service sector employment 
is anticipated to increase female and male wage inequality.  Service Sector Employment 
is measured as the proportion of the civilian workforce that is employed in the service 
sector (as opposed to industry or agriculture).  Data is from the Comparative Politics 
Dataset I (Armingeon et al. 2013).   
 
Unemployment:  The highly substitutable nature of less skilled workers makes them more 
vulnerable to unemployment than highly skilled workers (Hall and Franzese 1998).  A 
surplus supply of idle workers with less skills should reduce the bargaining power of these 
workers and thus increase wage inequality (Korpi 2002).  However, if the unemployed 
consist of a disproportionate number of less skilled workers, then wage earners (i.e., 
individuals in employment) must consist of a disproportionate number of more skilled 
workers.  Since the aggregate result of these two contrary rationales is unknown, there is 
no strong expectation regarding the impact that a rise in unemployment will have on female 
and male wage inequality.  Due to the existence of substantial gender occupational 
segregation, a rise in aggregate unemployment may conceal a disproportionate rise in 
female or male unemployment.  Unemployment is therefore measured as the proportion of 
the female labor force that is unemployed in the models of female wage inequality and as 
the proportion of the male labor force that is unemployed in the models of male wage 
inequality.  Data is from the OECD, Short-term Labour Market Statistics. 
 
Female Labor Force Participation:  In the shorter-term, a rise in female labor force 
participation implies greater competition for low-skilled service sector jobs (Svensson 
1995).  Over the longer-term, however, female labor force participation increasingly 
translates into experienced and skilled female workers, as well as more liberal gender 
norms (Pontusson et al. 2002).  Therefore, a rise in female labor force participation is 
anticipated to increase female and male wage inequality in the short-term and decrease 
female and male wage inequality in the long-term.  Female Labor Force Participation is 
measured as the proportion of the total labor force that is female.  Data is from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).  
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Education:  Skill-biased technological change and shifts in consumer preferences have 
increased the demand for, and thus also the wages of, more educated workers.  Since 
earnings and education tend to be positively correlated, this implies a rise in wage 
inequality.  However, as the supply of more educated labor grows, the wage premium 
attached to that education should decline (Autor et al. 2008; Alderson and Doran 2013).  
Therefore, a rise in the proportion of individuals with a tertiary education is anticipated to 
decrease female and male wage inequality. Since aggregate data may conceal substantial 
cross-national and particularly over-time variation in the gender profile of those with a 
higher education, education is measured as the proportion of the female population (over 
the age of 15) with a tertiary education in the models of female wage inequality and as the 
proportion of the male population (over the age of 15) with a tertiary education in the 
models of male wage inequality.  Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing 
years.  Data is from Barro and Lee (2013).   
 
Immigration:  Growth in immigration in wealthy democracies implies both an increase in 
the supply of less skilled labor (e.g., certain types of manual laborers and customer service 
representatives) and higher skilled labor (e.g., scientists and information technology 
professionals) (Card 2001; Mahroum 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).  Since the 
aggregate result of these two contrary forces is unknown, there is no strong expectation 
regarding the impact that a rise in immigration will have on female and male wage 
inequality.  Immigration is measured as proportion of the population that is foreign born. 
Linear interpolation is used to impute data for missing years.  Data is from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).   
 
Left Party Representation in Government:  The expectation that government partisanship 
matters for wage inequality arises somewhat tautologically out of the traditional political 
party typology, whereby left parties are defined as those most strongly favoring 
government action to reduce economic inequalities (Lijphart 1997)  Given the 
disproportionate number of women in the lowest paying jobs (Sainsbury 1996), 
government actions that increase earnings for workers near the bottom of the wage 
distribution (e.g., higher minimum wages or active labor market policies) provide a 
particular benefit to lower-earning women (Card et al. 2003; Soskice 2005; Orloff 2009).  
Therefore, an increase in left party participation in government is anticipated to decrease 
female wage inequality more than male wage inequality.  Left Government is measured as 
left party legislative seats as a proportion of all legislative seats.  Data is from the 
Comparative Political Parties Dataset: Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of 
Political Parties by Ideological Group in 21 Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2011 (Swank 
2013). 
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APPENDIX F:  FULL RESULTS (TABLE 2) 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Full)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Full)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.102*** -0.081*** -0.096*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)  -0.005 0.002 -0.004* -0.000 0.001 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)  -0.002 -0.003** -0.000 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
LME (Lib.) 0.055** 0.089*** 0.017** 0.024** 0.019* 0.027*** 
  (0.023) (0.026) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
CME (SD) 0.033 0.087* -0.008 0.005 0.031 0.045** 
  (0.063) (0.050) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) 
Δ Level of Wage Bargaining (t) 0.015* -0.004 0.005 -0.005 0.005 0.003 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Level of Wage Bargaining (t-1) 0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.000 -0.004 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Δ International Trade -0.003** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.000 0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
International Trade (t-1) -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.022*** 0.007 0.012*** 0.001 -0.000 0.003 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t-1) -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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APPENDIX F.  Continued. 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Full)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Full)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Full) 
Δ Service Sector Employment (t) -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Service Sector Employment (t-1) 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.026*** 0.010 0.009*** 0.004 0.005 0.002 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.002 0.007** 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t) 0.013 -0.016 0.012 -0.020 -0.006 0.009 
  (0.029) (0.033) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
Female Labor Force Participation (t-1) 0.008* 0.002 0.004** 0.002 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Δ Female (Male) Education (t) -0.008 0.012 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.003 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Female (Male) Education (t-1)  -0.001 0.008*** 0.001 0.002** -0.002** 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Immigration (t) 0.020 -0.022 -0.010 0.009 0.020 -0.024 
  (0.038) (0.043) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) 
Immigration (t-1) -0.001 -0.003** -0.001** -0.001 0.001 -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Left Govt. (t) 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.071 0.212 0.002 0.112 0.139 0.224** 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
R2 0.201 0.136 0.223 0.118 0.129 0.186 
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APPENDIX G:  FULL RESULTS (TABLE 3) 
Model 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Reduced)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Reduced)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
Wage Ratio (t-1) -0.077*** -0.095*** -0.080*** -0.107*** -0.084*** -0.103*** 
  (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t)  0.035 0.023 0.010 -0.007 0.010 0.020* 
  (0.026) (0.029) (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.010) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1)  -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002** -0.003*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
LME (Lib.) 0.018 -0.013 0.011 0.053 -0.004 -0.066** 
  (0.056) (0.081) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) (0.028) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X LME 
(Lib.) 
-0.036 -0.016 -0.010 0.009 -0.009 -0.018* 
  (0.028) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X LME 
(Lib.) 
0.001 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CME (SD) -0.234*** -0.207* -0.096*** -0.079* -0.045 -0.052 
  (0.096) (0.107) (0.037) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) X CME 
(SD) 
-0.043 -0.035 -0.015 0.001 -0.009 -0.022* 
  (0.028) (0.032) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) X CME 
(SD) 
0.005*** 0.005** 0.001** 0.001 0.002* 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Level of Wage Bargaining  -0.001 -0.001         
  (0.002) (0.001)         
Δ International Trade -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ GDP Per Capita (in thousands) (t) 0.024*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.002     
  (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004)     
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APPENDIX G.  Continued. 
Model 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Gender                                                               
(Number of Countries)                                                                                                              
Women                          
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Women                       
(15 
Countries) 
Men                            
(15 
Countries) 
Dependent Variable                                                       
(Model)                                                                                                     
90/10 
wage ratio                            
(Reduced)                          
90/10 
wage ratio                 
(Reduced)
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
90/50 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
50/10 
wage ratio                      
(Reduced) 
Δ Unemployment (t) 0.023*** 0.006 0.008*** 0.005 0.004 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Unemployment (t-1) 0.000 0.004**     0.000 0.002** 
  (0.002) (0.002)     (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Female Labor Force Participation (t) 0.027 -0.014 0.015 -0.009     
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.010) (0.012)     
Female Labor Force Participation (t-1) 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001     
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)     
Δ Female (Male) Education (t) -0.014 0.015 0.003 0.005 -0.011 0.004 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) 
Female (Male) Education (t-1)  -0.002 0.005* 0.001 0.001 -0.002** 0.002* 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Immigration (t) 0.006 0.005 -0.007 0.014 0.009 -0.011 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) 
Immigration (t-1) -0.001 -0.003** -0.001*** -0.001* 0.000 -0.001* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Δ Left Govt. (t) 0.001 0.001     0.000 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)     (0.001) (0.001) 
Left Govt. (t-1) -0.001*** -0.000     -0.001*** -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 0.248* 0.525*** 0.091 0.262** 0.229*** 0.255*** 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) LME 
(Lib.) 
-0.001 0.007 -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) LME 
(Lib.) 
-0.002** -0.003** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Δ Female (Male) Union Density (t) CME 
(SD) 
-0.008 -0.012 -0.006* -0.006 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Female (Male) Union Density (t-1) CME 
(SD) 
0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
N 225 225 225 225 225 225 
R2 0.222 0.145 0.236 0.127 0.134 0.191 
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